The Sidhanta -- Great or not?

[atanu]

THE GREAT SIDDH�NTA.

This entire theory rests on a fictitious foundation of altogether hollow and vicious arguments, incapable of being stated in definite logical alternatives, and devised by men who are destitute of those particular qualities which cause individuals to be chosen by the Supreme Person revealed in the Upanishads; whose intellects are darkened by the impression of beginningless evil; and who thus have no insight into the nature of words and sentences, into the real purport conveyed by them, and into the procedure of sound argumentation, with all its methods depending on perception and the other instruments of right knowledge. The theory therefore must needs be rejected by all those who, through texts, perception and the other means of knowledge--assisted by sound reasoning--have an insight into the true nature of things.


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The above is the beginning of Shri Ramanuja's refutation of Advaita. I note that in the beginning itself, before any refutation has taken place, the Purvapakshin (i.e. Advaitin -- Shankara et al) is thrown to the beginningless evil and termed as having darkened intelects. A good beginning and the tradition is alive.

Any comments any one?


Om

[yajvan]

THE GREAT SIDDH�NTA.

Any comments any one? Om

Ouch!

[saidevo]

Namaste Atanuji.

The above is the beginning of Shri Ramanuja's refutation of Advaita. I note that in the beginning itself, before any refutation has taken place, the Purvapakshin (i.e. Advaitin -- Shankara et al) is thrown to the beginningless evil and termed as having darkened intelects. A good beginning and the tradition is alive.

What you have pointed out above makes one wonder if Ramanuja does not sound like the Christian theologians! Anyway, here is a compilation of how the renowned Hindu scholar Prabhu Dutt Shastri refutes Ramanuja's arguments against Advaita, taken from the author's book The Doctrine of Maya. This is a rather long compilation but is worth reading as it covers all the points of objections raised by Ramanuja.

I am compiling a synopsis of the book that has very useful information Maya; I shall post it in HDF as early as possible.

From the book 'The Doctrine of Maya' by Prabhu Dutt Shastri
Tenets of Advaita

The three principal tenets of Advaita are:

a) That the only true existence is that of Brahman.
b) That Brahman is identical with the Atman.
c) That the universe is Maya, having only a phenomenal or relative existence.

Tenets of Vishishtadvaita

The Ramanujas represent the theistic school of the Vedanta. They worship Vishnu as their Brahman, in opposition to Sankara's Nirguna Brahman, and, denying that the deity is void of form or quality, regard him as endowed with all good and auspicious qualities, and with a two-fold form: the supreme spirit (Paramatma, or cause), and the gross one (the effect, the universe, or matter). Their doctrine is consequently known as Vishishtadvaita, or the doctrine of Unity with attributes.

Ramanuja himself has furnished us with a summary of his main teachings in the introduction to his Vedantadipa. He starts with what he calls the three primary and ultimate certainties known to philosophy, viz.--

1. God (Hari). Universal Soul, personal, and intelligent.
2. Soul (cit). Individual, intelligent.
3. Matter (acit). Non-intelligent.

Each of these three entities is distinct from the other: God, the Supreme Soul of the Universe, is distinct from the individual soul, which again is distinct from non-intelligent matter. This difference is intrinsic and natural. The relation between God and the universe (matter and soul) is that of cause and effect. Matter and soul form the body of God, which in its subtle condition is the universe in its causal state, and in its gross condition the created universe itself. The individual soul enters into matter, and thereby makes it live; and, similarly, God enters into matter and soul and gives them their powers and their peculiar characters. The universe without God is exactly analogous to matter without soul.

Brahman (which is identified with Hari in this system) is regarded as having svagatabheda, i.e., differences within itself in its threefold aspects referred to above. It is imagined to be like a tree, which, though one, has differences within itself in the shape of its branches, etc.

Ramanuja's Refutation of Advaita and its Validity

Ramanuja's criticism of the theory of Maya is embodied in his greatest work, The SribhASya, a commentary on BAdarAyana's Brahmasutras. His exposition of the first Sutra occupies the largest space in his treatise, and this criticism appears under the same division. Ramanuja brings seven charges against the doctrine of Maya. We reproduce the gist of each, in order, with a criticism of our own.

i. The charge of AsrayAnupapatti.

What is the Asraya (seat) of Maya (or avidyA)? Residing in what does it produce illusion? Surely not in the individual self, because the selfhood of the individual self is itself projected by avidyA; neither could it reside in Brahman, since He has the essential nature of self-luminous intelligence, and is
thus opposed to avidyA (ignorance).

Criticism.--This objection rests upon a two-fold misinterpretation. In the first place, Ramanuja starts with the idea that Maya (or avidyA) is some thing real, and consequently demands a seat for this 'illusion' or 'ignorance'. AvidyA is decidedly not a reality: it is only the negation of vidyA, or the obscuration of it. As the fire is latent in the wood, so is our godly nature, our spiritual principle, hidden by the upAdhis.

In the second place, Ramanuja makes an unwarranted differentiation between Brahman and the individual soul. In stating the position of the Advaitin he has no right to colour it with his own conceptions. We, after Sankara, do not admit such a difference between the two. Brahman becomes the individual soul only by upAdhis, i.e., self-imposed limitations of manas, ten senses, subtle body, Karma, etc. These upAdhis may figuratively be spoken of as limiting the Atman and resolving it into the two aspects of the Highest Atman (Brahman) and the individual Atman. If, therefore, we are pressed by Ramanuja to state the residence of avidyA, we may meet him by saying that it must, if at all conceived as such, reside in the upAdhis the mind (manas), the senses, etc. As a matter of fact, this demand of Ramanuja seems to be unjustifiable and inadmissible. It wholly rests upon his supposition of the reality of avidyA.

2. The Charge of TirodhAnAnupapatti.

The supposed 'ignorance' cannot, as maintained by its upholders, conceal Brahman, whose essential nature is self-luminosity. The concealment of luminosity means either (a) the obstruction of the origination of luminosity, or (b) the destruction of existing luminosity. But as it is held that the luminosity of Brahman is incapable of being a produced thing, the concealment of luminosity must mean the destruction of luminosity, which, in other words, amounts to the destruction of the essential nature of Brahman.

