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    Vedanta Sutra - read this translation

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    Vedanta Sutra - Here is a translation to read:

    The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by
    Ramanuja, by Trans. George Thibaut

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    Title: The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja
    Sacred Books of the East, Volume 48

    Author: Trans. George Thibaut

    Release Date: January, 2005 [EBook #7297]
    [Yes, we are more than one year ahead of schedule]
    [This file was first posted on April 9, 2003]

    Edition: 10

    Language: English

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    *** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE VEDANTA-SUTRAS ***





    THE

    VEDĀNTĀ-SŪTRAS

    WITH THE COMMENTARY BY

    RĀMĀNUJA

    TRANSLATED BY

    GEORGE THIBAUT

    PART III

    Sacred Books of the East, Volume 48

    [1904]



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    CONTENTS.

    VEDĀNTA-SŪTRAS WITH THE COMMENTARY OF RĀMĀNUJA.


    INTRODUCTION


    ADHYĀYA I

    Pāda I

    Pāda II

    Pāda III

    Pāda IV


    ADHYĀYA II

    Pāda I

    Pāda II

    Pāda III

    Pāda IV


    ADHYĀYA III

    Pāda I

    Pāda II

    Pāda III

    Pāda IV


    ADHYĀYA IV

    Pāda I

    Pāda II

    Pāda III

    Pāda IV


    INDEXES BY DR. M. WINTERNITZ:--

    Index of Quotations

    Index of Sanskrit Words

    Index of Names and Subjects

    Corrigenda

    Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Translations of the
    Sacred Books of the East




    INTRODUCTION.

    In the Introduction to the first volume of the translation of the
    'Vedānta-Sūtras with Sankara's Commentary' (vol. xxxiv of this Series) I
    have dwelt at some length on the interest which Rāmānuja's Commentary
    may claim--as being, on the one hand, the fullest exposition of what may
    be called the Theistic Vedānta, and as supplying us, on the other, with
    means of penetrating to the true meaning of Bādarāyana's Aphorisms. I do
    not wish to enter here into a fuller discussion of Rāmānuja's work in
    either of these aspects; an adequate treatment of them would, moreover,
    require considerably more space than is at my disposal. Some very useful
    material for the right understanding of Rāmānuju's work is to be found
    in the 'Analytical Outline of Contents' which Messrs. M. Rangākārya and
    M. B. Varadarāja Aiyangār have prefixed to the first volume of their
    scholarly translation of the Srībhāshya (Madras, 1899).

    The question as to what the Stūras really teach is a critical, not a
    philosophical one. This distinction seems to have been imperfectly
    realised by several of those critics, writing in India, who have
    examined the views expressed in my Introduction to the translation of
    Sankara's Commentary. A writer should not be taxed with 'philosophic
    incompetency,' 'hopeless theistic bias due to early training,' and the
    like, simply because he, on the basis of a purely critical investigation,
    considers himself entitled to maintain that a certain ancient document
    sets forth one philosophical view rather than another. I have nowhere
    expressed an opinion as to the comparative philosophical value of the
    systems of Sankara and Rāmānuja; not because I have no definite opinions
    on this point, but because to introduce them into a critical enquiry
    would be purposeless if not objectionable.

    The question as to the true meaning of the Sūtras is no doubt of some
    interest; although the interest of problems of this kind may easily be
    over-estimated. Among the remarks of critics on my treatment of this
    problem I have found little of solid value. The main arguments which I
    have set forth, not so much in favour of the adequacy of Rāmānuja's
    interpretation, as against the validity of Sankarākārya's understanding
    of the Sūtras, appear to me not to have been touched. I do not by any
    means consider the problem a hopeless one; but its solution will not be
    advanced, in any direction, but by those who will be at the trouble of
    submitting the entire body of the Sūtras to a new and detailed
    investigation, availing themselves to the full of the help that is to be
    derived from the study of all the existing Commentaries.

    The present translation of the Srībhāshya claims to be faithful on the
    whole, although I must acknowledge that I have aimed rather at making it
    intelligible and, in a certain sense, readable than scrupulously
    accurate. If I had to rewrite it, I should feel inclined to go even
    further in the same direction. Indian Philosophy would, in my opinion,
    be more readily and widely appreciated than it is at present, if the
    translators of philosophical works had been somewhat more concerned to
    throw their versions into a form less strange and repellent to the
    western reader than literal renderings from technical Sanskrit must
    needs be in many passages. I am not unaware of the peculiar dangers of
    the plan now advocated--among which the most obvious is the temptation
    it offers to the translator of deviating from the text more widely than
    regard for clearness would absolutely require. And I am conscious of
    having failed in this respect in more than one instance. In other cases
    I have no doubt gone astray through an imperfect understanding of the
    author's meaning. The fact is, that as yet the time has hardly come for
    fully adequate translations of comprehensive works of the type of the
    Srībhāshya, the authors of which wrote with reference--in many cases
    tacit--to an immense and highly technical philosophical literature which
    is only just beginning to be studied, and comprehended in part, by
    European scholars.

    It gives me great pleasure to acknowledge the help which I have received
    from various quarters in preparing this translation. Pandit Gangādhara
    Sāstrin, C. I. E., of the Benares Sanskrit College, has, with unwearying
    kindness and patience, supplied me throughout with comments of his own
    on difficult sections of the text. Pandit Svāmin Rāma Misra Sāstrin has
    rendered me frequent assistance in the earlier portion of my task. And
    to Mr. A. Venis, the learned Principal of the Benares Sanskrit College,
    I am indebted for most instructive notes on some passages of a
    peculiarly technical and abstruse character. Nor can I conclude without
    expressing my sense of obligation to Colonel G. A. Jacob, whose
    invaluable 'Concordance to the Principal Upanishads' lightens to an
    incalculable degree the task of any scholar who is engaged in work
    bearing on the Vedānta.




    VEDĀNTA-SŪTRAS

    WITH

    RĀMĀNUJA'S SRĪBHĀSHYA

    FIRST ADHYĀYA.

    FIRST PĀDA.

    MAY my mind be filled with devotion towards the highest Brahman, the
    abode of Lakshmi who is luminously revealed in the Upanishads; who in
    sport produces, sustains, and reabsorbs the entire Universe; whose only
    aim is to foster the manifold classes of beings that humbly worship him.

    The nectar of the teaching of Parāsara's son (Vyāsa),--which was brought
    up from the middle of the milk-ocean of the Upanishads--which restores
    to life the souls whose vital strength had departed owing to the heat of
    the fire of transmigratory existence--which was well guarded by the
    teachers of old--which was obscured by the mutual conflict of manifold
    opinions,--may intelligent men daily enjoy that as it is now presented
    to them in my words.

    The lengthy explanation (vritti) of the Brahma-sūtras which was composed
    by the Reverend Bodhāyana has been abridged by former teachers;
    according to their views the words of the Sūtras will be explained in
    this present work.




    1. Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.

    In this Sūtra the word 'then' expresses immediate sequence; the word
    'therefore' intimates that what has taken place (viz. the study of the
    karmakānda of the Veda) constitutes the reason (of the enquiry into
    Brahman). For the fact is that the enquiry into (lit.'the desire to
    know') Brahman--the fruit of which enquiry is infinite in nature and
    permanent--follows immediately in the case of him who, having read the
    Veda together with its auxiliary disciplines, has reached the knowledge
    that the fruit of mere works is limited and non-permanent, and hence has
    conceived the desire of final release.

    The compound 'brahmajijńāsā' is to be explained as 'the enquiry of
    Brahman,' the genitive case 'of Brahman' being understood to denote the
    object; in agreement with the special rule as to the meaning of the
    genitive case, Pānini II, 3, 65. It might be said that even if we
    accepted the general meaning of the genitive case--which is that of
    connexion in general--Brahman's position (in the above compound) as an
    object would be established by the circumstance that the 'enquiry'
    demands an object; but in agreement with the principle that the direct
    denotation of a word is to be preferred to a meaning inferred we take
    the genitive case 'of Brahman' as denoting the object.

