The Sidhanta -- Great or not?

[atanu]

THE GREAT SIDDHÂNTA.

This entire theory rests on a fictitious foundation of altogether hollow and vicious arguments, incapable of being stated in definite logical alternatives, and devised by men who are destitute of those particular qualities which cause individuals to be chosen by the Supreme Person revealed in the Upanishads; whose intellects are darkened by the impression of beginningless evil; and who thus have no insight into the nature of words and sentences, into the real purport conveyed by them, and into the procedure of sound argumentation, with all its methods depending on perception and the other instruments of right knowledge. The theory therefore must needs be rejected by all those who, through texts, perception and the other means of knowledge--assisted by sound reasoning--have an insight into the true nature of things.


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The above is the beginning of Shri Ramanuja's refutation of Advaita. I note that in the beginning itself, before any refutation has taken place, the Purvapakshin (i.e. Advaitin -- Shankara et al) is thrown to the beginningless evil and termed as having darkened intelects. A good beginning and the tradition is alive.

Any comments any one?


Om

[yajvan]

THE GREAT SIDDHÂNTA.

Any comments any one? Om

Ouch!

[saidevo]

Namaste Atanuji.



The above is the beginning of Shri Ramanuja's refutation of Advaita. I note that in the beginning itself, before any refutation has taken place, the Purvapakshin (i.e. Advaitin -- Shankara et al) is thrown to the beginningless evil and termed as having darkened intelects. A good beginning and the tradition is alive.


What you have pointed out above makes one wonder if Ramanuja does not sound like the Christian theologians! Anyway, here is a compilation of how the renowned Hindu scholar Prabhu Dutt Shastri refutes Ramanuja's arguments against Advaita, taken from the author's book The Doctrine of Maya. This is a rather long compilation but is worth reading as it covers all the points of objections raised by Ramanuja.

I am compiling a synopsis of the book that has very useful information Maya; I shall post it in HDF as early as possible.

From the book 'The Doctrine of Maya' by Prabhu Dutt Shastri
Tenets of Advaita

The three principal tenets of Advaita are:

a) That the only true existence is that of Brahman.
b) That Brahman is identical with the Atman.
c) That the universe is Maya, having only a phenomenal or relative existence.

Tenets of Vishishtadvaita

The Ramanujas represent the theistic school of the Vedanta. They worship Vishnu as their Brahman, in opposition to Sankara's Nirguna Brahman, and, denying that the deity is void of form or quality, regard him as endowed with all good and auspicious qualities, and with a two-fold form: the supreme spirit (Paramatma, or cause), and the gross one (the effect, the universe, or matter). Their doctrine is consequently known as Vishishtadvaita, or the doctrine of Unity with attributes.

Ramanuja himself has furnished us with a summary of his main teachings in the introduction to his Vedantadipa. He starts with what he calls the three primary and ultimate certainties known to philosophy, viz.--

1. God (Hari). Universal Soul, personal, and intelligent.
2. Soul (cit). Individual, intelligent.
3. Matter (acit). Non-intelligent.

Each of these three entities is distinct from the other: God, the Supreme Soul of the Universe, is distinct from the individual soul, which again is distinct from non-intelligent matter. This difference is intrinsic and natural. The relation between God and the universe (matter and soul) is that of cause and effect. Matter and soul form the body of God, which in its subtle condition is the universe in its causal state, and in its gross condition the created universe itself. The individual soul enters into matter, and thereby makes it live; and, similarly, God enters into matter and soul and gives them their powers and their peculiar characters. The universe without God is exactly analogous to matter without soul.

Brahman (which is identified with Hari in this system) is regarded as having svagatabheda, i.e., differences within itself in its threefold aspects referred to above. It is imagined to be like a tree, which, though one, has differences within itself in the shape of its branches, etc.

Ramanuja's Refutation of Advaita and its Validity

Ramanuja's criticism of the theory of Maya is embodied in his greatest work, The SribhASya, a commentary on BAdarAyana's Brahmasutras. His exposition of the first Sutra occupies the largest space in his treatise, and this criticism appears under the same division. Ramanuja brings seven charges against the doctrine of Maya. We reproduce the gist of each, in order, with a criticism of our own.

i. The charge of AsrayAnupapatti.

What is the Asraya (seat) of Maya (or avidyA)? Residing in what does it produce illusion? Surely not in the individual self, because the selfhood of the individual self is itself projected by avidyA; neither could it reside in Brahman, since He has the essential nature of self-luminous intelligence, and is
thus opposed to avidyA (ignorance).

Criticism.--This objection rests upon a two-fold misinterpretation. In the first place, Ramanuja starts with the idea that Maya (or avidyA) is some thing real, and consequently demands a seat for this 'illusion' or 'ignorance'. AvidyA is decidedly not a reality: it is only the negation of vidyA, or the obscuration of it. As the fire is latent in the wood, so is our godly nature, our spiritual principle, hidden by the upAdhis.

In the second place, Ramanuja makes an unwarranted differentiation between Brahman and the individual soul. In stating the position of the Advaitin he has no right to colour it with his own conceptions. We, after Sankara, do not admit such a difference between the two. Brahman becomes the individual soul only by upAdhis, i.e., self-imposed limitations of manas, ten senses, subtle body, Karma, etc. These upAdhis may figuratively be spoken of as limiting the Atman and resolving it into the two aspects of the Highest Atman (Brahman) and the individual Atman. If, therefore, we are pressed by Ramanuja to state the residence of avidyA, we may meet him by saying that it must, if at all conceived as such, reside in the upAdhis the mind (manas), the senses, etc. As a matter of fact, this demand of Ramanuja seems to be unjustifiable and inadmissible. It wholly rests upon his supposition of the reality of avidyA.

2. The Charge of TirodhAnAnupapatti.

The supposed 'ignorance' cannot, as maintained by its upholders, conceal Brahman, whose essential nature is self-luminosity. The concealment of luminosity means either (a) the obstruction of the origination of luminosity, or (b) the destruction of existing luminosity. But as it is held that the luminosity of Brahman is incapable of being a produced thing, the concealment of luminosity must mean the destruction of luminosity, which, in other words, amounts to the destruction of the essential nature of Brahman.

Criticism.--This objection is based upon Ramanuja's losing hold of the real position of the upholders of Maya. Our 'ignorance' is merely negative. It has no positive existence to be able to conceal anything else in the strict sense. Brahman is ever the same in its splendour and luminosity, but we fail to see it only through our own avidyA, which can, therefore, in no way be said to be able to conceal Brahman in the sense of destroying its luminosity. In the same way, if a follower of Ramanuja were to ask Kant, "Why do we not see the thing-in-itself (das Ding-an-sich)?" he would at once reply, "Because between that and ourselves are the intellectual forms (upddhis] of Time, Space, and Causality." Thus we are not explaining away the difficulty pointed out by Ramanuja when we say that we deny the concealment (tirodhAna) of Brahman by ignorance (avidyA).

3. The Charge of SvarUpAnupapatti.

What is the essential nature of avidyA? As long as it is a thing at all, it must either have the nature of reality or of unreality. But it is not admitted to be a reality; and it cannot be an unreality, for, as long as a real misguiding error, different from Brahman Himself, is not admitted, so long it is not possible to explain the theory of illusion. If Brahman Himself have the character of the misguiding error, then, owing to his eternity, there would be no final release to the individual self.

Here Ramanuja rightly understands the standpoint, but at once again makes a great confusion and becomes inconsistent when criticizing the theory on the basis of the assumed reality of Maya.

Criticism.--The whole difficulty is purely factitious. Certainly we do not admit the reality of Maya, but at the same time we do not hold that it is unreal from the empirical standpoint as well. Empirically it is sat (existing): the world is, but it is Maya. Ramanuja is too anxious and tactful to corner us by his dilemmas. But as a rule these dilemmas have one of the two horns already broken, since he generally starts with self-assumed premises, and draws his own inferences from them, most logically, of course.

The question as to what is the cause of Maya is, in the sense in which it is asked, an illegitimate one. Causality is the general law in the world (in Maya), but it has no warrant to transcend itself and ask, "What is the cause of Maya?" The category only applies within the phenomenal world, and at once breaks down when stretched out of it. Everything within Maya has a cause, but Maya has no cause. The same fact would be stated by Kant in the words "Causality is the universal law of the empirical world". Hence the question as to causality being meaningless in the present context, we are not obliged to answer it.

Again, when Ramanuja suggests that "as long as a real misguiding error, different from Brahman, is not admitted, so long it is not possible to explain the theory," the suggestion seems to us to convey hardly any meaning, since the moment we grant a real existence to Maya, our whole theory falls with it; a real dualism between the two realities (facing each other) will be at once created, and this will in no way afford even the slightest explanation of the theory. We wonder how Ramanuja himself would try to explain the theory even on these dualistic premises. The whole of this charge, therefore, is imaginary and futile.

4. The Charge of AnirvacanIyatvAnupapatti.

The Advaitins says that Maya is anirvacanIyA, i.e., incapable of definition, because it is neither an entity (sat) nor a non-entity (asat). To hold such a view is impossible. All cognitions relate to entities or non-entities; and if it be held that the object of a cognition has neither the positive characteristics of an entity nor the negative characteristics of a non-entity, then all things may become the objects of all cognitions.

Criticism.--This difficulty is couched in a very clever and catchy way. Yet the whole rests on a misconception, viz., the want or perceiving clearly what the "tertium comparationis" is in each case. Sat and asat sound two contradictory conceptions, and to say that a thing ("an object of cognition") is neither sat nor asat is not to say anything about it at all. But the thing is thought of in two wholly different aspects, and the tertium comparationis is not common to both.

Maya, we say, is neither sat nor asat, neither an 'entity' nor a 'non-entity.' It is not sat, since the Atman alone is real, and it is not asat, since it appears at least, or in other words, maintains itself as an iva ('as it were'). Where is the contradiction now? Does not this very fact allow us to speak of Maya as something mysterious, incapable of a strict definition ?

5. The charge of PramAnAnupapatti.

Is there any means by which this curious avidyA is brought within the range of our cognition? It can neither be proved by perception nor by inference. Neither can it be established by revelation, as the scriptural passages can be explained otherwise.

Criticism.--In the light of what we have said above this objection stands self-condemned. When we do not believe in the real existence of Maya, what logic is there in requiring us to prove the existence of it? If we had granted its reality, then indeed we could be called upon to name the source of its knowledge perception, inference, revelation, etc. However, to prove the validity of our conception we do not require any marshalled arguments or formal syllogisms. It is as clear as anything, when we recall to our mind the nature of avidyA, which, as we have shown after Sankara, is an erroneous transfer of the things and relations of the objective world to the Self in the strictest sense of the word.

Further, Ramanuja examines a few scriptural passages, and giving them another interpretation, infers that all such passages can be so explained as not to corroborate the theory of avidyA. He might draw any meaning out of the few passages he has gone into, so long as he is bent upon showing the untenableness of Maya, but there still remains a large number of passages, among which the metaphysics of Yajnavalkya occupies a prominent place, that defy all such attempts at a forced, far-fetched and perverted interpretation.

When we know that we are in reality no other than the Absolute Spirit, and that the Atman is the only reality; and yet we feel that we are different from the Absolute and that the world in which we live, move and have our being, is real, to what shall we attribute this clash between our knowledge and feelings? Is it not a mystery? And what else could we say but that this is due to our ignorance, the 'erroneous transference' spoken of above?

