7.
The Charge of Nivrttyanupapatti.
The removal of the Advaitin's hypothetical 'ignorance' is quite impossible. The individual soul s bondage of 'ignorance' is determined by Karma and is a concrete reality. It cannot therefore be removed by any abstract knowledge but only by divine worship and grace. Moreover, according to the Advaitins the differentiation between the knower, knowledge, and the known is unreal; and even that knowledge, which is capable of removing
avidyA has to be unreal and has to stand in need of another real removing knowledge.
Criticism.--Our struggle with Karma is undoubtedly real so long as our consciousness of the true nature of Brahman has not arisen. Karma, its determinations, and with it everything else, is supposed to be real, but only so far. We have already quoted passages from Sankara where he clearly and unequivocally makes this concession, '
vyAvahArically' (i.e., from the practical or empiric point of view), as he calls it. It may therefore be called 'a concrete reality,' but with the explicit understanding that such a reality is after all 'phenomenal.' We do not hold the efficacy of Karma in the case of one who has attained the knowledge of Brahman; such a man, being free from all desires and motives, all springs of action, is
pari passu beyond the control of Karma in so far as he is not creating any fresh and new Karma for himself. The laws of Karma are valid within the phenomenal, but in no way do they produce any real knowledge to the Atman, whose very nature forbids all such bondages.
The idea of divine worship and grace may be supported for the sake of the ordinary minds unable to go round the higher path of pure knowledge. But surely the idea of grace, etc., is not an exalted conception. Truly speaking, grace is only possible when there is a direct and perfect communion in other words, an 'identity' between the two forms of consciousness. This fact, too, shows that the ultimate nature of man and God is 'Consciousness.' So long as our ignorance is not cast away by the acquirement of 'knowledge' which alone is capable of ousting its opponent liberation is impossible. Without such a knowledge, mere devotion or deeds will never lead one to the same goal.
As to the differentiation between the knower (
jnAtA), knowledge (
jnAna),and the known (
jneya), we have to repeat that the distinction is certainly fictitious in the absolute sense. It is made by us and it is real for all our practical purposes. The metaphysical truth does not attempt to devour the world in its practical aspect. The knowledge removing
avidyA if we are at all to say '
removal' of
avidyA is not unreal. Unreal knowledge cannot destroy unreality. Knowledge in the lower sense of a relation between 'subject' and 'object' is of course unreal, but such knowledge is unable to give a deathblow to
avidyA. On the dawning of true knowledge the artificial distinction between 'subject' and 'object' vanishes. "By what shall we know the knower (the subject of all knowledge)?" as was so forcibly asked by Yajnavalkya.
Conclusion
These are in brief the seven difficulties which Ramanuja perceived in the doctrine of Maya. As will appear from what we have said above, Ramanuja's criticism rests on the whole on a misunderstanding of the genuine Advaita standpoint. All through he has been treating Maya as if it were a concrete reality, even perhaps existing in space, etc. We do not accuse him even because he attempted to reject Sankara's premises. But we fail to see his consistency, when even on his own premises he falls short of furnishing a really adequate explanation of the relation between God and the Universe. His doctrine of divine grace, devotion, etc., is apt to appeal strongly to many Christian theologians, who will therefore naturally prefer his philosophy to that of Sankara. Be as it may, to us it seems evident that Sankara's analysis of Reality went much further than Ramanuja's. The impersonal conception of the Absolute, we hold, is truly personal, if there is any real meaning in 'personality.' This is how we will meet those who cannot hold any such doctrine to be the ultimate if it destroys the idea of the divine personality.
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