    The word 'Brahman' denotes the hightest Person (purushottama), who is
    essentially free from all imperfections and possesses numberless classes
    of auspicious qualities of unsurpassable excellence. The term 'Brahman'
    is applied to any things which possess the quality of greatness
    (brihattva, from the root 'brih'); but primarily denotes that which
    possesses greatness, of essential nature as well as of qualities, in
    unlimited fulness; and such is only the Lord of all. Hence the word
    'Brahman' primarily denotes him alone, and in a secondary derivative
    sense only those things which possess some small part of the Lord's
    qualities; for it would be improper to assume several meanings for the
    word (so that it would denote primarily or directly more than one thing).
    The case is analogous to that of the term 'bhagavat [FOOTNOTE 4:1].' The
    Lord only is enquired into, for the sake of immortality, by all those
    who are afflicted with the triad of pain. Hence the Lord of all is that
    Brahman which, according to the Sūtra, constitutes the object of enquiry.
    The word 'jijńāsā' is a desiderative formation meaning 'desire to know.'
    And as in the case of any desire the desired object is the chief thing,
    the Sūtra means to enjoin knowledge--which is the object of the desire
    of knowledge. The purport of the entire Sūtra then is as follows: 'Since
    the fruit of works known through the earlier part of the Mīmāmsā is
    limited and non-permanent, and since the fruit of the knowledge of
    Brahman--which knowledge is to be reached through the latter part of the
    Mīmāmsā--is unlimited and permanent; for this reason Brahman is to be
    known, after the knowledge of works has previously taken place.'--The
    same meaning is expressed by the Vrittikāra when saying 'after the
    comprehension of works has taken place there follows the enquiry into
    Brahman.' And that the enquiry into works and that into Brahman
    constitute one body of doctrine, he (the Vrittikāra) will declare later
    on 'this Sārīraka-doctrine is connected with Jaimini's doctrine as
    contained in sixteen adhyāyas; this proves the two to constitute one
    body of doctrine.' Hence the earlier and the later Mīmāmsā are separate
    only in so far as there is a difference of matter to be taught by each;
    in the same way as the two halves of the Pūrva Mīmāmsā-sūtras,
    consisting of six adhyāyas each, are separate [FOOTNOTE 5:1]; and as each
    adhyāya is separate. The entire Mīmāmsā-sātra--which begins with the
    Sūtra 'Now therefore the enquiry into religious duty' and concludes with
    the Sūtra '(From there is) no return on account of scriptural statement'--
    has, owing to the special character of the contents, a definite order of
    internal succession. This is as follows. At first the precept 'one is to
    learn one's own text (svādhyāya)' enjoins the apprehension of that
    aggregate of syllables which is called 'Veda,' and is here referred to
    as 'svādhyāya.' Next there arises the desire to know of what nature the
    'Learning' enjoined is to be, and how it is to be done. Here there come
    in certain injunctions such as 'Let a Brahnmana be initiated in his
    eighth year' and 'The teacher is to make him recite the Veda'; and
    certain rules about special observances and restrictions--such as
    'having performed the upākarman on the full moon of Sravana or
    Praushthapada according to prescription, he is to study the sacred
    verses for four months and a half--which enjoin all the required details.

    From all these it is understood that the study enjoined has for its
    result the apprehension of the aggregate of syllables called Veda, on
    the part of a pupil who has been initiated by a teacher sprung from a
    good family, leading a virtuous life, and possessing purity of soul; who
    practises certain special observances and restrictions; and who learns
    by repeating what is recited by the teacher.

    And this study of the Veda is of the nature of a samskāra of the text,
    since the form of the injunction 'the Veda is to be studied' shows that
    the Veda is the object (of the action of studying). By a samskāra is
    understood an action whereby something is fitted to produce some other
    effect; and that the Veda should be the object of such a samskaāra is
    quite appropriate, since it gives rise to the knowledge of the four
    chief ends of human action--viz. religious duty, wealth, pleasure, and
    final release--and of the means to effect them; and since it helps to
    effect those ends by itself also, viz. by mere mechanical repetition
    (apart from any knowledge to which it may give rise).

    The injunction as to the study of the Veda thus aims only at the
    apprehension of the aggregate of syllables (constituting the Veda)
    according to certain rules; it is in this way analogous to the recital
    of mantras.

    It is further observed that the Veda thus apprehended through reading
    spontaneously gives rise to the ideas of certain things subserving
    certain purposes. A person, therefore, who has formed notions of those
    things immediately, i.e. on the mere apprehension of the text of the
    Veda through reading, thereupon naturally applies himself to the study
    of the Mimāmsa, which consists in a methodical discussion of the
    sentences constituting the text of the Veda, and has for its result the
    accurate determination of the nature of those things and their different
    modes. Through this study the student ascertains the character of the
    injunctions of work which form part of the Veda, and observes that all
    work leads only to non-permanent results; and as, on the other hand, he
    immediately becomes aware that the Upanishad sections--which form part
    of the Veda which he has apprehended through reading--refer to an
    infinite and permanent result, viz. immortality, he applies himself to
    the study of the Sārīraka-Mīmāmsā, which consists in a systematic
    discussion of the Vedānta-texts, and has for its result the accurate
    determination of their sense. That the fruit of mere works is transitory,
    while the result of the knowledge of Brahman is something permanent, the
    Vedanta-texts declare in many places--'And as here the world acquired by
    work perishes, so there the world acquired by merit perishes' (Ch. Up.
    VIII, 1,6); 'That work of his has an end' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 10); 'By
    non-permanent works the Permanent is not obtained' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 10);
    'Frail indeed are those boats, the sacrifices' (Mu. Up. I, 2, 7); 'Let a
    Brāhmana, after he has examined all these worlds that are gained by
    works, acquire freedom from all desires. What is not made cannot be
    gained by what is made. To understand this, let the pupil, with fuel in
    his hand, go to a teacher who is learned and dwells entirely in Brahman.
    To that pupil who has approached him respectfully, whose mind is
    altogether calm, the wise teacher truly told that knowledge of Brahman
    through which he knows the imperishable true Person' (Mu. Up. I, 2, 12,
    13). 'Told' here means 'he is to tell.'--On the other hand, 'He who
    knows Brahman attains the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'He who sees
    this does not see death' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2); 'He becomes a self-ruler'
    (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'Knowing him he becomes immortal here' (Taitt. Ār.
    III, 12, 7); 'Having known him he passes over death; there is no other
    path to go' (Svet. Up. VI, 15); 'Having known as separate his Self and
    the Mover, pleased thereby he goes to immortality' (Svet. Up. I, 6).

    But--an objection here is raised--the mere learning of the Veda with its
    auxiliary disciplines gives rise to the knowledge that the heavenly
    world and the like are the results of works, and that all such results
    are transitory, while immortality is the fruit of meditation on Brahman.
    Possessing such knowledge, a person desirous of final release may at
    once proceed to the enquiry into Brahman; and what need is there of a
    systematic consideration of religious duty (i.e. of the study of the
    Purva Mimāmsā)?--If this reasoning were valid, we reply, the person
    desirous of release need not even apply himself to the study of the
    Sārīraka Mīmāmsā, since Brahman is known from the mere reading of the
    Veda with its auxiliary disciplines.--True. Such knowledge arises indeed
    immediately (without deeper enquiry). But a matter apprehended in this
    immediate way is not raised above doubt and mistake. Hence a systematic
    discussion of the Vedānta-texts must he undertaken in order that their
    sense may be fully ascertained--We agree. But you will have to admit
    that for the very same reason we must undertake a systematic enquiry
    into religious duty!

    [FOOTNOTE 4:1. 'Bhagavat' denotes primarily the Lord, the divinity;
    secondarily any holy person.]

    [FOOTNOTE 5:1. The first six books of the Pūrva Mīmāmsā-sūtras give
    rules for the fundamental forms of the sacrifice; while the last six
    books teach how these rules are to be applied to the so-called modified
    forms.]




    THE SMALL PŪRVAPAKSHA.