6. The Charge of NivartakAnupapatti.

This difficulty is in relation to the idea that the cessation of avidyA takes place solely by means of the knowledge which has the attributeless Brahman for its object. Brahman is not without attributes and qualities, since there are many passages which prove that He is possessed of these. Moreover, the grammatical equations, such as "tattvam asi" ("That art Thou"), do not denote the oneness of any attributeless thing, they are not intended to give rise to the stultification of any illusion due to avidyA; but they simply show that Brahman is capable of existing in two different modes or forms. The universe is the body of which Brahman is the soul. He is Himself all the three entities God, soul and matter. Consequently, the knowledge which has an attributeless Brahman for its object is impossible and cannot be the complete knowledge of truth; and obviously such an impossible knowledge of the oneness of the attributeless Brahman cannot be the remover of the avidyA postulated by the Advaitins.

Criticism.--The force of this objection lies mainly in the supposition that "Brahman is not without attributes," and it is further pointed out by Ramanuja that many passages of the Sruti prove this thesis. In the light of Sankara's Advaita, as briefly described in Chapter II, we fail to see the force of this argument. To say that there are some scriptural passages bearing out the assertion may equally be met by the counter-proposition that there are also passages countenancing the attributelessness of Brahman. If, then, both these assertions neutralize each other from the scriptural point of view, one may well ask, What then is the real trend and purport of the Vaidic thought? It seems to us that this question could not be better answered than by repeating the doctrine of Sankara when he attempted to synthesize the whole of the Sruti by taking a wide conspectus of its purport. All passages which speak of the qualified Brahman may be placed under aparA vidyA, while parA will include only those that expound the metaphysical truth as it is. Brahman may, from a lower standpoint, be conceived as "with attributes," but the ultimate truth remains that He is really "without attributes." Besides, the conception of the Absolute in the strict sense leaves hardly any room for "attributes." Impose any attributes and you at once make the Absolute "non-absolute," i.e., destroy his very nature by making paricchinna (limited) that which is aparicchinna (without limits).

Again, Ramanuja denies that the text, 'tat tvam asi,' denotes the oneness of the individual with the attributeless Universal, and holds that it simply brings out Brahman's capability of existing in two forms or modes. Now, this seems to us to be an ambiguous use of language. That Brahman exists in two opposite forms will be meaningless if one of the forms were not supposed to be due to avidyA. How can a being exist in two contradictory forms? Cit and acit are two opposite notions in the system of Ramanuja, but he has not succeeded in reconciling their existence by merely saying that they are two modes of the Absolute. To picture the universe as the body of Brahman is after all a mere analogy, which hardly makes the matter even a jot clearer. Even by investing God with all auspicious attributes, how will Ramanuja account for the existence of evil '(moral) or error (psychological)? Simply to say, as did Plato, that God is good, hence the universe must be good, is no explanation, but a mere shirking of the question. Like Plato, Ramanuja uses many analogies and metaphors while speaking of Brahman, but the Advaitist cannot but take all these as mere mythical representations.

Hence, with our denial of the qualified aspect of Brahman as a metaphysical truth is linked the denial of "the impossibility of the knowledge which has an attributeless Brahman for its object."

AvidyA being like darkness is itself expelled when light comes in. JnAna is the remover of ajnAna. As we have already pointed out above, the expression 'knowledge of Brahman' is strictly inadmissible, since Brahman is itself knowledge (JnAna) of course the term being used in the higher sense of 'pure consciousness.'

7. The Charge of Nivrttyanupapatti.

The removal of the Advaitin's hypothetical 'ignorance' is quite impossible. The individual soul s bondage of 'ignorance' is determined by Karma and is a concrete reality. It cannot therefore be removed by any abstract knowledge but only by divine worship and grace. Moreover, according to the Advaitins the differentiation between the knower, knowledge, and the known is unreal; and even that knowledge, which is capable of removing avidyA has to be unreal and has to stand in need of another real removing knowledge.

Criticism.--Our struggle with Karma is undoubtedly real so long as our consciousness of the true nature of Brahman has not arisen. Karma, its determinations, and with it everything else, is supposed to be real, but only so far. We have already quoted passages from Sankara where he clearly and unequivocally makes this concession, 'vyAvahArically' (i.e., from the practical or empiric point of view), as he calls it. It may therefore be called 'a concrete reality,' but with the explicit understanding that such a reality is after all 'phenomenal.' We do not hold the efficacy of Karma in the case of one who has attained the knowledge of Brahman; such a man, being free from all desires and motives, all springs of action, is pari passu beyond the control of Karma in so far as he is not creating any fresh and new Karma for himself. The laws of Karma are valid within the phenomenal, but in no way do they produce any real knowledge to the Atman, whose very nature forbids all such bondages.

The idea of divine worship and grace may be supported for the sake of the ordinary minds unable to go round the higher path of pure knowledge. But surely the idea of grace, etc., is not an exalted conception. Truly speaking, grace is only possible when there is a direct and perfect communion in other words, an 'identity' between the two forms of consciousness. This fact, too, shows that the ultimate nature of man and God is 'Consciousness.' So long as our ignorance is not cast away by the acquirement of 'knowledge' which alone is capable of ousting its opponent liberation is impossible. Without such a knowledge, mere devotion or deeds will never lead one to the same goal.

As to the differentiation between the knower (jnAtA), knowledge (jnAna),and the known (jneya), we have to repeat that the distinction is certainly fictitious in the absolute sense. It is made by us and it is real for all our practical purposes. The metaphysical truth does not attempt to devour the world in its practical aspect. The knowledge removing avidyA if we are at all to say 'removal' of avidyA is not unreal. Unreal knowledge cannot destroy unreality. Knowledge in the lower sense of a relation between 'subject' and 'object' is of course unreal, but such knowledge is unable to give a deathblow to avidyA. On the dawning of true knowledge the artificial distinction between 'subject' and 'object' vanishes. "By what shall we know the knower (the subject of all knowledge)?" as was so forcibly asked by Yajnavalkya.

Conclusion

These are in brief the seven difficulties which Ramanuja perceived in the doctrine of Maya. As will appear from what we have said above, Ramanuja's criticism rests on the whole on a misunderstanding of the genuine Advaita standpoint. All through he has been treating Maya as if it were a concrete reality, even perhaps existing in space, etc. We do not accuse him even because he attempted to reject Sankara's premises. But we fail to see his consistency, when even on his own premises he falls short of furnishing a really adequate explanation of the relation between God and the Universe. His doctrine of divine grace, devotion, etc., is apt to appeal strongly to many Christian theologians, who will therefore naturally prefer his philosophy to that of Sankara. Be as it may, to us it seems evident that Sankara's analysis of Reality went much further than Ramanuja's. The impersonal conception of the Absolute, we hold, is truly personal, if there is any real meaning in 'personality.' This is how we will meet those who cannot hold any such doctrine to be the ultimate if it destroys the idea of the divine personality.

[yajvan]