Criticism.--This objection is based upon Ramanuja's losing hold of the real position of the upholders of Maya. Our 'ignorance' is merely negative. It has no positive existence to be able to conceal anything else in the strict sense. Brahman is ever the same in its splendour and luminosity, but we fail to see it only through our own avidyA, which can, therefore, in no way be said to be able to conceal Brahman in the sense of destroying its luminosity. In the same way, if a follower of Ramanuja were to ask Kant, "Why do we not see the thing-in-itself (das Ding-an-sich)?" he would at once reply, "Because between that and ourselves are the intellectual forms (upddhis] of Time, Space, and Causality." Thus we are not explaining away the difficulty pointed out by Ramanuja when we say that we deny the concealment (tirodhAna) of Brahman by ignorance (avidyA).

3. The Charge of SvarUpAnupapatti.

What is the essential nature of avidyA? As long as it is a thing at all, it must either have the nature of reality or of unreality. But it is not admitted to be a reality; and it cannot be an unreality, for, as long as a real misguiding error, different from Brahman Himself, is not admitted, so long it is not possible to explain the theory of illusion. If Brahman Himself have the character of the misguiding error, then, owing to his eternity, there would be no final release to the individual self.

Here Ramanuja rightly understands the standpoint, but at once again makes a great confusion and becomes inconsistent when criticizing the theory on the basis of the assumed reality of Maya.

Criticism.--The whole difficulty is purely factitious. Certainly we do not admit the reality of Maya, but at the same time we do not hold that it is unreal from the empirical standpoint as well. Empirically it is sat (existing): the world is, but it is Maya. Ramanuja is too anxious and tactful to corner us by his dilemmas. But as a rule these dilemmas have one of the two horns already broken, since he generally starts with self-assumed premises, and draws his own inferences from them, most logically, of course.

The question as to what is the cause of Maya is, in the sense in which it is asked, an illegitimate one. Causality is the general law in the world (in Maya), but it has no warrant to transcend itself and ask, "What is the cause of Maya?" The category only applies within the phenomenal world, and at once breaks down when stretched out of it. Everything within Maya has a cause, but Maya has no cause. The same fact would be stated by Kant in the words "Causality is the universal law of the empirical world". Hence the question as to causality being meaningless in the present context, we are not obliged to answer it.

Again, when Ramanuja suggests that "as long as a real misguiding error, different from Brahman, is not admitted, so long it is not possible to explain the theory," the suggestion seems to us to convey hardly any meaning, since the moment we grant a real existence to Maya, our whole theory falls with it; a real dualism between the two realities (facing each other) will be at once created, and this will in no way afford even the slightest explanation of the theory. We wonder how Ramanuja himself would try to explain the theory even on these dualistic premises. The whole of this charge, therefore, is imaginary and futile.

4. The Charge of AnirvacanIyatvAnupapatti.

The Advaitins says that Maya is anirvacanIyA, i.e., incapable of definition, because it is neither an entity (sat) nor a non-entity (asat). To hold such a view is impossible. All cognitions relate to entities or non-entities; and if it be held that the object of a cognition has neither the positive characteristics of an entity nor the negative characteristics of a non-entity, then all things may become the objects of all cognitions.

Criticism.--This difficulty is couched in a very clever and catchy way. Yet the whole rests on a misconception, viz., the want or perceiving clearly what the "tertium comparationis" is in each case. Sat and asat sound two contradictory conceptions, and to say that a thing ("an object of cognition") is neither sat nor asat is not to say anything about it at all. But the thing is thought of in two wholly different aspects, and the tertium comparationis is not common to both.

Maya, we say, is neither sat nor asat, neither an 'entity' nor a 'non-entity.' It is not sat, since the Atman alone is real, and it is not asat, since it appears at least, or in other words, maintains itself as an iva ('as it were'). Where is the contradiction now? Does not this very fact allow us to speak of Maya as something mysterious, incapable of a strict definition ?

5. The charge of PramAnAnupapatti.

Is there any means by which this curious avidyA is brought within the range of our cognition? It can neither be proved by perception nor by inference. Neither can it be established by revelation, as the scriptural passages can be explained otherwise.

Criticism.--In the light of what we have said above this objection stands self-condemned. When we do not believe in the real existence of Maya, what logic is there in requiring us to prove the existence of it? If we had granted its reality, then indeed we could be called upon to name the source of its knowledge perception, inference, revelation, etc. However, to prove the validity of our conception we do not require any marshalled arguments or formal syllogisms. It is as clear as anything, when we recall to our mind the nature of avidyA, which, as we have shown after Sankara, is an erroneous transfer of the things and relations of the objective world to the Self in the strictest sense of the word.

Further, Ramanuja examines a few scriptural passages, and giving them another interpretation, infers that all such passages can be so explained as not to corroborate the theory of avidyA. He might draw any meaning out of the few passages he has gone into, so long as he is bent upon showing the untenableness of Maya, but there still remains a large number of passages, among which the metaphysics of Yajnavalkya occupies a prominent place, that defy all such attempts at a forced, far-fetched and perverted interpretation.

When we know that we are in reality no other than the Absolute Spirit, and that the Atman is the only reality; and yet we feel that we are different from the Absolute and that the world in which we live, move and have our being, is real, to what shall we attribute this clash between our knowledge and feelings? Is it not a mystery? And what else could we say but that this is due to our ignorance, the 'erroneous transference' spoken of above?

6. The Charge of NivartakAnupapatti.

This difficulty is in relation to the idea that the cessation of avidyA takes place solely by means of the knowledge which has the attributeless Brahman for its object. Brahman is not without attributes and qualities, since there are many passages which prove that He is possessed of these. Moreover, the grammatical equations, such as "tattvam asi" ("That art Thou"), do not denote the oneness of any attributeless thing, they are not intended to give rise to the stultification of any illusion due to avidyA; but they simply show that Brahman is capable of existing in two different modes or forms. The universe is the body of which Brahman is the soul. He is Himself all the three entities God, soul and matter. Consequently, the knowledge which has an attributeless Brahman for its object is impossible and cannot be the complete knowledge of truth; and obviously such an impossible knowledge of the oneness of the attributeless Brahman cannot be the remover of the avidyA postulated by the Advaitins.

