wundermonk
20 August 2012, 04:39 AM
Greetings all,
One interesting result in the foundation of mathematics is Godel's incompleteness theorem (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del's_incompleteness_theorems).
The theorem states that in a "sufficiently strong" (technical definition of what constitutes this is beyond the scope of this thread) axiomatic system the following are true:
(1)There are true statements which cannot be proven to be true.
(2)There are statements that can not be proven to be either true or false.
Focussing on (2) above, I find a lot of similarity between that and the Advaitin conception of "anirvacaniya" or indeterminacy of the nature of the world.
The Advaitin argument is roughly the following:
(a)It is impossible to prove that the external world exists independent of cognition - this is the Advaitin's anti-realist (anti-Nyaya) position.
(b)However, cognition and the objects of cognition do follow some causal law. This is meant to imply that the world of cognition is not a mere cognitive construct but does have some causal factors outside of cognition - this is the anti-idealist (anti Madhyamika Buddhist) position. The classical example to drive home this point is the rope-snake analogy. Why does cognition misfire when a rope is perceived as a snake? Clearly, there is a rope out there. Yet, when it is wrongly cognized as a snake, where exactly is the snake that caused this cognition? In his introduction to the Brahmasutras, Shankara explains miscognitions as due to superposition of the not-self on the self.
So, the Advaitin argues that the status of the world is anirvacaniya - indeterminable to be either existent (as the Nyaya would claim) or non-existent (as the Madhyamika Buddhist would claim). That is, the world can not be assigned any determinate ontological status.
Yet, provisionally granting/assuming the existence of the external world, we can go about discussing/debating/arguing/disagreeing about it. This is the vyavaharika level. At the paramarthika (absolute) level, only Brahman exists.
Any thoughts/comments?
One interesting result in the foundation of mathematics is Godel's incompleteness theorem (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del's_incompleteness_theorems).
The theorem states that in a "sufficiently strong" (technical definition of what constitutes this is beyond the scope of this thread) axiomatic system the following are true:
(1)There are true statements which cannot be proven to be true.
(2)There are statements that can not be proven to be either true or false.
Focussing on (2) above, I find a lot of similarity between that and the Advaitin conception of "anirvacaniya" or indeterminacy of the nature of the world.
The Advaitin argument is roughly the following:
(a)It is impossible to prove that the external world exists independent of cognition - this is the Advaitin's anti-realist (anti-Nyaya) position.
(b)However, cognition and the objects of cognition do follow some causal law. This is meant to imply that the world of cognition is not a mere cognitive construct but does have some causal factors outside of cognition - this is the anti-idealist (anti Madhyamika Buddhist) position. The classical example to drive home this point is the rope-snake analogy. Why does cognition misfire when a rope is perceived as a snake? Clearly, there is a rope out there. Yet, when it is wrongly cognized as a snake, where exactly is the snake that caused this cognition? In his introduction to the Brahmasutras, Shankara explains miscognitions as due to superposition of the not-self on the self.
So, the Advaitin argues that the status of the world is anirvacaniya - indeterminable to be either existent (as the Nyaya would claim) or non-existent (as the Madhyamika Buddhist would claim). That is, the world can not be assigned any determinate ontological status.
Yet, provisionally granting/assuming the existence of the external world, we can go about discussing/debating/arguing/disagreeing about it. This is the vyavaharika level. At the paramarthika (absolute) level, only Brahman exists.
Any thoughts/comments?