Hari Om
~~~~~



1. God (Hari). Universal Soul, personal, and intelligent.
2. Soul (cit). Individual, intelligent.
3. Matter (acit). Non-intelligent.


It is imagined to be like a tree, which, though one, has differences within itself in the shape of its branches, etc.


Namaste saidevo,

A most excellent post saidevo, thank you for your efforts and organizing power to lay this out succinctly. As you have offered much, it makes sense to perhaps view various parts for commentary and not boil the ocean on this matter.

Then notion of the tree is very attractive when discussing Brahman. As mentioned, the tree in fact has different qualities throughout... the beauty is in the sap as the metaphor ~example~ of Brahman.

The sap becomes the leafs, the bark, the branches and the root. IT - ITself remains clear and behind the expression of the tree. The tree is the expression of the sap. The universe is an expression of Brahman. Yet one can say the leaf is the sap, so is the branch, or bark, just in a different form.

Like that when we speak of the Supreme + the Individual + matter we can perhaps view it in the same light. All expressions of Supreme Consciousness. That suggest that even matter is this consciousness that is expressed in the Universe as such. This is the views of Vasistha, that all this is conciousness, subtler then prana, subtler then my favorite akasha.
That is why when the enlightened look at a rock, gold, a flower, a tree that see even-ness, the same thing,an expression of Consciousness.

So it depends on ones point of view. I respect Ramanuja's work as he brings this to bear and allows us to compare and contast his works to Adi Shankara. If one looks at it ( and I am not implying anyone on this post is suggesting so), is Ramanuja's way correct or Shankara's, then one misses the teaching.

To ponder the two views and look for the perspectives that grooms ones view to understand Reality is the benefit. This is the same blessing of the 6 classical systems of Indian Philosophy. I mention these works as classical to mean orthodox (astika) as they accept the authority of the Vedas as final. The notion of offering 6 optical views (drsti) of Reality.

They, the 6 systems, are so complete in themselves, that any one can stand on their own, yet the value is the cross-pollinization of the Truths in our minds to compare and contrast.
As one view or school may hold true for a person's experience at a particular point in time, then another view. This is the blessing offered from these schools; yet like humans we think these schools are football teams and only applaud our home team and our team (school of philosophy) is the only right one.

I look forward to your additional posts on Ramanuja..perhaps this will bring you to his nine precious gems , or Navarathnas.

pranams,

[Sudarshan]

THE GREAT SIDDHÂNTA.

This entire theory rests on a fictitious foundation of altogether hollow and vicious arguments, incapable of being stated in definite logical alternatives, and devised by men who are destitute of those particular qualities which cause individuals to be chosen by the Supreme Person revealed in the Upanishads; whose intellects are darkened by the impression of beginningless evil; and who thus have no insight into the nature of words and sentences, into the real purport conveyed by them, and into the procedure of sound argumentation, with all its methods depending on perception and the other instruments of right knowledge. The theory therefore must needs be rejected by all those who, through texts, perception and the other means of knowledge--assisted by sound reasoning--have an insight into the true nature of things.


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The above is the beginning of Shri Ramanuja's refutation of Advaita. I note that in the beginning itself, before any refutation has taken place, the Purvapakshin (i.e. Advaitin -- Shankara et al) is thrown to the beginningless evil and termed as having darkened intelects. A good beginning and the tradition is alive.

Any comments any one?


Om

Do you know what is the sanskrit equivalent of this translation? And how much the original words can be lost in an english translation?

BTW, it is not uncommon in the philosophical circles to refer to the adversaries by such titles. Even the great advaitin madhusUdana saraswathy who wrote the advaita siddhi calls Dvaitins by the word "dogs" and "wretches" in that work. So I must ask Saidevo if all advaitins really desist from such name calling - he should first read advaita works himself before calling people like Ramanuja as christian missionaries. Why, Shankara himself has claimed that all other philosophies other than his own are incorrect doctrines. Why does Vyasa himself a separate chapter for refuting all non vedic doctrines and even the traditional Hindu doctrines such as shankya and yoga? When did vedanta become a secular religion? No vedantin of any breed will compromise and accept the validity of all philosophies - it shows only muddled thinking. Accepting everything is a mere political gesture.

Atanu seems to have a go at the title - "Great Siddanta". Probably he thinks it is a boast in the commentary?

Actually, the commentary is dealing with two pUrvapakshas- the laghu(little) one that examines the necessity of karma kANDa, and the main pUrvapaksha, that evaluates the advaitin framework. Hence that part has been referred to as mahA pUrvapaksha and mahA siddhAnta - meaning the important siddhAnta.

These are the problems with those who rely on English translations to understand these works.

[Sudarshan]

Namaste Saidevo,







Ramanuja's Refutation of Advaita and its Validity

Ramanuja's criticism of the theory of Maya is embodied in his greatest work, The SribhASya, a commentary on BAdarAyana's Brahmasutras. His exposition of the first Sutra occupies the largest space in his treatise, and this criticism appears under the same division. Ramanuja brings seven charges against the doctrine of Maya. We reproduce the gist of each, in order, with a criticism of our own.


The author seems to be quite unaware that Vedanta Desika has expanded these charges and brings them under sixty six heads.



i. The charge of AsrayAnupapatti.

What is the Asraya (seat) of Maya (or avidyA)? Residing in what does it produce illusion? Surely not in the individual self, because the selfhood of the individual self is itself projected by avidyA; neither could it reside in Brahman, since He has the essential nature of self-luminous intelligence, and is
thus opposed to avidyA (ignorance).

Criticism.--This objection rests upon a two-fold misinterpretation. In the first place, Ramanuja starts with the idea that Maya (or avidyA) is some thing real, and consequently demands a seat for this 'illusion' or 'ignorance'. AvidyA is decidedly not a reality: it is only the negation of vidyA, or the obscuration of it. As the fire is latent in the wood, so is our godly nature, our spiritual principle, hidden by the upAdhis.


Aha, what is the basis for claiming that mAyA is unreal in the first place? shruti pramANa please, no handwaving please. Where does shruti teach that? And how can something unreal give rise to the unreal world and all that? Would any rational person agree with such a doctrine?

What is the basis of the theory of upAdi? Shruti does not teach that at all - it is an advaitin invention. Please use the ten major upanishads, Brahmsutras and Gita to prove the theory of upAdis.





In the second place, Ramanuja makes an unwarranted differentiation between Brahman and the individual soul. In stating the position of the Advaitin he has no right to colour it with his own conceptions. We, after Sankara, do not admit such a difference between the two. Brahman becomes the individual soul only by upAdhis, i.e., self-imposed limitations of manas, ten senses, subtle body, Karma, etc. These upAdhis may figuratively be spoken of as limiting the Atman and resolving it into the two aspects of the Highest Atman (Brahman) and the individual Atman. If, therefore, we are pressed by Ramanuja to state the residence of avidyA, we may meet him by saying that it must, if at all conceived as such, reside in the upAdhis the mind (manas), the senses, etc. As a matter of fact, this demand of Ramanuja seems to be unjustifiable and inadmissible. It wholly rests upon his supposition of the reality of avidyA.


The individual soul is mentioned to be different from Brahman all over the scripture. So Ramanuja is quite justified. Advaita takes a few verses out of context to demonstrate the identity of Atma and Brahman.

Advaita claims that mAyA is the cause of jIva, but claims that mAyA exists only because of jIva. Is there any logic here - pure mutual dependency.




2. The Charge of TirodhAnAnupapatti.

The supposed 'ignorance' cannot, as maintained by its upholders, conceal Brahman, whose essential nature is self-luminosity. The concealment of luminosity means either (a) the obstruction of the origination of luminosity, or (b) the destruction of existing luminosity. But as it is held that the luminosity of Brahman is incapable of being a produced thing, the concealment of luminosity must mean the destruction of luminosity, which, in other words, amounts to the destruction of the essential nature of Brahman.

Criticism.--This objection is based upon Ramanuja's losing hold of the real position of the upholders of Maya. Our 'ignorance' is merely negative. It has no positive existence to be able to conceal anything else in the strict sense. Brahman is ever the same in its splendour and luminosity, but we fail to see it only through our own avidyA, which can, therefore, in no way be said to be able to conceal Brahman in the sense of destroying its luminosity. In the same way, if a follower of Ramanuja were to ask Kant, "Why do we not see the thing-in-itself (das Ding-an-sich)?" he would at once reply, "Because between that and ourselves are the intellectual forms (upddhis] of Time, Space, and Causality." Thus we are not explaining away the difficulty pointed out by Ramanuja when we say that we deny the concealment (tirodhAna) of Brahman by ignorance (avidyA).



That, the mAyA is unreal needs proof. You can't assume the truth of mAyA=unreal to prove your premises. This is like assuming that 1=2 initially and then claiming that 4=5 because 1+3=2+3.




3. The Charge of SvarUpAnupapatti.

What is the essential nature of avidyA? As long as it is a thing at all, it must either have the nature of reality or of unreality. But it is not admitted to be a reality; and it cannot be an unreality, for, as long as a real misguiding error, different from Brahman Himself, is not admitted, so long it is not possible to explain the theory of illusion. If Brahman Himself have the character of the misguiding error, then, owing to his eternity, there would be no final release to the individual self.

Here Ramanuja rightly understands the standpoint, but at once again makes a great confusion and becomes inconsistent when criticizing the theory on the basis of the assumed reality of Maya.

Criticism.--The whole difficulty is purely factitious. Certainly we do not admit the reality of Maya, but at the same time we do not hold that it is unreal from the empirical standpoint as well. Empirically it is sat (existing): the world is, but it is Maya. Ramanuja is too anxious and tactful to corner us by his dilemmas. But as a rule these dilemmas have one of the two horns already broken, since he generally starts with self-assumed premises, and draws his own inferences from them, most logically, of course.

The question as to what is the cause of Maya is, in the sense in which it is asked, an illegitimate one. Causality is the general law in the world (in Maya), but it has no warrant to transcend itself and ask, "What is the cause of Maya?" The category only applies within the phenomenal world, and at once breaks down when stretched out of it. Everything within Maya has a cause, but Maya has no cause. The same fact would be stated by Kant in the words "Causality is the universal law of the empirical world". Hence the question as to causality being meaningless in the present context, we are not obliged to answer it.

Again, when Ramanuja suggests that "as long as a real misguiding error, different from Brahman, is not admitted, so long it is not possible to explain the theory," the suggestion seems to us to convey hardly any meaning, since the moment we grant a real existence to Maya, our whole theory falls with it; a real dualism between the two realities (facing each other) will be at once created, and this will in no way afford even the slightest explanation of the theory. We wonder how Ramanuja himself would try to explain the theory even on these dualistic premises. The whole of this charge, therefore, is imaginary and futile.


Let us assume that you are not already prejudiced towards Advaita and come as beginner. What would convince that there are three kinds of entities.

1. Real 2. Unreal. 3. Neither Real Nor Unreal.

The third category is an invention of advaita. It has no proof in shruti. No scientist will accept the validity of the third state. Can you give an example of something that is neither real nor unreal?




4. The Charge of AnirvacanIyatvAnupapatti.

The Advaitins says that Maya is anirvacanIyA, i.e., incapable of definition, because it is neither an entity (sat) nor a non-entity (asat). To hold such a view is impossible. All cognitions relate to entities or non-entities; and if it be held that the object of a cognition has neither the positive characteristics of an entity nor the negative characteristics of a non-entity, then all things may become the objects of all cognitions.

Criticism.--This difficulty is couched in a very clever and catchy way. Yet the whole rests on a misconception, viz., the want or perceiving clearly what the "tertium comparationis" is in each case. Sat and asat sound two contradictory conceptions, and to say that a thing ("an object of cognition") is neither sat nor asat is not to say anything about it at all. But the thing is thought of in two wholly different aspects, and the tertium comparationis is not common to both.

Maya, we say, is neither sat nor asat, neither an 'entity' nor a 'non-entity.' It is not sat, since the Atman alone is real, and it is not asat, since it appears at least, or in other words, maintains itself as an iva ('as it were'). Where is the contradiction now? Does not this very fact allow us to speak of Maya as something mysterious, incapable of a strict definition ?


mAyA is referred all through shruti as a positive power of Brahman. There are no grounds to call it anivachanIya.





5. The charge of PramAnAnupapatti.

Is there any means by which this curious avidyA is brought within the range of our cognition? It can neither be proved by perception nor by inference. Neither can it be established by revelation, as the scriptural passages can be explained otherwise.

Criticism.--In the light of what we have said above this objection stands self-condemned. When we do not believe in the real existence of Maya, what logic is there in requiring us to prove the existence of it? If we had granted its reality, then indeed we could be called upon to name the source of its knowledge perception, inference, revelation, etc. However, to prove the validity of our conception we do not require any marshalled arguments or formal syllogisms. It is as clear as anything, when we recall to our mind the nature of avidyA, which, as we have shown after Sankara, is an erroneous transfer of the things and relations of the objective world to the Self in the strictest sense of the word.

Further, Ramanuja examines a few scriptural passages, and giving them another interpretation, infers that all such passages can be so explained as not to corroborate the theory of avidyA. He might draw any meaning out of the few passages he has gone into, so long as he is bent upon showing the untenableness of Maya, but there still remains a large number of passages, among which the metaphysics of Yajnavalkya occupies a prominent place, that defy all such attempts at a forced, far-fetched and perverted interpretation.