Criticism.--The force of this objection lies mainly in the supposition that "Brahman is not without attributes," and it is further pointed out by Ramanuja that many passages of the Sruti prove this thesis. In the light of Sankara's Advaita, as briefly described in Chapter II, we fail to see the force of this argument. To say that there are some scriptural passages bearing out the assertion may equally be met by the counter-proposition that there are also passages countenancing the attributelessness of Brahman. If, then, both these assertions neutralize each other from the scriptural point of view, one may well ask, What then is the real trend and purport of the Vaidic thought? It seems to us that this question could not be better answered than by repeating the doctrine of Sankara when he attempted to synthesize the whole of the Sruti by taking a wide conspectus of its purport. All passages which speak of the qualified Brahman may be placed under aparA vidyA, while parA will include only those that expound the metaphysical truth as it is. Brahman may, from a lower standpoint, be conceived as "with attributes," but the ultimate truth remains that He is really "without attributes." Besides, the conception of the Absolute in the strict sense leaves hardly any room for "attributes." Impose any attributes and you at once make the Absolute "non-absolute," i.e., destroy his very nature by making paricchinna (limited) that which is aparicchinna (without limits).

Again, Ramanuja denies that the text, 'tat tvam asi,' denotes the oneness of the individual with the attributeless Universal, and holds that it simply brings out Brahman's capability of existing in two forms or modes. Now, this seems to us to be an ambiguous use of language. That Brahman exists in two opposite forms will be meaningless if one of the forms were not supposed to be due to avidyA. How can a being exist in two contradictory forms? Cit and acit are two opposite notions in the system of Ramanuja, but he has not succeeded in reconciling their existence by merely saying that they are two modes of the Absolute. To picture the universe as the body of Brahman is after all a mere analogy, which hardly makes the matter even a jot clearer. Even by investing God with all auspicious attributes, how will Ramanuja account for the existence of evil '(moral) or error (psychological)? Simply to say, as did Plato, that God is good, hence the universe must be good, is no explanation, but a mere shirking of the question. Like Plato, Ramanuja uses many analogies and metaphors while speaking of Brahman, but the Advaitist cannot but take all these as mere mythical representations.

Hence, with our denial of the qualified aspect of Brahman as a metaphysical truth is linked the denial of "the impossibility of the knowledge which has an attributeless Brahman for its object."

AvidyA being like darkness is itself expelled when light comes in. JnAna is the remover of ajnAna. As we have already pointed out above, the expression 'knowledge of Brahman' is strictly inadmissible, since Brahman is itself knowledge (JnAna) of course the term being used in the higher sense of 'pure consciousness.'

7. The Charge of Nivrttyanupapatti.

The removal of the Advaitin's hypothetical 'ignorance' is quite impossible. The individual soul s bondage of 'ignorance' is determined by Karma and is a concrete reality. It cannot therefore be removed by any abstract knowledge but only by divine worship and grace. Moreover, according to the Advaitins the differentiation between the knower, knowledge, and the known is unreal; and even that knowledge, which is capable of removing avidyA has to be unreal and has to stand in need of another real removing knowledge.

Criticism.--Our struggle with Karma is undoubtedly real so long as our consciousness of the true nature of Brahman has not arisen. Karma, its determinations, and with it everything else, is supposed to be real, but only so far. We have already quoted passages from Sankara where he clearly and unequivocally makes this concession, 'vyAvahArically' (i.e., from the practical or empiric point of view), as he calls it. It may therefore be called 'a concrete reality,' but with the explicit understanding that such a reality is after all 'phenomenal.' We do not hold the efficacy of Karma in the case of one who has attained the knowledge of Brahman; such a man, being free from all desires and motives, all springs of action, is pari passu beyond the control of Karma in so far as he is not creating any fresh and new Karma for himself. The laws of Karma are valid within the phenomenal, but in no way do they produce any real knowledge to the Atman, whose very nature forbids all such bondages.

The idea of divine worship and grace may be supported for the sake of the ordinary minds unable to go round the higher path of pure knowledge. But surely the idea of grace, etc., is not an exalted conception. Truly speaking, grace is only possible when there is a direct and perfect communion in other words, an 'identity' between the two forms of consciousness. This fact, too, shows that the ultimate nature of man and God is 'Consciousness.' So long as our ignorance is not cast away by the acquirement of 'knowledge' which alone is capable of ousting its opponent liberation is impossible. Without such a knowledge, mere devotion or deeds will never lead one to the same goal.

As to the differentiation between the knower (jnAtA), knowledge (jnAna),and the known (jneya), we have to repeat that the distinction is certainly fictitious in the absolute sense. It is made by us and it is real for all our practical purposes. The metaphysical truth does not attempt to devour the world in its practical aspect. The knowledge removing avidyA if we are at all to say 'removal' of avidyA is not unreal. Unreal knowledge cannot destroy unreality. Knowledge in the lower sense of a relation between 'subject' and 'object' is of course unreal, but such knowledge is unable to give a deathblow to avidyA. On the dawning of true knowledge the artificial distinction between 'subject' and 'object' vanishes. "By what shall we know the knower (the subject of all knowledge)?" as was so forcibly asked by Yajnavalkya.

Conclusion

These are in brief the seven difficulties which Ramanuja perceived in the doctrine of Maya. As will appear from what we have said above, Ramanuja's criticism rests on the whole on a misunderstanding of the genuine Advaita standpoint. All through he has been treating Maya as if it were a concrete reality, even perhaps existing in space, etc. We do not accuse him even because he attempted to reject Sankara's premises. But we fail to see his consistency, when even on his own premises he falls short of furnishing a really adequate explanation of the relation between God and the Universe. His doctrine of divine grace, devotion, etc., is apt to appeal strongly to many Christian theologians, who will therefore naturally prefer his philosophy to that of Sankara. Be as it may, to us it seems evident that Sankara's analysis of Reality went much further than Ramanuja's. The impersonal conception of the Absolute, we hold, is truly personal, if there is any real meaning in 'personality.' This is how we will meet those who cannot hold any such doctrine to be the ultimate if it destroys the idea of the divine personality.