    But--a further objection is urged--as that which has to precede the
    systematic enquiry into Brahman we should assign something which that
    enquiry necessarily presupposes. The enquiry into the nature of duty,
    however, does not form such a prerequisite, since a consideration of the
    Vedanta-texts may be undertaken by any one who has read those texts,
    even if he is not acquainted with works.--But in the Vedanta-texts there
    are enjoined meditations on the Udgītha and the like which are matters
    auxiliary to works; and such meditations are not possible for him who is
    not acquainted with those works!--You who raise this objection clearly
    are ignorant of what kind of knowledge the Sārīraka Mīmāmsā is concerned
    with! What that sāstra aims at is to destroy completely that wrong
    knowledge which is the root of all pain, for man, liable to birth, old
    age, and death, and all the numberless other evils connected with
    transmigratory existence--evils that spring from the view, due to
    beginningless Nescience, that there is plurality of existence; and to
    that end the sāstra endeavours to establish the knowledge of the unity
    of the Self. Now to this knowledge, the knowledge of works--which is
    based on the assumption of plurality of existence--is not only useless
    but even opposed. The consideration of the Udgītha and the like, which
    is supplementary to works only, finds a place in the Vedānta-texts, only
    because like them it is of the nature of knowledge; but it has no direct
    connexion with the true topic of those texts. Hence some prerequisite
    must be indicated which has reference to the principal topic of the
    sāstra.--Quite so; and this prerequisite is just the knowledge of works;
    for scripture declares that final release results from knowledge with
    works added. The Sūtra-writer himself says further on 'And there is need
    of all works, on account of the scriptural statement of sacrifices and
    the like' (Ve. Sū. III, 4, 26). And if the required works were not known,
    one could not determine which works have to be combined with knowledge
    and which not. Hence the knowledge of works is just the necessary
    prerequisite.--Not so, we reply. That which puts an end to Nescience is
    exclusively the knowledge of Brahman, which is pure intelligence and
    antagonistic to all plurality. For final release consists just in the
    cessation of Nescience; how then can works--to which there attach
    endless differences connected with caste, āsrama, object to be
    accomplished, means and mode of accomplishment, &c.--ever supply a means
    for the cessation of ignorance, which is essentially the cessation of
    the view that difference exists? That works, the results of which are
    transitory, are contrary to final release, and that such release can be
    effected through knowledge only, scripture declares in many places;
    compare all the passages quoted above (p. 7).

    As to the assertion that knowledge requires sacrifices and other works,
    we remark that--as follows from the essential contrariety of knowledge
    and works, and as further appears from an accurate consideration of the
    words of scripture--pious works can contribute only towards the rise of
    the desire of knowledge, in so far namely as they clear the internal
    organ (of knowledge), but can have no influence on the production of the
    fruit, i.e. knowledge itself. For the scriptural passage concerned runs
    as follows Brāhmanas desire to know him by the study of the Veda, by
    sacrifice, by gifts,' &c. (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22).

    According to this passage, the desire only of knowledge springs up
    through works; while another text teaches that calmness, self-restraint,
    and so on, are the direct means for the origination of knowledge itself.
    (Having become tranquil, calm, subdued, satisfied, patient, and
    collected, he is to see the Self within the Self (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23).)

    The process thus is as follows. After the mind of a man has been cleaned
    of all impurities through works performed in many preceding states of
    existence, without a view to special forms of reward, there arises in
    him the desire of knowledge, and thereupon--through knowledge itself
    originated by certain scriptural texts--'Being only, this was in the
    beginning, one only without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, I, 2); 'Truth,
    Knowledge, the Infinite, is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'Without parts,
    without actions, calm, without fault, without taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19);
    'This Self is Brahman' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19); 'Thou art that' (Ch. Up. VI,
    9, 7), Nescience comes to an end. Now, 'Hearing,' 'reflection,' and
    'meditation,' are helpful towards cognising the sense of these Vedic
    texts. 'Hearing' (sravana) means the apprehension of the sense of
    scripture, together with collateral arguments, from a teacher who
    possesses the true insight, viz. that the Vedānta-texts establish the
    doctrine of the unity of the Self. 'Reflection' (mananam) means the
    confirmation within oneself of the sense taught by the teacher, by means
    of arguments showing it alone to be suitable. 'Meditation'
    (nididhyāsanam) finally means the constant holding of thai sense before
    one's mind, so as to dispel thereby the antagonistic beginningless
    imagination of plurality. In the case of him who through 'hearing,'
    'reflection,' and meditation,' has dis-dispelled the entire imagination
    of plurality, the knowledge of the sense of Vedānta-texts puts an end to
    Nescience; and what we therefore require is a statement of the
    indispensable prerequisites of such 'hearing,' 'reflection,' and so on.
    Now of such prerequisites there are four, viz. discrimination of what is
    permanent and what is non-permanent; the full possession of calmness of
    mind, self-restraint and similar means; the renunciation of all
    enjoyment of fruits here below as well as in the next world; and the
    desire of final release.

    Without these the desire of knowledge cannot arise; and they are
    therefore known, from the very nature of the matter, to be necessary
    prerequisites. To sum up: The root of bondage is the unreal view of
    plurality which itself has its root in Nescience that conceals the true
    being of Brahman. Bondage itself thus is unreal, and is on that account
    cut short, together with its root, by mere knowledge. Such knowledge is
    originated by texts such as 'That art thou'; and work is of no help
    either towards its nature, or its origination, or its fruit (i.e.
    release). It is on the other hand helpful towards the desire of
    knowledge, which arises owing to an increase of the element of goodness
    (sattva) in the soul, due to the destruction of the elements of passion
    (rajas) and darkness (tamas) which are the root of all moral evil. This
    use is referred to in the text quoted above, 'Brāhmanas wish to know him,'
    &c. As, therefore, the knowledge of works is of no use towards the
    knowledge of Brahman, we must acknowledge as the prerequisite of the
    latter knowledge the four means mentioned above.
    Last edited by Mohini Shakti Devi; 06 February 2010 at 03:22 PM.

  2. #2

    Re: Vedanta Sutra - read this translation



    THE SMALL SIDDHÂNTA.

    To this argumentation we make the following reply. We admit that release
    consists only in the cessation of Nescience, and that this cessation
    results entirely from the knowledge of Brahman. But a distinction has
    here to be made regarding the nature of this knowledge which the
    Vedânta-texts aim at enjoining for the purpose of putting an end to
    Nescience. Is it merely the knowledge of the sense of sentences which
    originates from the sentences? or is it knowledge in the form of
    meditation (upâsana) which has the knowledge just referred to as its
    antecedent? It cannot be knowledge of the former kind: for such
    knowledge springs from the mere apprehension of the sentence, apart from
    any special injunction, and moreover we do not observe that the
    cessation of Nescience is effected by such knowledge merely. Our
    adversary will perhaps attempt to explain things in the following way.
    The Vedânta-texts do not, he will say, produce that knowledge which
    makes an end of Nescience, so long as the imagination of plurality is
    not dispelled. And the fact that such knowledge, even when produced,
    does not at once and for every one put a stop to the view of plurality
    by no means subverts my opinion; for, to mention an analogous instance,
    the double appearance of the moon--presenting itself to a person
    affected with a certain weakness of vision--does not come to an end as
    soon as the oneness of the moon has been apprehended by reason.
    Moreover, even without having come to an end, the view of plurality is
    powerless to effect further bondage, as soon as the root, i.e.
    Nescience, has once been cut But this defence we are unable to admit. It
    is impossible that knowledge should not arise when its means, i.e. the
    texts conveying knowledge, are once present. And we observe that even
    when there exists an antagonistic imagination (interfering with the rise
    of knowledge), information given by competent persons, the presence of
    characteristic marks (on which a correct inference may be based), and
    the like give rise to knowledge which sublates the erroneous
    imagination. Nor can we admit that even after the sense of texts has
    been apprehended, the view of plurality may continue owing to some small
    remainder of beginningless imagination. For as this imagination which
    constitutes the means for the view of plurality is itself false, it is
    necessarily put an end to by the rise of true knowledge. If this did not
    take place, that imagination would never come to an end, since there is
    no other means but knowledge to effect its cessation. To say that the
    view of plurality, which is the effect of that imagination, continues
    even after its root has been cut, is mere nonsense. The instance of some
    one seeing the moon double is not analogous. For in his case the
    non-cessation of wrong knowledge explains itself from the circumstance
    that the cause of wrong knowledge, viz. the real defect of the eye which
    does not admit of being sublated by knowledge, is not removed, although
    that which would sublate wrong knowledge is near. On the other hand,
    effects, such as fear and the like, may come to an end because they can
    be sublated by means of knowledge of superior force. Moreover, if it
    were true that knowledge arises through the dispelling of the
    imagination of plurality, the rise of knowledge would really never be
    brought about. For the imagination of plurality has through gradual
    growth in the course of beginningless time acquired an infinite
    strength, and does not therefore admit of being dispelled by the
    comparatively weak conception of non-duality. Hence we conclude that the
    knowledge which the Vedânta-texts aim at inculcating is a knowledge
    other than the mere knowledge of the sense of sentences, and denoted by
    'dhyâna,' 'upâsanâ' (i. e. meditation), and similar terms.