When we know that we are in reality no other than the Absolute Spirit, and that the Atman is the only reality; and yet we feel that we are different from the Absolute and that the world in which we live, move and have our being, is real, to what shall we attribute this clash between our knowledge and feelings? Is it not a mystery? And what else could we say but that this is due to our ignorance, the 'erroneous transference' spoken of above?


No new comments. The whole framework is shaky.



6. The Charge of NivartakAnupapatti.

This difficulty is in relation to the idea that the cessation of avidyA takes place solely by means of the knowledge which has the attributeless Brahman for its object. Brahman is not without attributes and qualities, since there are many passages which prove that He is possessed of these. Moreover, the grammatical equations, such as "tattvam asi" ("That art Thou"), do not denote the oneness of any attributeless thing, they are not intended to give rise to the stultification of any illusion due to avidyA; but they simply show that Brahman is capable of existing in two different modes or forms. The universe is the body of which Brahman is the soul. He is Himself all the three entities God, soul and matter. Consequently, the knowledge which has an attributeless Brahman for its object is impossible and cannot be the complete knowledge of truth; and obviously such an impossible knowledge of the oneness of the attributeless Brahman cannot be the remover of the avidyA postulated by the Advaitins.

Criticism.--The force of this objection lies mainly in the supposition that "Brahman is not without attributes," and it is further pointed out by Ramanuja that many passages of the Sruti prove this thesis. In the light of Sankara's Advaita, as briefly described in Chapter II, we fail to see the force of this argument. To say that there are some scriptural passages bearing out the assertion may equally be met by the counter-proposition that there are also passages countenancing the attributelessness of Brahman. If, then, both these assertions neutralize each other from the scriptural point of view, one may well ask, What then is the real trend and purport of the Vaidic thought? It seems to us that this question could not be better answered than by repeating the doctrine of Sankara when he attempted to synthesize the whole of the Sruti by taking a wide conspectus of its purport. All passages which speak of the qualified Brahman may be placed under aparA vidyA, while parA will include only those that expound the metaphysical truth as it is. Brahman may, from a lower standpoint, be conceived as "with attributes," but the ultimate truth remains that He is really "without attributes." Besides, the conception of the Absolute in the strict sense leaves hardly any room for "attributes." Impose any attributes and you at once make the Absolute "non-absolute," i.e., destroy his very nature by making paricchinna (limited) that which is aparicchinna (without limits).


It is easily proved that an entity without attributes is non existant. Brahman has an infinite number of attributes each of which is infinite. How does it limit Brahman?

Advaitins resort to the apaccheda nyAya while reconciling the nirguNa and the saguNa shrutis, which is flawed. The right mImamsa rule is the utsargApavAda nyAya, which will resolve the saguna and nirguna shrutis correctly.




Again, Ramanuja denies that the text, 'tat tvam asi,' denotes the oneness of the individual with the attributeless Universal, and holds that it simply brings out Brahman's capability of existing in two forms or modes. Now, this seems to us to be an ambiguous use of language. That Brahman exists in two opposite forms will be meaningless if one of the forms were not supposed to be due to avidyA. How can a being exist in two contradictory forms? Cit and acit are two opposite notions in the system of Ramanuja, but he has not succeeded in reconciling their existence by merely saying that they are two modes of the Absolute. To picture the universe as the body of Brahman is after all a mere analogy, which hardly makes the matter even a jot clearer. Even by investing God with all auspicious attributes, how will Ramanuja account for the existence of evil '(moral) or error (psychological)? Simply to say, as did Plato, that God is good, hence the universe must be good, is no explanation, but a mere shirking of the question. Like Plato, Ramanuja uses many analogies and metaphors while speaking of Brahman, but the Advaitist cannot but take all these as mere mythical representations.

Hence, with our denial of the qualified aspect of Brahman as a metaphysical truth is linked the denial of "the impossibility of the knowledge which has an attributeless Brahman for its object."


The advaitin interpretation of tat tvam asi using bhAga-tyAga laxaNa is incorrect according to the pAnini rule for sAmAnAdhikaraNya. Do you really think if I say "the man is a tiger", you could equate man=tiger?

An identity statement such as That Thou Art requires a context. The ignorant shvetaketu (tvam) cannot be directly equated to Ishvara(tat) directly. There must some context by which the equality is to be held. In Advaita vedanta, shvetaketu must be stripped of all qualities belonging to the jIva such as ignorance, weakness etc. Ishvara too has to be stripped of his Lordly qualities such as omnipotence, omniscience etc. What remains on both sides without qualities is equated. This is called double pruning which is a very far fetched interpretation. Better explanations apply the indirection on only one side of the equation. For eg, Ramanuja takes Tat as it stands without pruning it. tvam is taken to be the antaryAmi of shvetaketu, which is the paramAtma. Thus Tat tvam asi would render to antaryAmi in shvetaketu(tvam) = Atma( the creator) where there are no absurd conclusions.





AvidyA being like darkness is itself expelled when light comes in. JnAna is the remover of ajnAna. As we have already pointed out above, the expression 'knowledge of Brahman' is strictly inadmissible, since Brahman is itself knowledge (JnAna) of course the term being used in the higher sense of 'pure consciousness.'


Upanishads declare that all attributes of Brahman are eternal ( B.U 4.5.14) ~ hence knowledge is an attribute of Brahman.



7. The Charge of Nivrttyanupapatti.

The removal of the Advaitin's hypothetical 'ignorance' is quite impossible. The individual soul s bondage of 'ignorance' is determined by Karma and is a concrete reality. It cannot therefore be removed by any abstract knowledge but only by divine worship and grace. Moreover, according to the Advaitins the differentiation between the knower, knowledge, and the known is unreal; and even that knowledge, which is capable of removing avidyA has to be unreal and has to stand in need of another real removing knowledge.

Criticism.--Our struggle with Karma is undoubtedly real so long as our consciousness of the true nature of Brahman has not arisen. Karma, its determinations, and with it everything else, is supposed to be real, but only so far. We have already quoted passages from Sankara where he clearly and unequivocally makes this concession, 'vyAvahArically' (i.e., from the practical or empiric point of view), as he calls it. It may therefore be called 'a concrete reality,' but with the explicit understanding that such a reality is after all 'phenomenal.' We do not hold the efficacy of Karma in the case of one who has attained the knowledge of Brahman; such a man, being free from all desires and motives, all springs of action, is pari passu beyond the control of Karma in so far as he is not creating any fresh and new Karma for himself. The laws of Karma are valid within the phenomenal, but in no way do they produce any real knowledge to the Atman, whose very nature forbids all such bondages.

The idea of divine worship and grace may be supported for the sake of the ordinary minds unable to go round the higher path of pure knowledge. But surely the idea of grace, etc., is not an exalted conception. Truly speaking, grace is only possible when there is a direct and perfect communion in other words, an 'identity' between the two forms of consciousness. This fact, too, shows that the ultimate nature of man and God is 'Consciousness.' So long as our ignorance is not cast away by the acquirement of 'knowledge' which alone is capable of ousting its opponent liberation is impossible. Without such a knowledge, mere devotion or deeds will never lead one to the same goal.

As to the differentiation between the knower (jnAtA), knowledge (jnAna),and the known (jneya), we have to repeat that the distinction is certainly fictitious in the absolute sense. It is made by us and it is real for all our practical purposes. The metaphysical truth does not attempt to devour the world in its practical aspect. The knowledge removing avidyA if we are at all to say 'removal' of avidyA is not unreal. Unreal knowledge cannot destroy unreality. Knowledge in the lower sense of a relation between 'subject' and 'object' is of course unreal, but such knowledge is unable to give a deathblow to avidyA. On the dawning of true knowledge the artificial distinction between 'subject' and 'object' vanishes. "By what shall we know the knower (the subject of all knowledge)?" as was so forcibly asked by Yajnavalkya.

Conclusion

These are in brief the seven difficulties which Ramanuja perceived in the doctrine of Maya. As will appear from what we have said above, Ramanuja's criticism rests on the whole on a misunderstanding of the genuine Advaita standpoint. All through he has been treating Maya as if it were a concrete reality, even perhaps existing in space, etc. We do not accuse him even because he attempted to reject Sankara's premises. But we fail to see his consistency, when even on his own premises he falls short of furnishing a really adequate explanation of the relation between God and the Universe. His doctrine of divine grace, devotion, etc., is apt to appeal strongly to many Christian theologians, who will therefore naturally prefer his philosophy to that of Sankara. Be as it may, to us it seems evident that Sankara's analysis of Reality went much further than Ramanuja's. The impersonal conception of the Absolute, we hold, is truly personal, if there is any real meaning in 'personality.' This is how we will meet those who cannot hold any such doctrine to be the ultimate if it destroys the idea of the divine personality.

What did Yagnyavalkya teach Maitreyi? How can you support Advaita from it, when Yagnavalkya has declared "avinAshI vA are.ayamAtmA.anuchchhittidharmA" and also stated that "yatra hi dvaitamiva bhavati"?

There is no misunderstanding of Advaita's position. We simply state that categories such as "neither real nor unreal" or "maya is unreal" , "anirvacanIya" etc are mere assumptions made by Advaita without any proof. No use in proving advaita from within advaita's self assumed postulates. Go ahead, start from first principles, and prove with shruti and logic that there exist entities that are "neither real nor unreal" and "maya is unreal", "ishvara is unreal" etc.

[atanu]

Do you know what is the sanskrit equivalent of this translation? And how much the original words can be lost in an english translation?

BTW, it is not uncommon in the philosophical circles to refer to the adversaries by such titles.

Namaskar Sudarshan,

Well, I did not know that. Welcome.

Om

[Sudarshan]

These are in brief the seven difficulties which Ramanuja perceived in the doctrine of Maya. As will appear from what we have said above, Ramanuja's criticism rests on the whole on a misunderstanding of the genuine Advaita standpoint. All through he has been treating Maya as if it were a concrete reality, even perhaps existing in space, etc. We do not accuse him even because he attempted to reject Sankara's premises. But we fail to see his consistency, when even on his own premises he falls short of furnishing a really adequate explanation of the relation between God and the Universe. His doctrine of divine grace, devotion, etc., is apt to appeal strongly to many Christian theologians, who will therefore naturally prefer his philosophy to that of Sankara. Be as it may, to us it seems evident that Sankara's analysis of Reality went much further than Ramanuja's. The impersonal conception of the Absolute, we hold, is truly personal, if there is any real meaning in 'personality.' This is how we will meet those who cannot hold any such doctrine to be the ultimate if it destroys the idea of the divine personality.

It is a rather ingeneous idea to concieve of an ultimate Godhead beyond all notions of words and thoughts - but does it answer some basic questions?

1. How and why did the Nirguna Brahman become the Saguna Brahman, if NB is considered to be both actionless and attributeless?

2. And what is the basis for dismissing the reality of creation when there is sufficient scriptural evidence for it? Not to speak of pratyaxa and anumAna.

You cannot go deeper into reality than the pratyaxa, anumAna and shruti tell you. Anything else is just conjecture. Buddha conjectured that ultimate reality is a void.

The supreme reality must be a personality. Otherwise, we would not be sitting here and typing these things. Denying the reality of this typing and claiming the supreme Godhead to be impersonal, is like touching the nose the other way around.

[Sudarshan]

Namaskar Sudarshan,

Well, I did not know that. Welcome.

Om


Namaskar. Good to see you again.

Just because AchAryas have used "names" in their works against other AchAryas do not give disciples like us the right to do so. Both Shankara and Ramanuja were great scholars and equals in their own right. We must respect all personalities, though disagreeing with their views is an acceptable proposition.

Every philosophy is a viewpoint. It is an opinion. It maybe right or not. Logic is not the best means to arrive at the truth. Even untruth can be passed on as truth with shrewed reasoning. So truth must be known from experience - through the grace of God. Till such time, logic will prevail.

[atanu]

NAMASKAR Sudarshan.


Namaskar. Good to see you again.

Just because AchAryas have used "names" in their works against other AchAryas do not give disciples like us the right to do so. ---.

OK. Hope that we remember this. Let us start then.



Aha, what is the basis for claiming that mAyA is unreal in the first place? shruti pramANa please, no handwaving please. Where does shruti teach that? And how can something unreal give rise to the unreal world and all that? Would any rational person agree with such a doctrine?


Kriya Shakti and Jnana Shakti of Brahman are true. But the power’s nature is to apparently fragment indivisible Atman. The apparent/illusion of fragmentation is Maya and Shakti is not Maya. Your premise is wrong. Advaita does not say that the world is Asat (as opposed to Sat) as you claim. It is Mithya, when not known as divine purusha.. Like in a dark room (in avidya) you may mistake a chair for something else. So, in Avidya we see a fragmented world and do not see the ONE substratum Brahman -- this wrong view is mistake, which leads to a mythical understanding of Universe.



Advaita claims that mAyA is the cause of jIva, but claims that mAyA exists only because of jIva. Is there any logic here - pure mutual dependency.


Your premise is false. Where Advaita says that Maya is dependent on Jiva?




mAyA is referred all through shruti as a positive power of Brahman. There are no grounds to call it anivachanIya.


Maya is not positive power of Brahman, who is not cruel that He has to use Maya. Kriya Shakti or Jnana Shakti are two powers of Brahman. vidyAvidya is hidden in Brahman (Svet. Upanishad). Vidya is eternal. Avidya perishes.

When the light rises only the sadashiva exists alone (Svet. Up.).



It is easily proved that an entity without attributes is non existant. Brahman has an infinite number of attributes each of which is infinite. How does it limit Brahman?


It is easily proven otherwise.

Brahman is all. So, if we attach an attribute of ‘tall’ to Brahman, then there is no scope for short things to occur. So, Brahman is ultimately Net-Neti (and this is Shruti).