[yajvan]

Hari Om
~~~~~

1. God (Hari). Universal Soul, personal, and intelligent.
2. Soul (cit). Individual, intelligent.
3. Matter (acit). Non-intelligent.


It is imagined to be like a tree, which, though one, has differences within itself in the shape of its branches, etc.

Namaste saidevo,

A most excellent post saidevo, thank you for your efforts and organizing power to lay this out succinctly. As you have offered much, it makes sense to perhaps view various parts for commentary and not boil the ocean on this matter.

Then notion of the tree is very attractive when discussing Brahman. As mentioned, the tree in fact has different qualities throughout... the beauty is in the sap as the metaphor ~example~ of Brahman.

The sap becomes the leafs, the bark, the branches and the root. IT - ITself remains clear and behind the expression of the tree. The tree is the expression of the sap. The universe is an expression of Brahman. Yet one can say the leaf is the sap, so is the branch, or bark, just in a different form.

Like that when we speak of the Supreme + the Individual + matter we can perhaps view it in the same light. All expressions of Supreme Consciousness. That suggest that even matter is this consciousness that is expressed in the Universe as such. This is the views of Vasistha, that all this is conciousness, subtler then prana, subtler then my favorite akasha.
That is why when the enlightened look at a rock, gold, a flower, a tree that see even-ness, the same thing,an expression of Consciousness.

So it depends on ones point of view. I respect Ramanuja's work as he brings this to bear and allows us to compare and contast his works to Adi Shankara. If one looks at it ( and I am not implying anyone on this post is suggesting so), is Ramanuja's way correct or Shankara's, then one misses the teaching.

To ponder the two views and look for the perspectives that grooms ones view to understand Reality is the benefit. This is the same blessing of the 6 classical systems of Indian Philosophy. I mention these works as classical to mean orthodox (astika) as they accept the authority of the Vedas as final. The notion of offering 6 optical views (drsti) of Reality.

They, the 6 systems, are so complete in themselves, that any one can stand on their own, yet the value is the cross-pollinization of the Truths in our minds to compare and contrast.
As one view or school may hold true for a person's experience at a particular point in time, then another view. This is the blessing offered from these schools; yet like humans we think these schools are football teams and only applaud our home team and our team (school of philosophy) is the only right one.

I look forward to your additional posts on Ramanuja..perhaps this will bring you to his nine precious gems , or Navarathnas.

pranams,

[Sudarshan]

THE GREAT SIDDH�NTA.

This entire theory rests on a fictitious foundation of altogether hollow and vicious arguments, incapable of being stated in definite logical alternatives, and devised by men who are destitute of those particular qualities which cause individuals to be chosen by the Supreme Person revealed in the Upanishads; whose intellects are darkened by the impression of beginningless evil; and who thus have no insight into the nature of words and sentences, into the real purport conveyed by them, and into the procedure of sound argumentation, with all its methods depending on perception and the other instruments of right knowledge. The theory therefore must needs be rejected by all those who, through texts, perception and the other means of knowledge--assisted by sound reasoning--have an insight into the true nature of things.


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The above is the beginning of Shri Ramanuja's refutation of Advaita. I note that in the beginning itself, before any refutation has taken place, the Purvapakshin (i.e. Advaitin -- Shankara et al) is thrown to the beginningless evil and termed as having darkened intelects. A good beginning and the tradition is alive.

Any comments any one?


Om

Do you know what is the sanskrit equivalent of this translation? And how much the original words can be lost in an english translation?

BTW, it is not uncommon in the philosophical circles to refer to the adversaries by such titles. Even the great advaitin madhusUdana saraswathy who wrote the advaita siddhi calls Dvaitins by the word "dogs" and "wretches" in that work. So I must ask Saidevo if all advaitins really desist from such name calling - he should first read advaita works himself before calling people like Ramanuja as christian missionaries. Why, Shankara himself has claimed that all other philosophies other than his own are incorrect doctrines. Why does Vyasa himself a separate chapter for refuting all non vedic doctrines and even the traditional Hindu doctrines such as shankya and yoga? When did vedanta become a secular religion? No vedantin of any breed will compromise and accept the validity of all philosophies - it shows only muddled thinking. Accepting everything is a mere political gesture.

Atanu seems to have a go at the title - "Great Siddanta". Probably he thinks it is a boast in the commentary?

Actually, the commentary is dealing with two pUrvapakshas- the laghu(little) one that examines the necessity of karma kANDa, and the main pUrvapaksha, that evaluates the advaitin framework. Hence that part has been referred to as mahA pUrvapaksha and mahA siddhAnta - meaning the important siddhAnta.

These are the problems with those who rely on English translations to understand these works.

[Sudarshan]

Namaste Saidevo,

Ramanuja's Refutation of Advaita and its Validity

Ramanuja's criticism of the theory of Maya is embodied in his greatest work, The SribhASya, a commentary on BAdarAyana's Brahmasutras. His exposition of the first Sutra occupies the largest space in his treatise, and this criticism appears under the same division. Ramanuja brings seven charges against the doctrine of Maya. We reproduce the gist of each, in order, with a criticism of our own.

The author seems to be quite unaware that Vedanta Desika has expanded these charges and brings them under sixty six heads.

i. The charge of AsrayAnupapatti.

What is the Asraya (seat) of Maya (or avidyA)? Residing in what does it produce illusion? Surely not in the individual self, because the selfhood of the individual self is itself projected by avidyA; neither could it reside in Brahman, since He has the essential nature of self-luminous intelligence, and is
thus opposed to avidyA (ignorance).

Criticism.--This objection rests upon a two-fold misinterpretation. In the first place, Ramanuja starts with the idea that Maya (or avidyA) is some thing real, and consequently demands a seat for this 'illusion' or 'ignorance'. AvidyA is decidedly not a reality: it is only the negation of vidyA, or the obscuration of it. As the fire is latent in the wood, so is our godly nature, our spiritual principle, hidden by the upAdhis.

Aha, what is the basis for claiming that mAyA is unreal in the first place? shruti pramANa please, no handwaving please. Where does shruti teach that? And how can something unreal give rise to the unreal world and all that? Would any rational person agree with such a doctrine?