    With this agree scriptural texts such as 'Having known it, let him
    practise meditation' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 21); 'He who, having searched out
    the Self, knows it' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Meditate on the Self as Om'
    (Mu. Up. II, 2, 6); 'Having known that, he is freed from the jaws of
    death' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 15); 'Let a man meditate on the Self only as his
    world' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 15); 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard, to her
    reflected on, to be meditated on' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 6); 'That we must
    search out, that we must try to understand' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1).

    (According to the principle of the oneness of purport of the different
    sâkhâs) all these texts must be viewed as agreeing in meaning with the
    injunction of meditation contained in the passage quoted from the Bri.
    Up.; and what they enjoin is therefore meditation. In the first and
    second passages quoted, the words 'having known' and 'having searched
    out' (vijñâya; anuvidya) contain a mere reference to (not injunction of)
    the apprehension of the meaning of texts, such apprehension subserving
    meditation; while the injunction of meditation (which is the true
    purport of the passages) is conveyed by the clauses 'let him practise
    meditation' (prajñâm kurvîta) and 'he knows it.' In the same way the
    clause 'the Self is to be heard' is a mere anuvâda, i.e. a mere
    reference to what is already established by other means; for a person
    who has read the Veda observes that it contains instruction about
    matters connected with certain definite purposes, and then on his own
    account applies himself to methodical 'hearing,' in order definitely to
    ascertain these matters; 'hearing' thus is established already. In the
    same way the clause 'the Self is to be reflected upon' is a mere anuvâda
    of reflection which is known as a means of confirming what one has
    'heard.' It is therefore meditation only which all those texts enjoin.
    In agreement with this a later Sûtra also says, 'Repetition more than
    once, on account of instruction' (Ve. Sû. IV, I, I). That the knowledge
    intended to be enjoined as the means of final release is of the nature
    of meditation, we conclude from the circumstance that the terms
    'knowing' and'meditating' are seen to be used in place of each other in
    the earlier and later parts of Vedic texts. Compare the following
    passages: 'Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman,' and 'he who knows
    this shines and warms through his celebrity, fame, and glory of
    countenance' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 1; 6). And 'He does not know him, for he
    is not complete,' and 'Let men meditate on him as the Self (Bri. Up. I,
    4, 7). And 'He who knows what he knows,' and 'Teach me the deity on
    which you meditate' (Ch. Up. IV, 1, 6; 2, 2).

    'Meditation' means steady remembrance, i.e. a continuity of steady
    remembrance, uninterrupted like the flow of oil; in agreement with the
    scriptural passage which declares steady remembrance to be the means of
    release, 'on the attainment of remembrance all the ties are loosened'
    (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2). Such remembrance is of the same character (form)
    as seeing (intuition); for the passage quoted has the same purport as
    the following one, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are
    solved, and all the works of that man perish when he has been seen who
    is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). And this being so, we conclude that
    the passage 'the Self is to be seen' teaches that 'Meditation' has the
    character of 'seeing' or 'intuition.' And that remembrance has the
    character of 'seeing' is due to the element of imagination
    (representation) which prevails in it. All this has been set forth at
    length by the Vâkyakâra. 'Knowledge (vedana) means meditation (upâsana),
    scripture using the word in that sense'; i.e. in all Upanishads that
    knowledge which is enjoined as the means of final release is Meditation.
    The Vâkyakâra then propounds a pûrvapaksha (primâ facie view), 'Once he
    is to make the meditation, the matter enjoined by scripture being
    accomplished thereby, as in the case of the prayâjas and the like'; and
    then sums up against this in the words 'but (meditation) is established
    on account of the term meditation'; that means--knowledge repeated more
    than once (i.e. meditation) is determined to be the means of Release.--
    The Vâkyakâra then goes on 'Meditation is steady remembrance, on the
    ground of observation and statement.' That means--this knowledge, of the
    form of meditation, and repeated more than once, is of the nature of
    steady remembrance.

    Such remembrance has been declared to be of the character of 'seeing,'
    and this character of seeing consists in its possessing the character of
    immediate presentation (pratyakshat&#226. With reference to remembrance,
    which thus acquires the character of immediate presentation and is the
    means of final release, scripture makes a further determination, viz. in
    the passage Ka. Up. I, 2, 23, 'That Self cannot be gained by the study
    of the Veda ("reflection"), nor by thought ("meditation"), nor by much
    hearing. Whom the Self chooses, by him it may be gained; to him the Self
    reveals its being.' This text says at first that mere hearing,
    reflection, and meditation do not suffice to gain the Self, and then
    declares, 'Whom the Self chooses, by him it may be gained.' Now a
    'chosen' one means a most beloved person; the relation being that he by
    whom that Self is held most dear is most dear to the Self. That the Lord
    (bhagavân) himself endeavours that this most beloved person should gain
    the Self, he himself declares in the following words, 'To those who are
    constantly devoted and worship with love I give that knowledge by which
    they reach me' (Bha. Gî. X, 10), and 'To him who has knowledge I am dear
    above all things, and he is dear to me' (VII, 17). Hence, he who
    possesses remembrance, marked by the character of immediate presentation
    (sâkshâtkâra), and which itself is dear above all things since the
    object remembered is such; he, we say, is chosen by the highest Self,
    and by him the highest Self is gained. Steady remembrance of this kind
    is designated by the word 'devotion' (bhakti); for this term has the
    same meaning as upâsanâ (meditation). For this reason scripture and
    smriti agree in making the following declarations, 'A man knowing him
    passes over death' (Svet. Up. III, 8); 'Knowing him thus he here becomes
    immortal' (Taitt. Âr. III, 12,7); 'Neither by the Vedas, nor by
    austerities, nor by gifts, nor by sacrifice can I be so seen as thou
    hast seen me. But by devotion exclusive I may in this form be known and
    seen in truth, O Arjuna, and also be entered into' (Bha. Gî. XI, 53, 54);
    'That highest Person, O Pârtha, may be obtained by exclusive devotion'
    (VIII, 22).

    That of such steady remembrance sacrifices and so on are means will be
    declared later on (Ve. Sû. III, 4, 26). Although sacrifices and the like
    are enjoined with a view to the origination of knowledge (in accordance
    with the passage 'They desire to know,' Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22), it is only
    knowledge in the form of meditation which--being daily practised,
    constantly improved by repetition, and continued up to death--is the
    means of reaching Brahman, and hence all the works connected with the
    different conditions of life are to be performed throughout life only
    for the purpose of originating such knowledge. This the Sûtrakâra
    declares in Ve. Sû. IV, 1, 12; 16; III, 4, 33, and other places. The
    Vâkyakâra also declares that steady remembrance results only from
    abstention, and so on; his words being 'This (viz. steady remembrance =
    meditation) is obtained through abstention (viveka), freeness of mind
    (vimoka), repetition (abhyâsa), works (kriy&#226, virtuous conduct
    (kalyâna), freedom from dejection (anavasâda), absence of exultation
    (anuddharsha); according to feasibility and scriptural statement.' The
    Vâkyakâra also gives definitions of all these terms. Abstention (viveka)
    means keeping the body clean from all food, impure either owing to
    species (such as the flesh of certain animals), or abode (such as food
    belonging to a Kândâla or the like), or accidental cause (such as food
    into which a hair or the like has fallen). The scriptural passage
    authorising this point is Ch. Up. VII, 26, 'The food being pure, the
    mind becomes pure; the mind being pure, there results steady remembrance.'
    Freeness of mind (vimoka) means absence of attachment to desires. The
    authoritative passage here is 'Let him meditate with a calm mind' (Ch.
    Up. III, 14, 1). Repetition means continued practice. For this point the
    Bhâshya-kâra quotes an authoritative text from Smriti, viz.: 'Having
    constantly been absorbed in the thought of that being' (sadâ
    tadbhâvabhâvitah; Bha. Gî. VIII, 6).--By 'works' (kriy&#226 is understood
    the performance, according to one's ability, of the five great
    sacrifices. The authoritative passages here are 'This person who
    performs works is the best of those who know Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 1,
    4); and 'Him Brâhmanas seek to know by recitation of the Veda, by
    sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22).--By
    virtuous conduct (kalyânâni) are meant truthfulness, honesty, kindness,
    liberality, gentleness, absence of covetousness. Confirmatory texts are
    'By truth he is to be obtained' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 5) and 'to them belongs
    that pure Brahman-world' (Pr. Up. I, 16).--That lowness of spirit or
    want of cheerfulness which results from unfavourable conditions of place
    or time and the remembrance of causes of sorrow, is denoted by the term
    'dejection'; the contrary of this is 'freedom from dejection.' The
    relevant scriptural passage is 'This Self cannot be obtained by one
    lacking in strength' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 4).--'Exultation' is that
    satisfaction of mind which springs from circumstances opposite to those
    just mentioned; the contrary is 'absence of exultation.' Overgreat
    satisfaction also stands in the way (of meditation). The scriptural
    passage for this is 'Calm, subdued,' &c. (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23).--What the
    Vâkyakâra means to say is therefore that knowledge is realised only
    through the performance of the duly prescribed works, on the part of a
    person fulfilling all the enumerated conditions.