An identity statement such as That Thou Art requires a context. The ignorant shvetaketu (tvam) cannot be directly equated to Ishvara(tat) directly. There must some context by which the equality is to be held. In Advaita vedanta, shvetaketu must be stripped of all qualities belonging to the jIva such as ignorance, weakness etc. Ishvara too has to be stripped of his Lordly qualities such as omnipotence, omniscience etc. What remains on both sides without qualities is equated. This is called double pruning which is a very far fetched interpretation. Better explanations apply the indirection on only one side of the equation. For eg, Ramanuja takes Tat as it stands without pruning it. tvam is taken to be the antaryAmi of shvetaketu, which is the paramAtma. Thus Tat tvam asi would render to antaryAmi in shvetaketu(tvam) = Atma( the creator) where there are no absurd conclusions.

Shankara never teaches that Svetaketu as the body is Tat.

Hehe. Assuming that you are correct then you must be equipped with two Atmas, one of Ishwara and another of so-called Sudarshan? Moreover, have you ever contemplated why should ‘Tvam’ apply to a different being from Svetaketu? Will I ever call “you” as “not you”.


Upanishads declare that all attributes of Brahman are eternal ( B.U 4.5.14) ~ hence knowledge is an attribute of Brahman.

Well. Paramatman is Nirguna. You say loudly that you do not agree to Gita.

Anaaditwaan nirgunatwaat paramaatmaayam avyayah;
Shareerastho’pi kaunteya na karoti na lipyate.

BG 13.32. Being without beginning and Nirguna, the Supreme Self, imperishable, though dwelling in the body, O Arjuna, neither acts nor is tainted!

Svet Up.
eko devaH sarvabhuuteshhu guuDhaH sarvavyaapii sarvabhuutaantaraatmaa.karmaadhyaxaH sarvabhuutaadhivaasaH saaxii chetaa kevalo nirguNashcha .. 11..



No use in proving advaita from within advaita's self assumed postulates. Go ahead, start from first principles, and prove with shruti and logic that there exist entities that are "neither real nor unreal" and "maya is unreal", "ishvara is unreal" etc.


Suits me.

A i) The shruti ‘One who sees any difference here goes from death to death’, invalidates that Brahman who is pure knowledge has any real divisions, as proposed by VA.

Aii) Chandogya teaches that happiness is in the unlimited. So, a circumscribed mukta Atman (as hypothesized by VA) cannot be happy and thus is not mukta.

B) That the boundaries are apparent and not real is the teaching of Gita.

Avibhaktam cha bhooteshu vibhaktamiva cha sthitam;
Bhootabhartru cha tajjneyam grasishnu prabhavishnu cha.

13.17. And undivided, yet He exists as if divided in beings; He is to be known as the supporter of beings; He devours and He generates also.

C) VA teaches that karma is without beginning. Wheras Shri Krishna teaches: "Arjuna Know that you are not the doer”. So, the perception of karma is itself the avidya, which Advaita says is without beginning.

Moreover, assuming that VA is correct, please tell us where the bad karmas originate from and where thet reside, before you ask us where Avidya resides? (That Avidya and Vidya are seated in Brahman is shruti, however).

D) The fundamental prescription

I have asked you several times of the logical implication of a shruti prescription. Mandukya Upanishad teaches that advaita atman has to be known. You please tell me how one will know the Advaita Atman as another?

(I remind you that in another post (elsewhere) you had accepted that this shruti dictum you do not abide by).

E) When ignorance s destroyed by the destroyer, the following is said to happen.


yadaa.atamastaanna divaa na raatriH na sannachaasachchhiva eva kevalaH .tadaxara.n tat.h saviturvareNyaM praGYaa cha tasmaat.h prasR^itaa puraaNii .. 18..

Svet. Upanishad 4.18
When there is no darkness of ignorance, there is no day or night, neither being nor non—being; Shiva alone exists. That immutable Reality is the meaning of "That"; It is adored by the Sun. From It has proceeded the ancient wisdom.
-------------------
Om

[Sudarshan]

Namaste,



Kriya Shakti and Jnana Shakti of Brahman are true. But the power’s nature is to apparently fragment indivisible Atman. The apparent/illusion of fragmentation is Maya and Shakti is not Maya. Your premise is wrong. Advaita does not say that the world is Asat (as opposed to Sat) as you claim. It is Mithya, when not known as divine purusha.. Like in a dark room (in avidya) you may mistake a chair for something else. So, in Avidya we see a fragmented world and do not see the ONE substratum Brahman -- this wrong view is mistake, which leads to a mythical understanding of Universe.


What is the difference between asat and mithya? Advaitins have not been able to justify the difference at all. Asat is non existing. What is mithyA? Neither existing nor non existing? And what is the proof of the existance of this category?





Your premise is false. Where Advaita says that Maya is dependent on Jiva?


If not, then it means Maya is Real. Dont you know that mAyA exists only from the perspective of the jIva? According to you now, that mAyA is observor independent? This is against the fundamentals of Advaita. I suggest you quote from Shankara to prove otherwise.




Maya is not positive power of Brahman, who is not cruel that He has to use Maya. Kriya Shakti or Jnana Shakti are two powers of Brahman. vidyAvidya is hidden in Brahman (Svet. Upanishad). Vidya is eternal. Avidya perishes.

When the light rises only the sadashiva exists alone (Svet. Up.).


Please read BG, and tell me what Krishna talks about his mAyA. We will take it from there, if it is anivachanIya or is it some glorious power of God.




It is easily proven otherwise.

Brahman is all. So, if we attach an attribute of ‘tall’ to Brahman, then there is no scope for short things to occur. So, Brahman is ultimately Net-Neti (and this is Shruti).


Please answer my specific objection regarding the apaccheda nyAya and
utsargApavAda nyAya. Dont handwave. Because quoting some verses here and there are no use. If you do not know what these are, you simply dont understand mImamsa( the cannons of interpretation) and how would you even judge the veracity of the conclusions?





Shankara never teaches that Svetaketu as the body is Tat.

Hehe. Assuming that you are correct then you must be equipped with two Atmas, one of Ishwara and another of so-called Sudarshan? Moreover, have you ever contemplated why should ‘Tvam’ apply to a different being from Svetaketu? Will I ever call “you” as “not you”.



Well. Paramatman is Nirguna. You say loudly that you do not agree to Gita.


Yeah, Shankara never taught that Shvetaketu as body is Tat. He instead equated two mithyas known as tvam and tat. Tat on the right hand side was Ishvara( not NB), you know that right?

And for the rest,same as above. Justify your interpretation of the nirguna shruti from mimamsa. Picking verses here and there is of no use. Paramatma who speaks and talks to you is nirguna in the way you think? You must be joking. A person comes and tells you that he is dumb. what do you make out of it? Nirguna can mean only nirdosha, or nir-traiguNya - the other explanations are riddled with logical absurdities.

Since you mentioned that it is easy to prove otherwise, please give me an example of an entity that has no guNas.



Anaaditwaan nirgunatwaat paramaatmaayam avyayah;
Shareerastho’pi kaunteya na karoti na lipyate.

BG 13.32. Being without beginning and Nirguna, the Supreme Self, imperishable, though dwelling in the body, O Arjuna, neither acts nor is tainted!

Svet Up.
eko devaH sarvabhuuteshhu guuDhaH sarvavyaapii sarvabhuutaantaraatmaa.karmaadhyaxaH sarvabhuutaadhivaasaH saaxii chetaa kevalo nirguNashcha .. 11..


Same as above - no point quoting out of context.



Suits me.

A i) The shruti ‘One who sees any difference here goes from death to death’, invalidates that Brahman who is pure knowledge has any real divisions, as proposed by VA.



Yes, we dont see any differences in the svarUpa of Brahman.



Aii) Chandogya teaches that happiness is in the unlimited. So, a circumscribed mukta Atman (as hypothesized by VA) cannot be happy and thus is not mukta.


V.A also teaches that the mukta's happiness is unlimited. It is jIva's nature to be a dependent being on the Lord and that is where his happiness lies - being in the company of God. It gives him infinite bliss. Why dont you read the mukta's description in the chAndogya chap 8?


Read Chandogya 7.25.2 and tell me how it fits Advaita's oneness in moksha and sublation of the world et al. Shankara himself says that this verse is just joking, unable to handle it

athaata aatmaadesha evaatmaivaadhastaadaatmoparishhTaadaatmaa
pashchaadaatmaa purastaadaatmaa dakshiNata aatmottarata
aatmaiveda\m+ sarvamiti sa vaa eshha evaM pashyannevaM manvaana evaM
vijaanannaatmaratiraatmakriiDa aatmamithuna aatmaanandaH sa
svaraaDbhavati tasya sarveshhu lokeshhu kaamachaaro bhavati
atha ye.anyathaato viduranyaraajaanaste kshayyalokaa bhavanti
teshhaa\m+ sarveshhu lokeshhvakaamachaaro bhavati || 7.25.2||

Please read what Shankara has to say on this verse in his BSB commentary.

The eight chapter of Chandogya is all against an advaitin interpretation. Shankara's commentary claims that these chapters are simply imaginations of the veda, since he cannot explain it with his philosophy.( read for instance 8.2.1, 8.2.2. etc)






Please tell us where the bad karmas reside, before you ask us where Avidya resides? (That Avidya and Vidya are seated in Brahman is shruti, however).


Karma resides in the linga deha. As if you did not know. Advaita also holds the same opinion.

Rest of your post is simply quoting something without a context. No system is proved that way.

As a start demonstrate with an example, shruti and logic that a category known as "neither unreal nor real" exists. We will take it from there. We will discuss specific shrutis later.

Regards,
Sudarshan

[sarabhanga]

Aha, what is the basis for claiming that mAyA is unreal in the first place? shruti pramANa please, no handwaving please. Where does shruti teach that?

Namaste Sudarshan,

maya is “the artificer”.

mAya means “creating illusions” ~ a property of viSNu.

mAyA is “art, illusion, unreality, deception, fraud, trick, sorcery, witchcraft, magic, an unreal or illusory image, a phantom or apparition”.

mAyA is “false, unreal, or illusory”, particularly indicating “duality or duplicity” or “Illusion (as the source of the visible universe)”, and regarded as the daughter of adharma and the mother of mRtyu.

mAyA is “unreal” by definition, from the very nature of saMskRtam !




The individual soul is mentioned to be different from Brahman all over the scripture. So Ramanuja is quite justified. Advaita takes a few verses out of context to demonstrate the identity of Atma and Brahman.

Yes, I remember the “thou art NOT that” debate, and have no wish to revisit such blatant perversions!

vedAnta does NOT rely on the pUrva-mImAMsA of jaimini.

vedAnta is synonymous with the uttara-mImAMsA or brahma-mImAMsA of bAdarAyaNa.

If brahma-mImAMsA is ignored when interpreting the upaniSada, then we are NOT dealing with vedAnta.

And if ramanuja gave priority to jaimini (a student of vyAsa) over the authority of bAdarAyaNa (vyAsa), then rAmAnuja was NOT a true vedAntin and his views have no bearing on the ultimate truth of advaita vedAnta!

It seems that you have completely ignored all past discussion on these matters, so further repetition would likely be futile.

[atanu]

Namaste Sudarshan,
---
Sudarshana, It seems that you have completely ignored all past discussion on these matters, so further repetition would likely be futile.

Namaste Friends,

Yes that is my view as well. When one says that begin from first principles yet ignores logic and shruti, there is absolutely no point in wasting time. All refutations have been provided. There is no need for more. A few points for readers who may like to follow.

1. Asat and Mithya can be understood to be different even by a child. Mithya is when one sees a White Shirt as Black, in dark. This is a mistake of perception and not a being.


2. If karma is in Linga Deha, then where is this Linga Deha? Finally one has to agree that Karma is in Brahman alone, which is unimaginable and it is the Avidya. Shruti indeed says that vidyaAvidya reside in Brahman. Ishwara is controller of both.

3. No answer has been given as to how the Advaita Atman will be known (the dictum of Mandukya)? As another? Atman is never another. And presence of another will invalidate the Advaita clause. How will a Jiva know Advaita Atman?

4.

An identity statement such as That Thou Art requires a context. The ignorant shvetaketu (tvam) cannot be directly equated to Ishvara(tat) directly. There must some context by which the equality is to be held. In Advaita vedanta, shvetaketu must be stripped of all qualities belonging to the jIva such as ignorance, weakness etc. Ishvara too has to be stripped of his Lordly qualities such as omnipotence, omniscience etc. What remains on both sides without qualities is equated. This is called double pruning which is a very far fetched interpretation. Better explanations apply the indirection on only one side of the equation. For eg, Ramanuja takes Tat as it stands without pruning it. tvam is taken to be the antaryAmi of shvetaketu, which is the paramAtma. Thus Tat tvam asi would render to antaryAmi in shvetaketu(tvam) = Atma( the creator) where there are no absurd conclusions.

Consider the following logic for ‘Sudarshana Thou Art That’, from the above purport.

If I say: “Sudarshan Thou art That”, will it mean “Sudarshan thou art not That, but Antaryami that is in thou is the thou and that thou is That (who is Ishwara – Omnipotent, Omniscient etc.)”?

What happens to Sudarshan then? Is he not Maya, since thou is referring to Antarayami and not to Sudarshana at all (though Sudarshana is the Pratyaksha Thou)? Since how can Sudarshana ever be equal to Omnipotent That? Or, does it amount to saying that Sudarshan you are omnipotent, since Sudarshan is Pratayksha and simply cannot be thrown away.

On the other hand, Shankara’s purport of equating Thou and That, by the bridge of Samana (the pure consciousness) is meaningful and supported by scriptures. Ishwara is from the Samana, but is differentiated (by his eternal Auspicious Aspirations and eternal Knowledge of Advaita Atman) from Jivas, who are also from Samana, but are ignorant and thus have ignorant ego aspirations.

5. Though proof of Nirguna has been given from Shruti, it has been brushed aside as out of context. And as if there is some Guna which is out of the Red, Black, and White categories (Tri Gunas) of the unborm female Prakriti.


-------------------------


Om

[Sudarshan]

Namaste Sudarshan,

maya is “the artificer”.

mAya means “creating illusions” ~ a property of viSNu.

mAyA is “art, illusion, unreality, deception, fraud, trick, sorcery, witchcraft,

magic, an unreal or illusory image, a phantom or apparition”.

mAyA is “false, unreal, or illusory”, particularly indicating “duality or duplicity”

or “Illusion (as the source of the visible universe)”, and regarded as the daughter of

adharma and the mother of mRtyu.

mAyA is “unreal” by definition, from the very nature of saMskRtam !


Yes, I remember the “thou art NOT that” debate, and have no wish to revisit such blatant

perversions!

vedAnta does NOT rely on the pUrva-mImAMsA of jaimini.

vedAnta is synonymous with the uttara-mImAMsA or brahma-mImAMsA of bAdarAyaNa.

If brahma-mImAMsA is ignored when interpreting the upaniSada, then we are NOT dealing with

vedAnta.

And if ramanuja gave priority to jaimini (a student of vyAsa) over the authority of

bAdarAyaNa (vyAsa), then rAmAnuja was NOT a true vedAntin and his views have no bearing on

the ultimate truth of advaita vedAnta!

It seems that you have completely ignored all past discussion on these matters, so further

repetition would likely be futile.

Namaste Sharabhanga,

I am not also too keen to reinvent the wheel and do keep out of discussions of these kinds because it is rather fruitless. I have responded only because someone called Ramanuja a christian missionary and also tried to 'refute' his views.