What is the basis of the theory of upAdi? Shruti does not teach that at all - it is an advaitin invention. Please use the ten major upanishads, Brahmsutras and Gita to prove the theory of upAdis.

In the second place, Ramanuja makes an unwarranted differentiation between Brahman and the individual soul. In stating the position of the Advaitin he has no right to colour it with his own conceptions. We, after Sankara, do not admit such a difference between the two. Brahman becomes the individual soul only by upAdhis, i.e., self-imposed limitations of manas, ten senses, subtle body, Karma, etc. These upAdhis may figuratively be spoken of as limiting the Atman and resolving it into the two aspects of the Highest Atman (Brahman) and the individual Atman. If, therefore, we are pressed by Ramanuja to state the residence of avidyA, we may meet him by saying that it must, if at all conceived as such, reside in the upAdhis the mind (manas), the senses, etc. As a matter of fact, this demand of Ramanuja seems to be unjustifiable and inadmissible. It wholly rests upon his supposition of the reality of avidyA.

The individual soul is mentioned to be different from Brahman all over the scripture. So Ramanuja is quite justified. Advaita takes a few verses out of context to demonstrate the identity of Atma and Brahman.

Advaita claims that mAyA is the cause of jIva, but claims that mAyA exists only because of jIva. Is there any logic here - pure mutual dependency.

2. The Charge of TirodhAnAnupapatti.

The supposed 'ignorance' cannot, as maintained by its upholders, conceal Brahman, whose essential nature is self-luminosity. The concealment of luminosity means either (a) the obstruction of the origination of luminosity, or (b) the destruction of existing luminosity. But as it is held that the luminosity of Brahman is incapable of being a produced thing, the concealment of luminosity must mean the destruction of luminosity, which, in other words, amounts to the destruction of the essential nature of Brahman.

Criticism.--This objection is based upon Ramanuja's losing hold of the real position of the upholders of Maya. Our 'ignorance' is merely negative. It has no positive existence to be able to conceal anything else in the strict sense. Brahman is ever the same in its splendour and luminosity, but we fail to see it only through our own avidyA, which can, therefore, in no way be said to be able to conceal Brahman in the sense of destroying its luminosity. In the same way, if a follower of Ramanuja were to ask Kant, "Why do we not see the thing-in-itself (das Ding-an-sich)?" he would at once reply, "Because between that and ourselves are the intellectual forms (upddhis] of Time, Space, and Causality." Thus we are not explaining away the difficulty pointed out by Ramanuja when we say that we deny the concealment (tirodhAna) of Brahman by ignorance (avidyA).

That, the mAyA is unreal needs proof. You can't assume the truth of mAyA=unreal to prove your premises. This is like assuming that 1=2 initially and then claiming that 4=5 because 1+3=2+3.

3. The Charge of SvarUpAnupapatti.

What is the essential nature of avidyA? As long as it is a thing at all, it must either have the nature of reality or of unreality. But it is not admitted to be a reality; and it cannot be an unreality, for, as long as a real misguiding error, different from Brahman Himself, is not admitted, so long it is not possible to explain the theory of illusion. If Brahman Himself have the character of the misguiding error, then, owing to his eternity, there would be no final release to the individual self.

Here Ramanuja rightly understands the standpoint, but at once again makes a great confusion and becomes inconsistent when criticizing the theory on the basis of the assumed reality of Maya.

Criticism.--The whole difficulty is purely factitious. Certainly we do not admit the reality of Maya, but at the same time we do not hold that it is unreal from the empirical standpoint as well. Empirically it is sat (existing): the world is, but it is Maya. Ramanuja is too anxious and tactful to corner us by his dilemmas. But as a rule these dilemmas have one of the two horns already broken, since he generally starts with self-assumed premises, and draws his own inferences from them, most logically, of course.

The question as to what is the cause of Maya is, in the sense in which it is asked, an illegitimate one. Causality is the general law in the world (in Maya), but it has no warrant to transcend itself and ask, "What is the cause of Maya?" The category only applies within the phenomenal world, and at once breaks down when stretched out of it. Everything within Maya has a cause, but Maya has no cause. The same fact would be stated by Kant in the words "Causality is the universal law of the empirical world". Hence the question as to causality being meaningless in the present context, we are not obliged to answer it.

Again, when Ramanuja suggests that "as long as a real misguiding error, different from Brahman, is not admitted, so long it is not possible to explain the theory," the suggestion seems to us to convey hardly any meaning, since the moment we grant a real existence to Maya, our whole theory falls with it; a real dualism between the two realities (facing each other) will be at once created, and this will in no way afford even the slightest explanation of the theory. We wonder how Ramanuja himself would try to explain the theory even on these dualistic premises. The whole of this charge, therefore, is imaginary and futile.

Let us assume that you are not already prejudiced towards Advaita and come as beginner. What would convince that there are three kinds of entities.

1. Real 2. Unreal. 3. Neither Real Nor Unreal.

The third category is an invention of advaita. It has no proof in shruti. No scientist will accept the validity of the third state. Can you give an example of something that is neither real nor unreal?

4. The Charge of AnirvacanIyatvAnupapatti.

The Advaitins says that Maya is anirvacanIyA, i.e., incapable of definition, because it is neither an entity (sat) nor a non-entity (asat). To hold such a view is impossible. All cognitions relate to entities or non-entities; and if it be held that the object of a cognition has neither the positive characteristics of an entity nor the negative characteristics of a non-entity, then all things may become the objects of all cognitions.

Criticism.--This difficulty is couched in a very clever and catchy way. Yet the whole rests on a misconception, viz., the want or perceiving clearly what the "tertium comparationis" is in each case. Sat and asat sound two contradictory conceptions, and to say that a thing ("an object of cognition") is neither sat nor asat is not to say anything about it at all. But the thing is thought of in two wholly different aspects, and the tertium comparationis is not common to both.

Maya, we say, is neither sat nor asat, neither an 'entity' nor a 'non-entity.' It is not sat, since the Atman alone is real, and it is not asat, since it appears at least, or in other words, maintains itself as an iva ('as it were'). Where is the contradiction now? Does not this very fact allow us to speak of Maya as something mysterious, incapable of a strict definition ?