    Analogously another scriptural passage says 'He who knows both knowledge
    and non-knowledge together, overcoming death by non-knowledge reaches
    the Immortal through knowledge' (Îs. Up. II). Here the term
    'non-knowledge' denotes the works enjoined on the different castes and
    âsramas; and the meaning of the text is that, having discarded by such
    works death, i.e. the previous works antagonistic to the origination of
    knowledge, a man reaches the Immortal, i.e. Brahman, through knowledge.
    The non-knowledge of which this passage speaks as being the means of
    overcoming death can only mean that which is other than knowledge, viz.
    prescribed works. The word has the same sense in the following passage:
    'Firm in traditional knowledge he offered many sacrifices, leaning on
    the knowledge of Brahman, so as to pass beyond death by non-knowledge'
    (Vi. Pu. VI, 6, 12).--Antagonistic to knowledge (as said above) are all
    good and evil actions, and hence--as equally giving rise to an
    undesirable result--they may both be designated as evil. They stand in
    the way of the origination of knowledge in so far as they strengthen the
    elements of passion and darkness which are antagonistic to the element
    of goodness which is the cause of the rise of knowledge. That evil works
    stand in the way of such origination, the following scriptural text
    declares: 'He makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds do
    an evil deed' (Ka. Up. III, 8). That passion and darkness veil the
    knowledge of truth while goodness on the other hand gives rise to it,
    the Divine one has declared himself, in the passage 'From goodness
    springs knowledge' (Bha. Gî. XIV, 17). Hence, in order that knowledge
    may arise, evil works have to be got rid of, and this is effected by the
    performance of acts of religious duty not aiming at some immediate
    result (such as the heavenly world and the like); according to the text
    'by works of religious duty he discards all evil.' Knowledge which is
    the means of reaching Brahman, thus requires the works prescribed for
    the different âsramas; and hence the systematic enquiry into works (i.
    e. the Pûrva Mîmâms&#226--from which we ascertain the nature of the works
    required and also the transitoriness and limitation of the fruits of
    mere works--forms a necessary antecedent to the systematic enquiry into
    Brahman. Moreover the discrimination of permanent and non-permanent
    things, &c. (i.e. the tetrad of 'means' mentioned above, p. 11) cannot
    be accomplished without the study of the Mîmâmsâ; for unless we
    ascertain all the distinctions of fruits of works, means, modes of
    procedure and qualification (on the part of the agent) we can hardly
    understand the true nature of works, their fruits, the transitoriness or
    non-transitoriness of the latter, the permanence of the Self, and
    similar matters. That those conditions (viz. nityânityavastuviveka,
    sama, dama, &c.) are 'means' must be determined on the basis of viniyoga
    ('application' which determines the relation of principal and
    subordinate matters--angin and anga); and this viniyoga which depends on
    direct scriptural statement (sruti), inferential signs (linga), and so
    on, is treated of in the third book of the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ-sûtras. And
    further we must, in this connexion, consider also the meditations on the
    Udgîtha and similar things--which, although aiming at the success of
    works, are of the nature of reflections on Brahman (which is viewed in
    them under various forms)--and as such have reference to knowledge of
    Brahman. Those works also (with which these meditations are connected)
    aim at no special results of their own, and produce and help to perfect
    the knowledge of Brahman: they are therefore particularly connected with
    the enquiry into Brahman. And that these meditations presuppose an
    understanding of the nature of works is admitted by every one.

  3. #3

    Re: Vedanta Sutra - read this translation

    THE GREAT PÛRVAPAKSHA.

    THE ONLY REALITY IS BRAHMAN.

    Brahman, which is pure intelligence and opposed to all difference,
    constitutes the only reality; and everything else, i.e. the plurality of
    manifold knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, and acts of knowledge
    depending on those two, is only imagined on (or 'in') that Brahman, and
    is essentially false.

    'In the beginning, my dear, there was that only which is, one only
    without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'The higher knowledge is that by
    which the Indestructible is apprehended' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5); 'That which
    cannot be seen nor seized, which has no eyes nor ears, no hands nor feet,
    the permanent, the all-pervading, the most subtle, the imperishable
    which the wise regard as the source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 6);
    'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'He
    who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without
    taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19); 'By whom it is not thought, by him it is
    thought; he by whom it is thought knows it not. It is not known by those
    who know it, known by those who do not know it' (Ke. Up. II, 3); 'Thou
    mayest not see the seer of sight; thou mayest not think the thinker of
    thought' (Bri. Up. III, 4, 2); 'Bliss is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6, 1);
    'All this is that Self' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 7); 'There is here no diversity
    whatever' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'From death to death goes he who sees
    any difference here' (Ka. Up. II, 4, 10); 'For where there is duality as
    it were, there one sees the other'; 'but where the Self has become all
    of him, by what means, and whom, should he see? by what means, and whom,
    should he know?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'the effect is a name merely
    which has its origin in speech; the truth is that (the thing made of
    clay) is clay merely' (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4); 'for if he makes but the
    smallest distinction in it there is fear for him' (Taitt. Up. II, 7);--
    the two following Vedânta-sûtras: III, 2, 11; III, 2, 3--the following
    passages from the Vishnu-purâna: 'In which all difference vanishes,
    which is pure Being, which is not the object of words, which is known by
    the Self only--that knowledge is called Brahman' (VI, 7, 53); 'Him whose
    essential nature is knowledge, who is stainless in reality'; 'Him who,
    owing to erroneous view, abides in the form of things' (I, 2, 6); 'the
    Reality thou art alone, there is no other, O Lord of the world!--
    whatever matter is seen belongs to thee whose being is knowledge; but
    owing to their erroneous opinion the non-devout look on it as the form
    of the world. This whole world has knowledge for its essential nature,
    but the Unwise viewing it as being of the nature of material things are
    driven round on the ocean of delusion. Those however who possess true
    knowledge and pure minds see this whole world as having knowledge for
    its Self, as thy form, O highest Lord!' (Vi. Pu. I, 4, 38 ff.).--'Of
    that Self, although it exists in one's own and in other bodies, the
    knowledge is of one kind, and that is Reality; those who maintain
    duality hold a false view' (II, 14, 31); 'If there is some other one,
    different from me, then it can be said, "I am this and that one is
    another"' (II, 13, 86); 'As owing to the difference of the holes of the
    flute the air equally passing through them all is called by the names of
    the different notes of the musical scale; so it is with the universal
    Self' (II, 14, 32); 'He is I; he is thou; he is all: this Universe is
    his form. Abandon the error of difference. The king being thus
    instructed, abandoned the view of difference, having gained an intuition
    of Reality' (II, 16, 24). 'When that view which gives rise to difference
    is absolutely destroyed, who then will make the untrue distinction
    between the individual Self and Brahman?' (VI, 7, 94).--The following
    passages from the Bhagavad-Gîtâ: 'I am the Self dwelling within all
    beings' (X, 20); 'Know me to be the soul within all bodies' (XIII, 2);
    'Being there is none, movable or immovable, which is without me' (X, 39).--
    All these and other texts, the purport of which clearly is instruction
    as to the essential nature of things, declare that Brahman only, i.e.
    non-differenced pure intelligence is real, while everything else is
    false.

    The appearance of plurality is due to avidyâ.