BTW, where are you getting the rules of interpretation of uttara mImamsa- please cite the sources on your methods of interpretation. Did you make the rules yourself?

Even advaita vedanta is heavily dependent on all the logistical devices it can borrow from nyAya and pUrva mImAmsa. Without these, any style of interpreting uttara mImamsa is self-styled and maybe rejected without reservation.

Now that you refer to uttara mImamsa, which is the vEdanta sUtras of bAdarAyana, please demonstrate how it supports advaita vedanta. The final passages of the sUtras altogether dismiss advaita's claims of jIva attaining absolute identity with Brahman. (Jagadvyaparavarjam and bhogamAtrasAmyaM) . Advaita is only able to explain these passages by introducing two types of mukti, which has no basis whatsoever in shruti. If the climax represented by the glorious words 'anAvrittih sabdAdanavrittih sabdAt' is interpreted to be 'no return' from a fictitious samsAra (albeit a higher one than earthly existance) how can one take such an interpretation to be authentic? How come that bAdarAyana reserved his ''anAvrittih sabdAt' for some state of existance which is still shades below the true mukti advocated by advaita?

Please note that, without nyAya and pUrva mImamsa, there are no rules available to interpret uttara mImamsa, as brahma sutras by itself does not furnish the rules at all. The karma mimamsa of jaimini, the sankarsha kanda of Jaimini and the brahma sutras of badarayana together constitute one single shastra - the mImamsa shAstra. pUrva mImamsa provides the ways in which veda has to be interpreted. Its philosophical doctrine is incomplete to the extent that it is the foundation on which uttara mImamsa stands. Jaimini, being a disciple of Badarayana cannot afford to teaches something which Badarayana himself would totally discard. Shankara has himself cited mImamsa sUtras of jaimini in his BSB and in his upanishadic commentaries.

It is the mImamsa shAstra that teaches us the very tAtparya lingas, and to discard them would mean we have to create a new methodology of interpretation.

upakramOpasamhArau abhyAsOpUrvatA phalam |
arthavAdOpapatti cha lingam tAtparya nirNayE ||

Regarding your comments on tat tvam asi, I have presented the case clearly as the advaitin interpretation breaks the rule of sAmAnAdhikaraNya given by the rule "bhinna pravriththi nimiththAnAm sAbdAnAm ekasmin arthe vriththi sAmAnAdhikaraNyam". There is even upakrama virodha in the advaitin interpretation. If people want to just keep insisting on their interpretations without understanding the objections and refuting them, you can do little about it. That is why I keep out of serious discussions.

The current trend is to ignore grammar, context, rules of mImamsa in interpretations and then claiming to arrive at a purport based on self made rules.:)

[saidevo]

Namaste Sudarshan.



So I must ask Saidevo if all advaitins really desist from such name calling - he should first read advaita works himself before calling people like Ramanuja as christian missionaries. Why, Shankara himself has claimed that all other philosophies other than his own are incorrect doctrines.


It was not my intention to do any name calling; if it sounds so I am sorry. I respect VaishNavam and its AchAryAs for their teachings of a single-pointed devotedness to a single God. I also know that many yogAsana books have been authored by VaishNavites. Many of my friends are also VaishNavites, some of them so strict that they won't visit Shiva temples.

As you say, people who depend on English translations miss much of the flavour and purport of the originals. My only point with the teachings of different views of Brahman and the Universe is that one POV should not slight (though it may not accommodate) the other in order to justify itself. Though I have not read much of Ramanuja's works, I sure have the impression that he is rather unnecessarily harsh on Advaita which after all teaches that God is one and everything created by God is also God.

In my view, the founder AchAryAs of the six schools of the Hindu philosophy and the four major sects of Hinduism were only playing their roles assigned by Brahman to them to evolve a complementary, phased system of knowledge, of which Advaita is the last rung of the ladder and where every Self-realized soul finally arrives at. It is not as if the Self-realized founder AchAryA of a system/sect speaking from a rung of the ladder belongs exclusively only to that rung; rather it is a case of all AchAryAs belonging to the topmost rung but coming down the level to play their roles for the sake of the spiritual advancement of mankind. If in that role-playing they seem to be at loggerheads with each other view and the entire scenario looks like a battle field, it might be only scripted so by Brahman to motivate and accommodate the multitude.

Your replies to scholar Prabhu Dutt Shastri's criticism of Ramanuja's points of refutation of Advaita have started a good debate: let us try to get our knowledge enhanced by arguments and counter-arguments but without any personal or sectarian animosities.

[Sudarshan]

Namaste Sai,



It was not my intention to do any name calling; if it sounds so I am sorry. I respect VaishNavam and its AchAryAs for their teachings of a single-pointed devotedness to a single God. I also know that many yogAsana books have been authored by VaishNavites. Many of my friends are also VaishNavites, some of them so strict that they won't visit Shiva temples.


Ok!!



As you say, people who depend on English translations miss much of the flavour and purport of the originals. My only point with the teachings of different views of Brahman and the Universe is that one POV should not slight (though it may not accommodate) the other in order to justify itself. Though I have not read much of Ramanuja's works, I sure have the impression that he is rather unnecessarily harsh on Advaita which after all teaches that God is one and everything created by God is also God.


Shankara is equally harsh on shankya, nyaya and earlier schools. So why are you singling out on Ramanuja?

Ramanuja is stressing that God is greater than us, and not everything is God, and that we have only God like nature. Because if everything is God, there would be no reason whatsoever for any ungodly things to exist - do you really think it is the same God who is the serial killer, rapist, terrorist etc? Isn't it oversimplistic to think that everything is God? What is the basis of such a beleif? Citing avidyA as a cause runs into the same problems because who can come under avidyA if only god exists? There is no point in declaring the unreality to escape this issue.

Actually if you look deep, Ramanuja's philosophy is closer to Advaita than Dvaita. Ramanuja is of the opinion that we are "god like" but not god. Dvaita teaches that man is absolute servant of god and has only little resemblance to God. And many souls are not even god like but will get ended up in hell. So I would agree with Advaita in many respects than I agree with Dvaita( which is only a modified form of shankya).




In my view, the founder AchAryAs of the six schools of the Hindu philosophy and the four major sects of Hinduism were only playing their roles assigned by Brahman to them to evolve a complementary, phased system of knowledge, of which Advaita is the last rung of the ladder and where every Self-realized soul finally arrives at. It is not as if the Self-realized founder AchAryA of a system/sect speaking from a rung of the ladder belongs exclusively only to that rung; rather it is a case of all AchAryAs belonging to the topmost rung but coming down the level to play their roles for the sake of the spiritual advancement of mankind. If in that role-playing they seem to be at loggerheads with each other view and the entire scenario looks like a battle field, it might be only scripted so by Brahman to motivate and accommodate the multitude.

Your replies to scholar Prabhu Dutt Shastri's criticism of Ramanuja's points of refutation of Advaita have started a good debate: let us try to get our knowledge enhanced by arguments and counter-arguments but without any personal or sectarian animosities.

I agree with this view, that many systems existed due to Godly inspiration for meeting the demands of various souls. But dont me that your view is the top rung, without providing solid evidence.

[sarabhanga]

BTW, where are you getting the rules of interpretation of uttara mImamsa- please cite the sources on your methods of interpretation. Did you make the rules yourself?


The fundamental rule of Vedanta is that the Brahma-Sutras are the basis for the correct interpretation of all scripture.


“But that (Brahman is to be known from the scriptures) because It is the main purport (of all Vedanta texts)”

Purva-Mimamsa objects that the Vedanta texts do not refer to Brahman; and Brahma-Mimamsa answers that the Vedanta texts refer to Brahman only, for all of them have Brahman as their main topic.


“He who knows the supreme Brahman becomes Brahman indeed”

“He who sees manifoldness in It goes from death to death”

“There is no manifoldness in It”

“Thou art That”

[Sudarshan]

The fundamental rule of Vedanta is that the Brahma-Sutras are the basis for the correct interpretation of all scripture.



But with what rules do you interpret the Brahma sutras? How do you resolve for eg, pUrvapaxas, siddhAntas etc? What is the rule by which pUrvapaxas and sidhAntas are identified? What is the rule by which you identify vishaya vAkyas? Such rules are furnished by the pUrva mImamsa because pUrva mImamsa itself contains the methods of interpretation. mImamsa's philosophical position is incomplete, but it provides us with the cannons of interpretation - even the tAtparya lingas come from the mImamsas. Your objection to mimamsa on the grounds that it does not talk of Brahman is not relevant because that has nothing to do with the rich exegesis methods furnished by it. mImamsa has the requisite framework for interpretation but they use it achieve a lower phalaM. Calculus can be used to solve simple problems like calculation of area under a curve or be used for very advanced mathematics like solving partial differential equations. Just because some people used calculus for an inferior purpose (mImAmsakas) does not make calculus itself unusable for a higher purpose.

So do you mean to say that vedanta sutras are self contained in themselves, and can be interpreted in anyway you want using home grown rules? That seems to be the advaitin position.

The sUtra itself has a standard definition:
alpAksharam asamdigdham sAravat vishwatOmukham astObham anavadyam ca sUtram sUtravido viduh

[saidevo]

Namaste Sudarshan.



Ramanuja is stressing that God is greater than us, and not everything is God, and that we have only God like nature. Because if everything is God, there would be no reason whatsoever for any ungodly things to exist - do you really think it is the same God who is the serial killer, rapist, terrorist etc? Isn't it oversimplistic to think that everything is God? What is the basis of such a beleif? Citing avidyA as a cause runs into the same problems because who can come under avidyA if only god exists? There is no point in declaring the unreality to escape this issue.


One of my favourite analogies of understanding God and his created universe is that of a novelist and his/her work of fiction or the movie makers, movie and the actors. Of course these analogies can't be stretched far, but let us see to what extent can they go.

In a work of fiction, there are different kinds of characters: heroes and villains and the in-betweens, representing the good, bad and ugly facets of manifest life. Can we say that the novelist is only in the hero and not in the villain he has created? Why did he create the work in the first place? Was it not the creative urge in him/her, the 'icchA shakti' and the 'kriya shakti'? Do the characters know anything about the novelist who created them? Can't we say that they have their own individual life within the illusory world they are placed in? They think and act differently yet they are all of the nature of the novelist in their core. Strangely, or rather naturally, the characters don't just have a one-time life and die with a single novel. They take rebirths in different names and forms in another novel, which only shows that it is entirely the author's show throughout.

Some novelists usually say that a particular character just 'took charge' and developed as if on his/her own, without the author consciously putting in the details of their traits and thoughts. Theosophy explains it as disembodied souls in the astral world influencing the author's mind remotely. The limitation of this analogy is that the characters can't know or become their author and the whole world they are placed in is only a sport from the author.

There is some slight improvement in the case of a movie. The actors know that they only play their roles and can't exceed their limits. Yet an actor has a scope to progress from a villain to a hero, a comedian to a hero, a hero to a movie maker and so on. It can also be the other way: the hero getting bored of his good roles wants to play the villain for a change! The actors have personal interactions with the movie makers who usually oblige them with necessary changes in the script within the framework of the overall work.

Why can't it be the same way with this world whose author is God?

[Sudarshan]

.

1. Asat and Mithya can be understood to be different even by a child. Mithya is when one sees a White Shirt as Black, in dark. This is a mistake of perception and not a being.



When White shirt is seen as black, it is asat only because the black shirt never existed. Where is mithya in here? Then please show an example for asat. This is called pratibhasika satya in advaita.




2. If karma is in Linga Deha, then where is this Linga Deha? Finally one has to agree that Karma is in Brahman alone, which is unimaginable and it is the Avidya. Shruti indeed says that vidyaAvidya reside in Brahman. Ishwara is controller of both.


Shruti says that Brahman is free from all evil. There is no question of Karma residing inside Brahman.

Now please answer:- Is the Karma residing in the svarUpa of Brahman, or does it reside in its attributes?



3. No answer has been given as to how the Advaita Atman will be known (the dictum of Mandukya)? As another? Atman is never another. And presence of another will invalidate the Advaita clause. How will a Jiva know Advaita Atman?


Jiva knows Atma though direct intution. Why should anything become something else to know it? Is there a known example of anyone needing to become an entity to know it?




4.


Consider the following logic for ‘Sudarshana Thou Art That’, from the above purport.

If I say: “Sudarshan Thou art That”, will it mean “Sudarshan thou art not That, but Antaryami that is in thou is the thou and that thou is That (who is Ishwara – Omnipotent, Omniscient etc.)”?

What happens to Sudarshan then? Is he not Maya, since thou is referring to Antarayami and not to Sudarshana at all (though Sudarshana is the Pratyaksha Thou)? Since how can Sudarshana ever be equal to Omnipotent That? Or, does it amount to saying that Sudarshan you are omnipotent, since Sudarshan is Pratayksha and simply cannot be thrown away.

On the other hand, Shankara’s purport of equating Thou and That, by the bridge of Samana (the pure consciousness) is meaningful and supported by scriptures. Ishwara is from the Samana, but is differentiated (by his eternal Auspicious Aspirations and eternal Knowledge of Advaita Atman) from Jivas, who are also from Samana, but are ignorant and thus have ignorant ego aspirations.


