Re: Thoughts on the value of doubt
Namaste, Parvana.
The Tragical History of Western Epistemology’s Modern Hubris in Twenty Minutes, Regarding Doubt:
At the inception of the modern era of philosophy, the genius Rene Descartes penned his famous Meditations, the first book of which was titled, “De iis quae in dubium revocare possunt,” or, “Regarding things that can be called into doubt.” Included in this summoning was no less than the entire foundation of human thought. The fundamental precepts of rational cognition were reduced to complete uncertainty. His solution was to devise a system of knowing, based on incontestable assertions. For example, his famous credo is “Cogito ergo sum,” or, “I think, therefore, I am.” Even one scarcely trained in argumentation immediately sees the fallacious nature of this conclusion, namely, that it is stated at the outset of the argument, being contained in the premises. Thus, we have a principio principii, or petition at the outset, the infamous fallacy of “begging the question.”
Viz., He states that he exists when he says “I think.” He then concludes that he exists. The reasoning is commonly referred to as “circular.”
Centuries later, Descartes has left us with what has been coined the “strong criterion” for knowledge, or, classically stated, justified, true belief. On the strong model, justification for a belief must be infallible in order for the proposition, which expresses the epistemic state of believing, to be eligible for syntactic predication with the term “knowledge.” Of course, the belief must also be able to be expressed as a proposition, which assumes that its content admits of kind and degree. The other latent assumption is that whatever “real” content to which a belief corresponds is something that can be dealt with by means of propositional structures and analytic manipulation.
With the strong criterion, thinkers can’t afford themselves enough material in order to make their precious predictions about things that don’t exist or haven’t happened. Hence, they have assumed the “weak criterion,” which states that a belief’s justification need only be reasonable in order to qualify it for structural predication with propositional knowledge.
Viz., I need only be reasonable sure that I am looking at the North Star in order to say that I know “I am looking at the north Star” (assuming it is true and I believe it).
Now the theorists have much more room to play their polemics against nature, citing axioms, norms, methods of induction, and arbitrary conclusions and principles, e.g., conservatism, internal and external consistency, scope, and the principle of parsimony, or Occam’s Razor. “Data” is the word of the hour. It’s odd how such an overbearing apparatus fills itself with such meaningless airs.
But these methods have been so successful at bringing progress, we say. We look with our eyes to our machines, drugs, and weapons. And we laud those with no vision because they are successful at forcing others to stare. All the while, we become more convinced that doubt is the way. It will prop us over mountains, as long as we bear their weight.
And they are dreadful, saying: Doubt your soul. Doubt the Gods. Doubt the value of song and story. Doubt that love is divine and unconditional.
Why not take a break from this burden and wander into the gentle valleys below, even if they are in fog? I hear it rises from the warm springs there.
The Greek mathematician Archimedes said, “Give me a lever large enough and a place on which to stand, and I will move the world.” But we cannot move the world; it moves us. Contrary to Protagoras’s decree, man is not the measure of all things. But all things are the measure of man, if he can leave behind his doubt.
Doubt can never know the mind of God.
"Be the change you wish to see in other people." ~Gandhi
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