mAyA is referred all through shruti as a positive power of Brahman. There are no grounds to call it anivachanIya.

5. The charge of PramAnAnupapatti.

Is there any means by which this curious avidyA is brought within the range of our cognition? It can neither be proved by perception nor by inference. Neither can it be established by revelation, as the scriptural passages can be explained otherwise.

Criticism.--In the light of what we have said above this objection stands self-condemned. When we do not believe in the real existence of Maya, what logic is there in requiring us to prove the existence of it? If we had granted its reality, then indeed we could be called upon to name the source of its knowledge perception, inference, revelation, etc. However, to prove the validity of our conception we do not require any marshalled arguments or formal syllogisms. It is as clear as anything, when we recall to our mind the nature of avidyA, which, as we have shown after Sankara, is an erroneous transfer of the things and relations of the objective world to the Self in the strictest sense of the word.

Further, Ramanuja examines a few scriptural passages, and giving them another interpretation, infers that all such passages can be so explained as not to corroborate the theory of avidyA. He might draw any meaning out of the few passages he has gone into, so long as he is bent upon showing the untenableness of Maya, but there still remains a large number of passages, among which the metaphysics of Yajnavalkya occupies a prominent place, that defy all such attempts at a forced, far-fetched and perverted interpretation.

When we know that we are in reality no other than the Absolute Spirit, and that the Atman is the only reality; and yet we feel that we are different from the Absolute and that the world in which we live, move and have our being, is real, to what shall we attribute this clash between our knowledge and feelings? Is it not a mystery? And what else could we say but that this is due to our ignorance, the 'erroneous transference' spoken of above?

No new comments. The whole framework is shaky.

6. The Charge of NivartakAnupapatti.

This difficulty is in relation to the idea that the cessation of avidyA takes place solely by means of the knowledge which has the attributeless Brahman for its object. Brahman is not without attributes and qualities, since there are many passages which prove that He is possessed of these. Moreover, the grammatical equations, such as "tattvam asi" ("That art Thou"), do not denote the oneness of any attributeless thing, they are not intended to give rise to the stultification of any illusion due to avidyA; but they simply show that Brahman is capable of existing in two different modes or forms. The universe is the body of which Brahman is the soul. He is Himself all the three entities God, soul and matter. Consequently, the knowledge which has an attributeless Brahman for its object is impossible and cannot be the complete knowledge of truth; and obviously such an impossible knowledge of the oneness of the attributeless Brahman cannot be the remover of the avidyA postulated by the Advaitins.

Criticism.--The force of this objection lies mainly in the supposition that "Brahman is not without attributes," and it is further pointed out by Ramanuja that many passages of the Sruti prove this thesis. In the light of Sankara's Advaita, as briefly described in Chapter II, we fail to see the force of this argument. To say that there are some scriptural passages bearing out the assertion may equally be met by the counter-proposition that there are also passages countenancing the attributelessness of Brahman. If, then, both these assertions neutralize each other from the scriptural point of view, one may well ask, What then is the real trend and purport of the Vaidic thought? It seems to us that this question could not be better answered than by repeating the doctrine of Sankara when he attempted to synthesize the whole of the Sruti by taking a wide conspectus of its purport. All passages which speak of the qualified Brahman may be placed under aparA vidyA, while parA will include only those that expound the metaphysical truth as it is. Brahman may, from a lower standpoint, be conceived as "with attributes," but the ultimate truth remains that He is really "without attributes." Besides, the conception of the Absolute in the strict sense leaves hardly any room for "attributes." Impose any attributes and you at once make the Absolute "non-absolute," i.e., destroy his very nature by making paricchinna (limited) that which is aparicchinna (without limits).

It is easily proved that an entity without attributes is non existant. Brahman has an infinite number of attributes each of which is infinite. How does it limit Brahman?

Advaitins resort to the apaccheda nyAya while reconciling the nirguNa and the saguNa shrutis, which is flawed. The right mImamsa rule is the utsargApavAda nyAya, which will resolve the saguna and nirguna shrutis correctly.

Again, Ramanuja denies that the text, 'tat tvam asi,' denotes the oneness of the individual with the attributeless Universal, and holds that it simply brings out Brahman's capability of existing in two forms or modes. Now, this seems to us to be an ambiguous use of language. That Brahman exists in two opposite forms will be meaningless if one of the forms were not supposed to be due to avidyA. How can a being exist in two contradictory forms? Cit and acit are two opposite notions in the system of Ramanuja, but he has not succeeded in reconciling their existence by merely saying that they are two modes of the Absolute. To picture the universe as the body of Brahman is after all a mere analogy, which hardly makes the matter even a jot clearer. Even by investing God with all auspicious attributes, how will Ramanuja account for the existence of evil '(moral) or error (psychological)? Simply to say, as did Plato, that God is good, hence the universe must be good, is no explanation, but a mere shirking of the question. Like Plato, Ramanuja uses many analogies and metaphors while speaking of Brahman, but the Advaitist cannot but take all these as mere mythical representations.

Hence, with our denial of the qualified aspect of Brahman as a metaphysical truth is linked the denial of "the impossibility of the knowledge which has an attributeless Brahman for its object."

The advaitin interpretation of tat tvam asi using bhAga-tyAga laxaNa is incorrect according to the pAnini rule for sAmAnAdhikaraNya. Do you really think if I say "the man is a tiger", you could equate man=tiger?

An identity statement such as That Thou Art requires a context. The ignorant shvetaketu (tvam) cannot be directly equated to Ishvara(tat) directly. There must some context by which the equality is to be held. In Advaita vedanta, shvetaketu must be stripped of all qualities belonging to the jIva such as ignorance, weakness etc. Ishvara too has to be stripped of his Lordly qualities such as omnipotence, omniscience etc. What remains on both sides without qualities is equated. This is called double pruning which is a very far fetched interpretation. Better explanations apply the indirection on only one side of the equation. For eg, Ramanuja takes Tat as it stands without pruning it. tvam is taken to be the antaryAmi of shvetaketu, which is the paramAtma. Thus Tat tvam asi would render to antaryAmi in shvetaketu(tvam) = Atma( the creator) where there are no absurd conclusions.