You have not answered my specific question at all. Shankara's interpretation using bhAga-tyAga laxana( do you know what it is?) is against the rules of sAmAnadhikaraNya given by the sUtra "bhinna pravriththi nimiththAnAm sAbdAnAm ekasmin arthe vriththi sAmAnAdhikaraNyam". People are simply equating tat with tvam and claiming that advaita has been proved. Even Shankara cannot equate them like that because the entities being equated are entirley different in nature - Shvetaketu and Ishvara. That is why, he uses bhAga-tyAga laxaNa as explained above. Such an interpretation is not allowed as per proper rules of interpretation. Identity statements involving incomparable entities must be interpreted using vishisTa aikya only. If I say that Arjuna is a tiger, will it follow that Arjuna became a tiger? Any sane person will conclude that Arjuna is called tiger because he is brave. Similar is tat tvam asi. vishisTa aikya demands that idenity be resolved by a common denominator between the entities.





5. Though proof of Nirguna has been given from Shruti, it has been brushed aside as out of context. And as if there is some Guna which is out of the Red, Black, and White categories (Tri Gunas) of the unborm female Prakriti.


Aha, please explain how apaccheda nyAya( used by advaita) is better than utsargApavAda nyAya( used by V.A) for resolving nirguna/saguna shruti conflicts. I brushed aside the context?

Simple thing is: Advaita is claiming that nirguna shrutis overrides the saguna shrutis and saguna shrutis are false statements. VishistAdvaita is claiming that saguna shrutis override nirguna shrutis, and nirguna shrutis are meant only to negate doshas in Ishvara and not to negate every quality, and so both statements have equivalent truth values. These are two nyAyas explained above.

Study about these nyAyas in detail, and then we will discuss this issue. Dont just assume that just because you quote a verse that states that Brahman is nirguna does not prove your statement because Brahman is also described with guNas, and nowhere it is mentioned that these guNas are false. On the other hand, Brahman's dharmas are said to be eternal by Brihad Up.

Advaita vedanta assumes that some parts of vedas have higher truth value than some others, without a rationale to backup the claim. Shankaracharya has classified the vedas into two - truth telling and false tellling. It is because of such treatment meted out to vedas that people like Ramanuja who believe in the truth of every single verse of vedas - have mentioned that advaitins have darkened intellects.( quoted by Atanu earlier)

[sarabhanga]

Namaste Sudarshan,

“The mImAMsA” (i.e. pUrva-mImAMsA) is the correct interpretation of shruti.

“The vedAnta” (i.e. brahma-mImAMsA) is the correct interpretation of the brahmasUtra (which is smRti rather than shruti) and the upaniSada.

The term shruti is properly only applied to the mantra and brAhmaNa portion of the veda, although it was later extended to include the upaniSada and other vaidika texts, including the sUtra works.

pUrvamImAMsA is unnecessary for the interpretation of both the upaniSada and the brahmasUtra.

According to the brahmasUtra:

“But that (brahman is to be known from the scriptures) because It is the main purport (of all vedAnta texts)”

mImAMsA objects that the vedAnta texts do not refer to brahman; and vedAnta answers that the vedAnta texts refer to brahman only, for all of them have brahman as their main topic.

If pUrvamImAMsA considers that the brahmasUtra says that the main topic of both the upaniSada and the brahmasUtra is NOT brahman, then pUrvamImAMsA is completely at odds with vedAnta. And anyone with such a view could NOT be considered as a vedAntin !

“He who knows the supreme brahman becomes brahman indeed”

“He who sees manifoldness in It goes from death to death”

“There is no manifoldness in It”

“Thou art That”

I have NOT objected to mImAMsA “on the grounds that it does not talk of brahman”. My objection has been that, in vedAnta, the vaidika authority of pUrvamImAMsA is exceeded by the authority of uttaramImAMsA.

No new school of vedAnta can be established without its own particular interpretation of the sUtra, and all of the accepted schools of vedAnta have the commentary of their founding AcArya as an inviolable starting point for all philosophical investigations.

When it comes to interpreting the words of shrI bAdarAyaNa, then pUrvamImAMsA is not required ~ and for an advaitin, only the bhASya of shrI saÑkarAcArya is required for the correct interpretation of the brahmasUtra.

[atanu]

Namaste Sudarshan


When White shirt is seen as black, it is asat only because the black shirt never existed. Where is mithya in here? Then please show an example for asat. This is called pratibhasika satya in advaita.


The shirt is the subject and it appears as black. Similarly Brahman is the subject and it appears fragmented to the ignorant mind.

You put yourself in great trouble. Since Brahman also is not known to you and me correctly (like the white shirt is not known correctly), so Brahman is also Asat?

You put yourself in great trouble. Since Brahman also is not known to you and me correctly (like the white shirt is not known correctly), so Brahman is also Asat?

You put yourself in great trouble. Since Brahman also is not known to you and me correctly (like the white shirt is not known correctly), so Brahman is also Asat?


To know One underlying reality it is essential to see one unbroken substratum. And this the Self only, since shruti says Ayam Atma Brahma.

It is very simple for me. Knowing a lot of shastra is not important but knowing God as one's own Self is all that one needs to know. And this will come from love.




Shruti says that Brahman is free from all evil. There is no question of Karma residing inside Brahman.


Yes. So, when Shruti says that Brahman alone existed, where these beginningless karma existed?


Jiva knows Atma though direct intution. Why should anything become something else to know it? Is there a known example of anyone needing to become an entity to know it?

Yes. So, when Jiva knows Atman the true "I", it is known as Advaita and Atman (the eternally true Me). Brahma Sutra's teaching that Mukta attains its own nature and becomes inseparable from Brahman is enough.

Water and milk are separable. The fruit and seed are separable.

To know Atman, complicated terms and theories are not required. Meditation and Samadhi into one's own heart is required.

Om

[sarabhanga]

“But that (brahman is to be known from the scriptures) because It is the main purport (of all vedAnta texts)”

The word tu (“but”) in the sUtra refutes the objections of mImAMsA.

The vedAnta texts refer to brahman only, for all of them have brahman as their main topic.

The 6th chapter of the chAndogyopaniSad, for example, begins with: “This universe was but the Real, in the beginning.” And the chapter concludes with: “In it all that exists has its self. It is true. It is the Self.” Thus, the introduction and conclusion both refer to the brahman; and the frequent repetition of “Thou art That” refers to the same brahman. And the purport of the whole chapter is only the brahman.

The current trend, however, is to ignore context, brahmamImAMsA, and natural logic, in interpretations, and then to arrive at a purport based on misapplied rules !

[atanu]

Please check for Maya.

Om

[atanu]

Please check for Visva Maya.

Please check for Purusha who is vishnu, Rudra, Indra, Brahma.

Please check for Sadashiva -- all knowledge, the I, the Om, Brahma Pati.

Please check for the samana -- Shiv.

Om

[sm78]

Any comments any one?

Om

Ya, the one I made sometime back...panditya without anubhuti is worthless.

[atanu]

Namaste Saidevoji,


Namaste Atanuji.

---4. The Charge of AnirvacanIyatvAnupapatti.

The Advaitins says that Maya is anirvacanIyA, i.e., incapable of definition, because it is neither an entity (sat) nor a non-entity (asat). To hold such a view is impossible. All cognitions relate to entities or non-entities; and if it be held that the object of a cognition has neither the positive characteristics of an entity nor the negative characteristics of a non-entity, then all things may become the objects of all cognitions.

Criticism.--This difficulty is couched in a very clever and catchy way. Yet the whole rests on a misconception, viz., the want or perceiving clearly what the "tertium comparationis" is in each case. Sat and asat sound two contradictory conceptions, and to say that a thing ("an object of cognition") is neither sat nor asat is not to say anything about it at all. But the thing is thought of in two wholly different aspects, and the tertium comparationis is not common to both.

Maya, we say, is neither sat nor asat, neither an 'entity' nor a 'non-entity.' It is not sat, since the Atman alone is real, and it is not asat, since it appears at least, or in other words, maintains itself as an iva ('as it were'). Where is the contradiction now? Does not this very fact allow us to speak of Maya as something mysterious, incapable of a strict definition ?

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You must have noticed that Sudarshan used this point and you might have noticed the refutation with the example of a white shirt appearing as black.

In addition to the very able refutation of VA position wrt to Maya being neither a being nor a non-being (neither sat nor asat) given in your account, I wish to expand on this point a bit. Sat is true (being) and Asat is that which has no existence at all and has no possibility of existence as well.

Actually, the scope of definition of Sat and Asat that VA proponents use to level the criticism boomerangs on them.

VA proponents ask, how that which gets removed (Maya) be not Asat? They define illusion, which hides ( or functions to hide) till ignorance is destroyed, as Asat, since it is not a constancy. In other words, illusion, which is now there and not there later, must be termed as asat. And then they continue further, how can Asat, which is non-existent like son of a barren woman, hide a truth called Brahman?

How can what is not there hide what is there? It seems to be very strong logic. Apparently only, however.

Using such a logic, Brahman also should be Asat, since the knowledge of Brahman is not a constancy. We do not see it now but it will be revealed only on liberation, so Brahman should also be termed Asat, based on VA definition of Sat and Asat.

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However, this kind of argumentation is futile, since there is no way that a thinker can know the person who is thinking. Intuiting this, one may simply meditate.

Om

[saidevo]

Namaste Atanu ji.



Actually, the scope of definition of Sat and Asat that VA proponents use to level the criticism boomerangs on them.

VA proponents ask, how that which gets removed (Maya) be not Asat? They define illusion, which hides ( or functions to hide) till ignorance is destroyed, as Asat, since it is not a constancy. In other words, illusion, which is now there and not there later, must be termed as asat. And then they continue further, how can Asat, which is non-existent like son of a barren woman, hide a truth called Brahman?

How can what is not there hide what is there? It seems to be very strong logic. Apparently only, however.

Using such a logic, Brahman also should be Asat, since the knowledge of Brahman is not a constancy. We do not see it now but it will be revealed only on liberation, so Brahman should also be termed Asat, based on VA definition of Sat and Asat.


You have nicely expanded the point of Maya being 'anirvacanIyA' by the analogy of a white shirt appearing blank in darkness and by the logic used in the above quote. Since I am not well read in the Upanishads I have not tried to answer Sudarshan's points, which anyway have been well discussed by you, Sarabhanga and Yajvan. However, I understand that refutations of Ramanuja's objections to Advaita is an endless debate even among pandits.

Let me first understand the correct meanings and definitions of the terms (correct me if and where I am wrong):

1. 'sat' in Advaita means 'absolute reality', the equivalent Sanskrit term being 'pAramArthika satyaM' (supreme/whole/essential truth).

2. 'asat' is the other extreme, the 'absolute unreality' that neither exists ever nor has any scope for existence at any point of time, space or other reference, such as 'a hare's horn' or 'the son of a barren woman'.

3. That which is neither 'sat' nor 'asat' has two kinds of impermanent existence: 'vyAvahArika satyaM', the operational reality and 'prAtibhAsika satyaM', the subjective reality.

4. The term 'mithyA' includes all that comes in between 'sat' and 'asat', that is both the operational and subjective reality.

5. Thus Maya is neither 'sat' nor 'asat' but only 'mithyA', since it belongs to the order of the 'mithyA' type of reality.

6. 'sat' as the absolute reality never changes but serves as a substratum of all that is 'mithyA'. The question of 'sat' serving as the substratum of the 'asat' never arises because 'asat' as absolute unreality is a non-entity.

7. 'sat' as the absolute reality remains the same at all levels of existence (waking, dreaming, deep sleep, 'turiya' and behond), unaffected by any other kinds of reality ('mithyA') experienced in the different levels.

7. Since 'sat' is the only (absolute) reality, any other kind of (impermanent) reality can only be an appearance, Maya in other words. The world that appears uniformly real to the entire mankind disappears in sleep. The dream world that appears as the subjective reality to the dreamer disappears when he/she wakes up. Any 'reality' experienced in deep sleep also is not 'sat' because of the fourth level ('turiya') of existence.

8. Creation also belongs to the 'mithyA' category of reality: everything is 'made up' from something else and has a lesser permanence than what it is made of (e.g. the pot and the clay). Relentless pursuit of this idea of permanence** not only reveals the underlying 'sat' or absolute reality but brings up the knowledge that it is the 'sat' that appears as the universe and its beings at all levels of existence.

9. The wrong and empirical perception is due to 'avidyA' (nescience), which is the imposition of name and form (or in other words an abuse of speech) to the temporal reality of the illusory Maya. In realizing the Self as Atman or Brahman, the 'avidyA' is not removed but only cleared and dispelled; it vanishes like darkness on which the light is shone.

10. Thus Maya and 'avidyA' are synonyms. They exist since creation started, but in the Hindu philosophy creation and dissolution are cyclic and eternal, so both Maya and 'avidyA' are 'anAdi' (beginningless).

Here is a quote that has some bearing on our discussions in this thread:



The Gaudiyas have concluded that Brahman is both one and different simultaneously, and that this is possible because the Absolute possesses inconceivable power (acintya-sakti). Others have developed terms such as anirvacaniya (Sankara), aprthak-siddhi (Ramanuja), svabhavika (Nimbarka), visesa (Madhva), and samavaya (Vallabha) to bring logic to bear on the oneness and difference of Brahman, when in reality the simultaneous oneness and difference of the absolute is acintya (inconceivable). Indeed, careful study of these other doctrines of Vedanta reveals that they implicitly acknowledge the acintya-sakti of the Absolute but are unable to identify it as such.

(http://www.gaudiyadiscussions.com/index.php?showtopic=2973&st=150)


Note: **I am reminded of a wedding reception gift that was typical in the olden days in the wedding of a South Indian brahmin. The wedded couple is presented a gift wrapped parcel. They open the cover by tearing it off, only to find another wrapper. They open this too and then is there is another wrapper under it. In this way, they relentlessly (or rather impatiently) tear off each later of wrapper to find the tiny gift at the center: a baby doll!

[atanu]

Ya, the one I made sometime back...panditya without anubhuti is worthless.

Namaste,


Shankara's interpretation using bhAga-tyAga laxana( do you know what it is?) is against the rules of sAmAnadhikaraNya given by the sUtra "bhinna pravriththi nimiththAnAm sAbdAnAm ekasmin arthe vriththi sAmAnAdhikaraNyam". People are simply equating tat with tvam and claiming that advaita has been proved.

Words such as pravriththi, nimiththAnAm etc. are indeed positive signs of increasingly out-of-reach panditya.

Om

[yajvan]

Hari Om
~~~~~~