    'Falsehood' (mithyâtva) belongs to what admits of being terminated by
    the cognition of the real thing--such cognition being preceded by
    conscious activity (not by mere absence of consciousness or knowledge).
    The snake, e.g. which has for its substrate a rope or the like is false;
    for it is due to an imperfection (dosha) that the snake is imagined in
    (or 'on') the rope. In the same way this entire world, with its
    distinctions of gods, men, animals, inanimate matter, and so on, is,
    owing to an imperfection, wrongly imagined in the highest Brahman whose
    substance is mere intelligence, and therefore is false in so far as it
    may be sublated by the cognition of the nature of the real Brahman. What
    constitutes that imperfection is beginningless Nescience (avidy&#226, which,
    hiding the truth of things, gives rise to manifold illusions, and cannot
    be defined either as something that is or as something that is not.--'By
    the Untrue they are hidden; of them which are true the Untrue is the
    covering' (Ch, Up. VIII, 3, 1); 'Know Mâya to be Prakriti, and the great
    Lord him who is associated with Mâya' (Svet. Up. IV, 10); 'Indra appears
    manifold through the Mâyâs' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19); 'My Mâya is hard to
    overcome' (Bha. Gî. VII, 14); 'When the soul slumbering in beginningless
    Mâyâ awakes' (Gau. Kâ. I, 16).--These and similar texts teach that it is
    through beginningless Mâyâ that to Brahman which truly is pure
    non-differenced intelligence its own nature hides itself, and that it
    sees diversity within itself. As has been said, 'Because the Holy One is
    essentially of the nature of intelligence, the form of all, but not
    material; therefore know that all particular things like rocks, oceans,
    hills and so on, have proceeded from intelligence [FOOTNOTE 22:1] But
    when, on the cessation of all work, everything is only pure intelligence
    in its own proper form, without any imperfections; then no differences--
    the fruit of the tree of wishes--any longer exist between things.
    Therefore nothing whatever, at any place or any time, exists apart from
    intelligence: intelligence, which is one only, is viewed as manifold by
    those whose minds are distracted by the effects of their own works.
    Intelligence pure, free from stain, free from grief, free from all
    contact with desire and other affections, everlastingly one is the
    highest Lord--Vâsudeva apart from whom nothing exists. I have thus
    declared to you the lasting truth of things--that intelligence only is
    true and everything else untrue. And that also which is the cause of
    ordinary worldly existence has been declared to you' (Vi. Pu. II, 12,
    39, 40, 43-45).

    Avidyâ is put an end to by true Knowledge.

    Other texts declare that this Nescience comes to an end through the
    cognition of the essential unity of the Self with Brahman which is
    nothing but non-differenced intelligence. 'He does not again go to death;'
    'He sees this as one;' 'He who sees this does not see death' (Ch. Up.
    VI, 27); 'When he finds freedom from fear and rest in that which is
    invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he has obtained the
    fearless' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all
    doubts are solved and all his works perish when he has been beheld who
    is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8); 'He knows Brahman, he becomes
    Brahman only' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9); 'Knowing him only a man passes over
    death; there is no other path to go' (Svet. Up. III, 8). In these and
    similar passages, the term 'death' denotes Nescience; analogously to the
    use of the term in the following words of Sanatsujâta, 'Delusion I call
    death; and freedom from delusion I call immortality' (Sanatsuj. II, 5).
    The knowledge again of the essential unity and non-difference of Brahman--
    which is ascertained from decisive texts such as 'The True, knowledge,
    the Infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'Knowledge, bliss is
    Brahman' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 28)--is confirmed by other passages, such as
    'Now if a man meditates on another deity, thinking the deity is one and
    he another, he does not know' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10); 'Let men meditate
    upon him as the Self (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7); 'Thou art that' (Ch. Up. VI, 8,
    7); 'Am I thou, O holy deity? and art thou me, O holy deity?'; 'What I
    am that is he; what he is that am I.'--This the Sûtrakâra himself will
    declare 'But as the Self (scriptural texts) acknowledge and make us
    apprehend (the Lord)' (Ve. Sû. IV, 1, 3). Thus the Vâkyakâra also, 'It
    is the Self--thus one should apprehend (everything), for everything is
    effected by that.' And to hold that by such cognition of the oneness of
    Brahman essentially false bondage, together with its cause, comes to an
    end, is only reasonable.

    Scripture is of greater force than Perception

    But, an objection is raised--how can knowledge, springing from the
    sacred texts, bring about a cessation of the view of difference, in
    manifest opposition to the evidence of Perception?--How then, we rejoin,
    can the knowledge that this thing is a rope and not a snake bring about,
    in opposition to actual perception, the cessation of the (idea of the)
    snake?--You will perhaps reply that in this latter case there is a
    conflict between two forms of perception, while in the case under
    discussion the conflict is between direct perception and Scripture which
    is based on perception. But against this we would ask the question how,
    in the case of a conflict between two equal cognitions, we decide as to
    which of the two is refuted (sublated) by the other. If--as is to be
    expected--you reply that what makes the difference between the two is
    that one of them is due to a defective cause while the other is not: we
    point out that this distinction holds good also in the case of Scripture
    and perception being in conflict. It is not considerations as to the
    equality of conflicting cognitions, as to their being dependent or
    independent, and so on, that determine which of the two sublates the
    other; if that were the case, the perception which presents to us the
    flame of the lamp as one only would not be sublated by the cognition
    arrived at by inference that there is a succession of different flames.
    Wherever there is a conflict between cognitions based on two different
    means of knowledge we assign the position of the 'sublated one' to that
    which admits of being accounted for in some other way; while that
    cognition which affords no opening for being held unauthoritative and
    cannot be accounted for in another way, is the 'sublating one [FOOTNOTE
    25:1].' This is the principle on which the relation between 'what
    sublates' and 'what is sublated' is decided everywhere. Now apprehension
    of Brahman--which is mere intelligence, eternal, pure, free,
    self-luminous--is effected by Scripture which rests on endless unbroken
    tradition, cannot therefore be suspected of any, even the least,
    imperfection, and hence cannot be non-authoritative; the state of
    bondage, on the other hand, with its manifold distinctions is proved by
    Perception, Inference, and so on, which are capable of imperfections and
    therefore may be non-authoritative. It is therefore reasonable to
    conclude that the state of bondage is put an end to by the apprehension
    of Brahman. And that imperfection of which Perception--through which we
    apprehend a world of manifold distinctions--may be assumed to be
    capable, is so-called Nescience, which consists in the beginningless
    wrong imagination of difference.--Well then--a further objection is
    raised--let us admit that Scripture is perfect because resting on an
    endless unbroken tradition; but must we then not admit that texts
    evidently presupposing the view of duality, as e.g. 'Let him who desires
    the heavenly world offer the Jyotishtoma-sacrifice'--are liable to
    refutation?--True, we reply. As in the case of the Udgâtri and
    Pratihartri breaking the chain (not at the same time, but) in
    succession [FOOTNOTE 26:1], so here also the earlier texts (which refer
    to duality and transitory rewards) are sublated by the later texts which
    teach final release, and are not themselves sublated by anything else.

    The texts which represent Brahman as devoid of qualities have greater
    force

    The same reasoning applies to those passages in the Vedânta-texts which
    inculcate meditation on the qualified Brahman, since the highest Brahman
    is without any qualities.--But consider such passages as 'He who
    cognises all, who knows all' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'His high power is
    revealed as manifold, as essential, acting as force and knowledge' (Svet.
    Up. VI, 8); 'He whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true' (Ch. Up.
    VIII, 1, 5); how can these passages, which clearly aim at defining the
    nature of Brahman, be liable to refutation?--Owing to the greater weight,
    we reply, of those texts which set forth Brahman as devoid of qualities.
    'It is not coarse, not fine, not short, not long' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8);
    'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'That
    which is free from qualities,' 'that which is free from stain'--these
    and similar texts convey the notion of Brahman being changeless, eternal
    intelligence devoid of all difference; while the other texts--quoted
    before--teach the qualified Brahman. And there being a conflict between
    the two sets of passages, we--according to the Mîmâmsâ principle
    referred to above--decide that the texts referring to Brahman as devoid
    of qualities are of greater force, because they are later in order
    [FOOTNOTE 27:1] than those which speak of Brahman as having qualities.
    Thus everything is settled. The text Taitt. Up. II, 1 refers to Brahman
    as devoid of qualities.