AvidyA being like darkness is itself expelled when light comes in. JnAna is the remover of ajnAna. As we have already pointed out above, the expression 'knowledge of Brahman' is strictly inadmissible, since Brahman is itself knowledge (JnAna) of course the term being used in the higher sense of 'pure consciousness.'

Upanishads declare that all attributes of Brahman are eternal ( B.U 4.5.14) ~ hence knowledge is an attribute of Brahman.

7. The Charge of Nivrttyanupapatti.

The removal of the Advaitin's hypothetical 'ignorance' is quite impossible. The individual soul s bondage of 'ignorance' is determined by Karma and is a concrete reality. It cannot therefore be removed by any abstract knowledge but only by divine worship and grace. Moreover, according to the Advaitins the differentiation between the knower, knowledge, and the known is unreal; and even that knowledge, which is capable of removing avidyA has to be unreal and has to stand in need of another real removing knowledge.

Criticism.--Our struggle with Karma is undoubtedly real so long as our consciousness of the true nature of Brahman has not arisen. Karma, its determinations, and with it everything else, is supposed to be real, but only so far. We have already quoted passages from Sankara where he clearly and unequivocally makes this concession, 'vyAvahArically' (i.e., from the practical or empiric point of view), as he calls it. It may therefore be called 'a concrete reality,' but with the explicit understanding that such a reality is after all 'phenomenal.' We do not hold the efficacy of Karma in the case of one who has attained the knowledge of Brahman; such a man, being free from all desires and motives, all springs of action, is pari passu beyond the control of Karma in so far as he is not creating any fresh and new Karma for himself. The laws of Karma are valid within the phenomenal, but in no way do they produce any real knowledge to the Atman, whose very nature forbids all such bondages.

The idea of divine worship and grace may be supported for the sake of the ordinary minds unable to go round the higher path of pure knowledge. But surely the idea of grace, etc., is not an exalted conception. Truly speaking, grace is only possible when there is a direct and perfect communion in other words, an 'identity' between the two forms of consciousness. This fact, too, shows that the ultimate nature of man and God is 'Consciousness.' So long as our ignorance is not cast away by the acquirement of 'knowledge' which alone is capable of ousting its opponent liberation is impossible. Without such a knowledge, mere devotion or deeds will never lead one to the same goal.

As to the differentiation between the knower (jnAtA), knowledge (jnAna),and the known (jneya), we have to repeat that the distinction is certainly fictitious in the absolute sense. It is made by us and it is real for all our practical purposes. The metaphysical truth does not attempt to devour the world in its practical aspect. The knowledge removing avidyA if we are at all to say 'removal' of avidyA is not unreal. Unreal knowledge cannot destroy unreality. Knowledge in the lower sense of a relation between 'subject' and 'object' is of course unreal, but such knowledge is unable to give a deathblow to avidyA. On the dawning of true knowledge the artificial distinction between 'subject' and 'object' vanishes. "By what shall we know the knower (the subject of all knowledge)?" as was so forcibly asked by Yajnavalkya.

Conclusion

These are in brief the seven difficulties which Ramanuja perceived in the doctrine of Maya. As will appear from what we have said above, Ramanuja's criticism rests on the whole on a misunderstanding of the genuine Advaita standpoint. All through he has been treating Maya as if it were a concrete reality, even perhaps existing in space, etc. We do not accuse him even because he attempted to reject Sankara's premises. But we fail to see his consistency, when even on his own premises he falls short of furnishing a really adequate explanation of the relation between God and the Universe. His doctrine of divine grace, devotion, etc., is apt to appeal strongly to many Christian theologians, who will therefore naturally prefer his philosophy to that of Sankara. Be as it may, to us it seems evident that Sankara's analysis of Reality went much further than Ramanuja's. The impersonal conception of the Absolute, we hold, is truly personal, if there is any real meaning in 'personality.' This is how we will meet those who cannot hold any such doctrine to be the ultimate if it destroys the idea of the divine personality.

What did Yagnyavalkya teach Maitreyi? How can you support Advaita from it, when Yagnavalkya has declared "avinAshI vA are.ayamAtmA.anuchchhittidharmA" and also stated that "yatra hi dvaitamiva bhavati"?

There is no misunderstanding of Advaita's position. We simply state that categories such as "neither real nor unreal" or "maya is unreal" , "anirvacanIya" etc are mere assumptions made by Advaita without any proof. No use in proving advaita from within advaita's self assumed postulates. Go ahead, start from first principles, and prove with shruti and logic that there exist entities that are "neither real nor unreal" and "maya is unreal", "ishvara is unreal" etc.

[atanu]

Do you know what is the sanskrit equivalent of this translation? And how much the original words can be lost in an english translation?

BTW, it is not uncommon in the philosophical circles to refer to the adversaries by such titles.

Namaskar Sudarshan,

Well, I did not know that. Welcome.

Om

[Sudarshan]

These are in brief the seven difficulties which Ramanuja perceived in the doctrine of Maya. As will appear from what we have said above, Ramanuja's criticism rests on the whole on a misunderstanding of the genuine Advaita standpoint. All through he has been treating Maya as if it were a concrete reality, even perhaps existing in space, etc. We do not accuse him even because he attempted to reject Sankara's premises. But we fail to see his consistency, when even on his own premises he falls short of furnishing a really adequate explanation of the relation between God and the Universe. His doctrine of divine grace, devotion, etc., is apt to appeal strongly to many Christian theologians, who will therefore naturally prefer his philosophy to that of Sankara. Be as it may, to us it seems evident that Sankara's analysis of Reality went much further than Ramanuja's. The impersonal conception of the Absolute, we hold, is truly personal, if there is any real meaning in 'personality.' This is how we will meet those who cannot hold any such doctrine to be the ultimate if it destroys the idea of the divine personality.

It is a rather ingeneous idea to concieve of an ultimate Godhead beyond all notions of words and thoughts - but does it answer some basic questions?

1. How and why did the Nirguna Brahman become the Saguna Brahman, if NB is considered to be both actionless and attributeless?

2. And what is the basis for dismissing the reality of creation when there is sufficient scriptural evidence for it? Not to speak of pratyaxa and anumAna.