4. The term 'mithyA' includes all that comes in between 'sat' and 'asat', that is both the operational and subjective reality.



Namaste saidevo and atanu,
a great conversation... may I offer a suggestion? As you offer words that are not common to all, can you define them?
[ this was feedback we got a few months back from the HDF members ]

In the above example mithyA is discussed , yet a higher value to the reader perhaps would be the definition on the word itself e.g.

mithyA मिथ्या is defined as invertedly , contrarily , incorrectly , wrongly , improperly ; falsely , deceitfully , untruly; to turn out or prove false.

On a side note:
As you wrote saidevo "__comes in between 'sat' and 'asat' __" is insightful. In jyotish the satya peetha or seat of truth in ones chart ( janma kundali) is seen from the lagna or birth ascendant and the 7th house from it, or death. All the happenings 'in between' is that of this ~ maya~ and mala that has been discussed. The 'truth' of your existence coming into this manifestation via the lagna, and your exiting from this creation is opposite of lagna ( which is also the 12th from the 8th house, as a fyi note a place of endings).
And when one wants to look at 'you' as the rest of socitey sees you, then one looks to the Arudha Lagna, the ~reflection~ or image of the lagna.



Any hoo,
...just an idea to improve your already great posts!

pranams,

[sarabhanga]

Namaste,

mithyA is a contraction of mithUyA or mithunyA.

The verbal root mith means “to unite, pair, couple, meet, alternate, engage in altercation, or dash together”.

mithas means “together, mutually, reciprocally, alternately, to or from or with each other, privately, in secret, by contest or dispute”.

mithu (or mithU) means “together, alternately, perversely, falsely, or wrongly”.

mithuna means “united or uniting, paired or forming a pair, coupled or coupling, opposed, alternating, altercating, dashing or dashed together”.

mithuna indicates “a pair, couple, or twins”, or “the other part, complement, companion, alternative, opposite or opposition of anything”.

And mithuna refers to “the statue at the entrance of a temple, honey and ghee, or a grammatical root compounded with a preposition.

mithunyA (mithUyA, mithuyA) means “mutually, reciprocally, alternately, conflictingly, contrarily, inversely, perversely, deceitfully, untruly, falsely, wrongly, or incorrectly”.

And mithyA implies all of these meanings, along with connotations of “not in reality, only apparently, to no purpose, fruitlessly, or in vain”.

mithyA is “reciprocated, reflected, inverted, opposed, conflicted, contrary, incorrect, wrong, improper, perverse, false, deceitful, untrue, unreal, only apparent, sham, pointless, fruitless, or vain”; and mithyA is personified as the wife of adharma (“unrighteousness, injustice, irreligion, wickedness, demerit, or guilt”).

The first conception of mith is mithuna ~ “the twin” (http://www.hindudharmaforums.com/showpost.php?p=8374&postcount=6) ~ from which the whole mythology is descended. :)

[atanu]

Hari Om
~~~~~~
Namaste saidevo and atanu,

In the above example mithyA is discussed , yet a higher value to the reader perhaps would be the definition on the word itself e.g.

mithyA मिथ्या is defined as invertedly , contrarily , incorrectly , wrongly , improperly ; falsely , deceitfully , untruly; to turn out or prove false.

Any hoo,
...just an idea to improve your already great posts!

pranams,

Namaste Yajvan,

Thank you for giving the meanings of Mithya. Yet, it is not mithya that is the main bone of contention. It is logic.

It is the logic of VA and Dvaitins that Maya should be termed asat (by advaitins), since maya is found to be non-existent on removal of avidya. Then it is pointed out that how asat can cover up sat? How what has no existence hides Brahman -- the sat?


Om

[atanu]

Namaste,

mithyA is “reciprocated, reflected, inverted, opposed, conflicted, contrary, incorrect, wrong, improper, perverse, false, deceitful, untrue, unreal, only apparent, sham, pointless, fruitless, or vain”; and mithyA is personified as the wife of adharma (“unrighteousness, injustice, irreligion, wickedness, demerit, or guilt”).

The first conception of mith is mithuna ~ “the twin” (http://www.hindudharmaforums.com/showpost.php?p=8374&postcount=6) ~ from which the whole mythology is descended. :)


Namaskar Sarabhanga,

Double namaskar to you. This is an elegant piece of intuitional insight.

I would like to hear from ZN -- on the twin.

Om Namah Shivaya