    But--an objection is raised--even the passage 'The True, knowledge,
    infinite is Brahman' intimates certain qualities of Brahman, viz. true
    being, knowledge, infinity!--Not so, we reply. From the circumstance
    that all the terms of the sentence stand in co-ordination, it follows
    that they convey the idea of one matter (sense) only. If against this
    you urge that the sentence may convey the idea of one matter only, even
    if directly expressing a thing distinguished by several qualities; we
    must remark that you display an ignorance of the meaning of language
    which appears to point to some weakmindedness on your part. A sentence
    conveys the idea of one matter (sense) only when all its constitutive
    words denote one and the same thing; if, on the other hand, it expresses
    a thing possessing several attributes, the difference of these
    attributes necessarily leads to a difference in meaning on the part of
    the individual words, and then the oneness of meaning of the sentence is
    lost.--But from your view of the passage it would follow that the
    several words are mere synonyms!--Give us your attention, we reply, and
    learn that several words may convey one meaning without being idle
    synonyms. From the determination of the unity of purport of the whole
    sentence [FOOTNOTE 27:2] we conclude that the several words, applied to
    one thing, aim at expressing what is opposite in nature to whatever is
    contrary to the meanings of the several words, and that thus they have
    meaning and unity of meaning and yet are not mere synonyms. The details
    are as follows. Brahman is to be defined as what is contrary in nature
    to all other things. Now whatever is opposed to Brahman is virtually set
    aside by the three words (constituting the definition of Brahman in the
    Taittiriya-text). The word 'true' (or 'truly being') has the purport of
    distinguishing Brahman from whatever things have no truth, as being the
    abodes of change; the word 'knowledge' distinguishes Brahman from all
    non-sentient things whose light depends on something else (which are not
    self-luminous); and the word 'infinite' distinguishes it from whatever
    is limited in time or space or nature. Nor is this 'distinction' some
    positive or negative attribute of Brahman, it rather is just Brahman
    itself as opposed to everything else; just as the distinction of white
    colour from black and other colours is just the true nature of white,
    not an attribute of it. The three words constituting the text thus _have_
    a meaning, have _one_ meaning, and are non-synonymous, in so far as they
    convey the essential distinction of one thing, viz. Brahman from
    everything else. The text thus declares the one Brahman which is
    self-luminous and free from all difference. On this interpretation of
    the text we discern its oneness in purport with other texts, such as
    'Being only this was in the beginning, one only, without a second.'
    Texts such as 'That from whence these beings are born' (Taitt. Up. III,
    1); 'Being only this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'Self
    alone was this in the beginning' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 1), &c., describe
    Brahman as the cause of the world; and of this Brahman the Taittirîya
    passage 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' gives the strict
    definition.

    In agreement with the principle that all sâkhâs teach the same doctrine
    we have to understand that, in all the texts which speak of Brahman as
    cause, Brahman must be taken as being 'without a second', i.e. without
    any other being of the same or a different kind; and the text which aims
    at defining Brahman has then to be interpreted in accordance with this
    characteristic of Brahman, viz. its being without a second. The
    statement of the Chândogya as to Brahman being without a second must
    also be taken to imply that Brahman is non-dual as far as qualities are
    concerned; otherwise it would conflict with those passages which speak
    of Brahman as being without qualities and without stain. We therefore
    conclude that the defining Taittirîya-text teaches Brahman to be an
    absolutely homogeneous substance.

    But, the above explanation of the passage being accepted, it follows
    that the words 'true being,' 'knowledge,' &c., have to be viewed as
    abandoning their direct sense, and merely suggesting a thing distinct in
    nature from all that is opposite (to what the three words directly
    denote), and this means that we resort to so-called implication (implied
    meaning, lakshan&#226!--What objection is there to such a proceeding? we
    reply. The force of the general purport of a sentence is greater than
    that of the direct denotative power of the simple terms, and it is
    generally admitted that the purport of grammatical co-ordination is
    oneness (of the matter denoted by the terms co-ordinated).--But we never
    observe that all words of a sentence are to be understood in an implied
    sense!--Is it then not observed, we reply, that _one_ word is to be
    taken in its implied meaning if otherwise it would contradict the
    purport of the whole sentence? And if the purport of the sentence, which
    is nothing but an aggregate of words employed together, has once been
    ascertained, why should we not take two or three or all words in an
    implied sense--just as we had taken one--and thus make them fit in with
    the general purport? In agreement herewith those scholars who explain to
    us the sense of imperative sentences, teach that in imperative sentences
    belonging to ordinary speech all words have an implied meaning only (not
    their directly denotative meaning). For, they maintain, imperative forms
    have their primary meaning only in (Vedic) sentences which enjoin
    something not established by other means; and hence in ordinary speech
    the effect of the action is conveyed by implication only. The other
    words also, which form part of those imperative sentences and denote
    matters connected with the action, have their primary meaning only if
    connected with an action not established by other means; while if
    connected with an ordinary action they have a secondary, implied,
    meaning only [FOOTNOTE 30:1]. Perception reveals to us non-differenced
    substance only

    We have so far shown that in the case of a conflict between Scripture
    and Perception and the other instruments of knowledge, Scripture is of
    greater force. The fact, however, is that no such conflict is observed
    to exist, since Perception itself gives rise to the apprehension of a
    non-differenced Brahman whose nature is pure Being.--But how can it be
    said that Perception, which has for its object things of various kinds--
    and accordingly expresses itself in judgments such as 'Here is a jar,'
    'There is a piece of cloth'--causes the apprehension of mere Being? If
    there were no apprehension of difference, all cognitions would have one
    and the same object, and therefore would give rise to one judgment only--
    as takes place when one unbroken perceptional cognition is continued for
    some time.--True. We therefore have to enquire in what way, in the
    judgment 'here is a jar,' an assertion is made about being as well as
    some special form of being. These implied judgments cannot both be
    founded on perception, for they are the results of acts of cognition
    occupying different moments of time, while the perceptional cognition
    takes place in one moment (is instantaneous). We therefore must decide
    whether it is the essential nature of the jar, or its difference from
    other things, that is the object of perception. And we must adopt the
    former alternative, because the apprehension of difference presupposes
    the apprehension of the essential nature of the thing, and, in addition,
    the remembrance of its counterentities (i.e. the things from which the
    given thing differs). Hence difference is not apprehended by Perception;
    and all judgments and propositions relative to difference are founded on
    error only.

    Difference--bheda--does not admit of logical definition

    The Logicians, moreover, are unable to give a definition of such a thing
    as 'difference.' Difference cannot in the first place be the essential
    nature (of that which differs); for from that it would follow that on
    the apprehension of the essential nature of a thing there would at once
    arise not only the judgment as to that essential nature but also
    judgments as to its difference from everything else.--But, it may be
    objected to this, even when the essential nature of a thing is
    apprehended, the judgment 'this thing is different from other things'
    depends on the remembrance of its counterentities, and as long as this
    remembrance does not take place so long the judgment of difference is
    not formed!--Such reasoning, we reply, is inadmissible. He who maintains
    that 'difference' is nothing but 'essential nature' has no right to
    assume a dependence on counterentities since, according to him,
    essential nature and difference are the same, i.e. nothing but essential
    nature: the judgment of difference can, on his view, depend on
    counterentities no more than the judgment of essential nature does. His
    view really implies that the two words 'the jar' and 'different' (in the
    judgment 'the jar is different') are synonymous, just as the words
    'hasta' and 'kara' are (both of which mean 'hand').

    Nor, in the second place, can 'difference' be held to be an attribute
    (dharma). For if it were that, we should have to assume that
    'difference' possesses difference (i.e. is different) from essential
    nature; for otherwise it would be the same as the latter. And this
    latter difference would have to be viewed as an attribute of the first
    difference, and this would lead us on to a third difference, and so in
    infinitum. And the view of 'difference' being an attribute would further
    imply that difference is apprehended on the apprehension of a thing
    distinguished by attributes such as generic character and so on, and at
    the same time that the thing thus distinguished is apprehended on the
    apprehension of difference; and this would constitute a logical seesaw.--
    'Difference' thus showing itself incapable of logical definition, we are
    confirmed in our view that perception reveals mere 'Being' only.