You cannot go deeper into reality than the pratyaxa, anumAna and shruti tell you. Anything else is just conjecture. Buddha conjectured that ultimate reality is a void.

The supreme reality must be a personality. Otherwise, we would not be sitting here and typing these things. Denying the reality of this typing and claiming the supreme Godhead to be impersonal, is like touching the nose the other way around.

[Sudarshan]

Namaskar Sudarshan,

Well, I did not know that. Welcome.

Om

Namaskar. Good to see you again.

Just because AchAryas have used "names" in their works against other AchAryas do not give disciples like us the right to do so. Both Shankara and Ramanuja were great scholars and equals in their own right. We must respect all personalities, though disagreeing with their views is an acceptable proposition.

Every philosophy is a viewpoint. It is an opinion. It maybe right or not. Logic is not the best means to arrive at the truth. Even untruth can be passed on as truth with shrewed reasoning. So truth must be known from experience - through the grace of God. Till such time, logic will prevail.

[atanu]

NAMASKAR Sudarshan.

Namaskar. Good to see you again.

Just because AchAryas have used "names" in their works against other AchAryas do not give disciples like us the right to do so. ---.

OK. Hope that we remember this. Let us start then.

Aha, what is the basis for claiming that mAyA is unreal in the first place? shruti pramANa please, no handwaving please. Where does shruti teach that? And how can something unreal give rise to the unreal world and all that? Would any rational person agree with such a doctrine?

Kriya Shakti and Jnana Shakti of Brahman are true. But the power’s nature is to apparently fragment indivisible Atman. The apparent/illusion of fragmentation is Maya and Shakti is not Maya. Your premise is wrong. Advaita does not say that the world is Asat (as opposed to Sat) as you claim. It is Mithya, when not known as divine purusha.. Like in a dark room (in avidya) you may mistake a chair for something else. So, in Avidya we see a fragmented world and do not see the ONE substratum Brahman -- this wrong view is mistake, which leads to a mythical understanding of Universe.

Advaita claims that mAyA is the cause of jIva, but claims that mAyA exists only because of jIva. Is there any logic here - pure mutual dependency.

Your premise is false. Where Advaita says that Maya is dependent on Jiva?

mAyA is referred all through shruti as a positive power of Brahman. There are no grounds to call it anivachanIya.

Maya is not positive power of Brahman, who is not cruel that He has to use Maya. Kriya Shakti or Jnana Shakti are two powers of Brahman. vidyAvidya is hidden in Brahman (Svet. Upanishad). Vidya is eternal. Avidya perishes.

When the light rises only the sadashiva exists alone (Svet. Up.).

It is easily proved that an entity without attributes is non existant. Brahman has an infinite number of attributes each of which is infinite. How does it limit Brahman?

It is easily proven otherwise.

Brahman is all. So, if we attach an attribute of ‘tall’ to Brahman, then there is no scope for short things to occur. So, Brahman is ultimately Net-Neti (and this is Shruti).

An identity statement such as That Thou Art requires a context. The ignorant shvetaketu (tvam) cannot be directly equated to Ishvara(tat) directly. There must some context by which the equality is to be held. In Advaita vedanta, shvetaketu must be stripped of all qualities belonging to the jIva such as ignorance, weakness etc. Ishvara too has to be stripped of his Lordly qualities such as omnipotence, omniscience etc. What remains on both sides without qualities is equated. This is called double pruning which is a very far fetched interpretation. Better explanations apply the indirection on only one side of the equation. For eg, Ramanuja takes Tat as it stands without pruning it. tvam is taken to be the antaryAmi of shvetaketu, which is the paramAtma. Thus Tat tvam asi would render to antaryAmi in shvetaketu(tvam) = Atma( the creator) where there are no absurd conclusions.

Shankara never teaches that Svetaketu as the body is Tat.

Hehe. Assuming that you are correct then you must be equipped with two Atmas, one of Ishwara and another of so-called Sudarshan? Moreover, have you ever contemplated why should ‘Tvam’ apply to a different being from Svetaketu? Will I ever call “you” as “not you”.

Upanishads declare that all attributes of Brahman are eternal ( B.U 4.5.14) ~ hence knowledge is an attribute of Brahman.

Well. Paramatman is Nirguna. You say loudly that you do not agree to Gita.

Anaaditwaan nirgunatwaat paramaatmaayam avyayah;
Shareerastho’pi kaunteya na karoti na lipyate.

BG 13.32. Being without beginning and Nirguna, the Supreme Self, imperishable, though dwelling in the body, O Arjuna, neither acts nor is tainted!

Svet Up.
eko devaH sarvabhuuteshhu guuDhaH sarvavyaapii sarvabhuutaantaraatmaa.karmaadhyaxaH sarvabhuutaadhivaasaH saaxii chetaa kevalo nirguNashcha .. 11..

No use in proving advaita from within advaita's self assumed postulates. Go ahead, start from first principles, and prove with shruti and logic that there exist entities that are "neither real nor unreal" and "maya is unreal", "ishvara is unreal" etc.

Suits me.

A i) The shruti ‘One who sees any difference here goes from death to death’, invalidates that Brahman who is pure knowledge has any real divisions, as proposed by VA.

Aii) Chandogya teaches that happiness is in the unlimited. So, a circumscribed mukta Atman (as hypothesized by VA) cannot be happy and thus is not mukta.

B) That the boundaries are apparent and not real is the teaching of Gita.

Avibhaktam cha bhooteshu vibhaktamiva cha sthitam;
Bhootabhartru cha tajjneyam grasishnu prabhavishnu cha.

13.17. And undivided, yet He exists as if divided in beings; He is to be known as the supporter of beings; He devours and He generates also.

C) VA teaches that karma is without beginning. Wheras Shri Krishna teaches: "Arjuna Know that you are not the doer”. So, the perception of karma is itself the avidya, which Advaita says is without beginning.

Moreover, assuming that VA is correct, please tell us where the bad karmas originate from and where thet reside, before you ask us where Avidya resides? (That Avidya and Vidya are seated in Brahman is shruti, however).

D) The fundamental prescription

I have asked you several times of the logical implication of a shruti prescription. Mandukya Upanishad teaches that advaita atman has to be known. You please tell me how one will know the Advaita Atman as another?

(I remind you that in another post (elsewhere) you had accepted that this shruti dictum you do not abide by).

E) When ignorance s destroyed by the destroyer, the following is said to happen.


yadaa.atamastaanna divaa na raatriH na sannachaasachchhiva eva kevalaH .tadaxara.n tat.h saviturvareNyaM praGYaa cha tasmaat.h prasR^itaa puraaNii .. 18..

Svet. Upanishad 4.18
When there is no darkness of ignorance, there is no day or night, neither being nor non—being; Shiva alone exists. That immutable Reality is the meaning of "That"; It is adored by the Sun. From It has proceeded the ancient wisdom.
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Om