    Moreover, it appears that in states of consciousness such as 'Here is a
    jar,' 'There is a piece of cloth,' 'The jar is perceived,' 'The piece of
    cloth is perceived,' that which constitutes the things is Being
    (existence; satt&#226 and perception (or 'consciousness'; anubhûti). And we
    observe that it is pure Being only which persists in all states of
    cognition: this pure Being alone, therefore, is _real_. The differences,
    on the other hand, which do not persist, are unreal. The case is
    analogous to that of the snake-rope. The rope which persists as a
    substrate is real, while the non-continuous things (which by wrong
    imagination are superimposed on the rope) such as a snake, a cleft in
    the ground, a watercourse, and so on, are unreal.

    But--our adversary objects--the instance is not truly analogous. In the
    case of the snake-rope the non-reality of the snake results from the
    snake's being sublated (bâdhita) by the cognition of the true nature of
    the substrate 'This is a rope, not a snake'; it does not result from the
    non-continuousness of the snake. In the same way the reality of the rope
    does not follow from its persistence, but from the fact of its being not
    sublated (by another cognition). But what, we ask, establishes the
    non-reality of jars and pieces of cloth?--All are agreed, we reply, that
    we observe, in jars and similar things, individual difference
    (vyâvritti, literally 'separation,' 'distinction'). The point to decide
    is of what nature such difference is. Does it not mean that the judgment
    'This is a jar' implies the negation of pieces of cloth and other
    things? But this means that by this judgment pieces of cloth and other
    things are sublated (bâdhita). Individual difference (vyâvritti) thus
    means the cessation (or absence), due to sublation, of certain objects
    of cognition, and it proves the non-reality of whatever has
    non-continuous existence; while on the other hand, pure Being, like the
    rope, persists non-sublated. Hence everything that is additional to pure
    Being is non-real.--This admits of being expressed in technical form.
    'Being' is real because it persists, as proved by the case of the rope
    in the snake-rope; jars and similar things are non-real because they are
    non-continuous, as proved by the case of the snake that has the rope for
    its substrate.

    From all this it follows that persisting consciousness only has real
    being; it alone is.

    Being and consciousness are one. Consciousness is svayamprakâsa.

    But, our adversary objects, as mere Being is the object of consciousness,
    it is different therefrom (and thus there exists after all 'difference'
    or 'plurality').--Not so, we reply. That there is no such thing as
    'difference,' we have already shown above on the grounds that it is not
    the object of perception, and moreover incapable of definition. It
    cannot therefore be proved that 'Being' is the object of consciousness.
    Hence Consciousness itself is 'Being'--that which is.--This
    consciousness is self-proved, just because it is consciousness. Were it
    proved through something else, it would follow that like jars and
    similar things it is not consciousness. Nor can there be assumed, for
    consciousness, the need of another act of consciousness (through which
    its knowledge would be established); for it shines forth (prakâsate)
    through its own being. While it exists, consciousness--differing therein
    from jars and the like--is never observed not to shine forth, and it
    cannot therefore be held to depend, in its shining forth, on something
    else.--You (who object to the above reasoning) perhaps hold the
    following view:--even when consciousness has arisen, it is the object
    only which shines forth--a fact expressed in sentences such as: the jar
    is perceived. When a person forms the judgment 'This is a jar,' he is
    not at the time conscious of a consciousness which is not an object and
    is not of a definite character. Hence the existence of consciousness is
    the reason which brings about the 'shining forth' of jars and other
    objects, and thus has a similar office as the approximation of the
    object to the eye or the other organs of sense (which is another
    condition of perceptive consciousness). After this the existence of
    consciousness is inferred on the ground that the shining forth of the
    object is (not permanent, but) occasional only [FOOTNOTE 34:1]. And
    should this argumentation be objected to on the ground of its implying
    that consciousness--which is essentially of the nature of intelligence--
    is something non-intelligent like material things, we ask you to define
    this negation of non-intelligence (which you declare to be
    characteristic of consciousness). Have we, perhaps, to understand by it
    the invariable concomitance of existence and shining forth? If so, we
    point out that this invariable concomitance is also found in the case of
    pleasure and similar affections; for when pleasure and so on exist at
    all, they never are non-perceived (i.e. they exist in so far only as we
    are conscious of them). It is thus clear that we have no consciousness
    of consciousness itself--just as the tip of a finger, although touching
    other things, is incapable of touching itself.

    All this reasoning, we reply, is entirely spun out of your own fancy,
    without any due consideration of the power of consciousness. The fact is,
    that in perceiving colour and other qualities of things, we are not
    aware of a 'shining forth' as an attribute of those things, and as
    something different from consciousness; nor can the assumption of an
    attribute of things called 'light,' or 'shining forth,' be proved in any
    way, since the entire empirical world itself can be proved only through
    consciousness, the existence of which we both admit. Consciousness,
    therefore, is not something which is inferred or proved through some
    other act of knowledge; but while proving everything else it is proved
    by itself. This may be expressed in technical form as follows--
    Consciousness is, with regard to its attributes and to the empirical
    judgments concerning it, independent of any other thing, because through
    its connexion with other things it is the cause of their attributes and
    the empirical judgments concerning them. For it is a general principle
    that of two things that which through its connexion with the other is
    the cause of the attributes of--and the empirical judgments about--the
    latter, is itself independent of that other as to those two points. We
    see e.g. that colour, through its conjunction with earth and the like,
    produces in them the quality of visibility, but does not itself depend
    for its visibility on conjunction with colour. Hence consciousness is
    itself the cause of its own 'shining forth,' as well as of the
    empirically observed shining forth of objects such as jars and the like.

    Consciousness is eternal and incapable of change.

    This self-luminous consciousness, further, is eternal, for it is not
    capable of any form of non-existence--whether so--called antecedent
    non-existence or any other form. This follows from its being
    self-established. For the antecedent non-existence of self-established
    consciousness cannot be apprehended either through consciousness or
    anything else. If consciousness itself gave rise to the apprehension of
    its own non-existence, it could not do so in so far as 'being,' for that
    would contradict its being; if it is, i.e. if its non-existence is not,
    how can it give rise to the idea of its non-existence? Nor can it do so
    if not being; for if consciousness itself is not, how can it furnish a
    proof for its own non-existence? Nor can the non-existence of
    consciousness be apprehended through anything else; for consciousness
    cannot be the object of anything else. Any instrument of knowledge
    proving the non-existence of consciousness, could do so only by making
    consciousness its object--'this is consciousness'; but consciousness, as
    being self-established, does not admit of that objectivation which is
    implied in the word 'this,' and hence its previous non-existence cannot
    be proved by anything lying outside itself.

    As consciousness thus does not admit of antecedent non-existence, it
    further cannot be held to originate, and hence also all those other
    states of being which depend on origination cannot be predicated of it.

    As consciousness is beginningless, it further does not admit of any
    plurality within itself; for we observe in this case the presence of
    something which is contrary to what invariably accompanies plurality
    (this something being 'beginninglessness' which is contrary to the
    quality of having a beginning--which quality invariably accompanies
    plurality). For we never observe a thing characterised by plurality to
    be without a beginning.--And moreover difference, origination, &c., are
    objects of consciousness, like colour and other qualities, and hence
    cannot be attributes of consciousness. Therefore, consciousness being
    essentially consciousness only, nothing else that is an object of
    consciousness can be its attribute. The conclusion is that consciousness
    is free from difference of any kind.

    The apparent difference between Consciousness and the conscious subject
    is due to the unreal ahamkâra.

    From this it further follows that there is no substrate of
    consciousness--different from consciousness itself--such as people
    ordinarily mean when speaking of a 'knower.' It is self-luminous
    consciousness itself which constitutes the so-called 'knower.' This
    follows therefrom also that consciousness is not non-intelligent (jada);
    for non-intelligence invariably accompanies absence of Selfhood
    (anâtmatva); hence, non-intelligence being absent in consciousness,
    consciousness is not non-Self, that means, it is the Self.

    But, our adversary again objects, the consciousness which expresses
    itself in the judgment 'I know,' proves that the quality of being a
    'knower' belongs to consciousness!--By no means, we reply. The
    attribution to consciousness of this quality rests on error, no less
    than the attribution, to the shell, of the quality of being silver.
    Consciousness cannot stand in the relation of an agent toward itself:
    the attribute of being a knowing agent is erroneously imputed to it--an
    error analogous to that expressed in the judgment 'I am a man,' which
    identifies the Self of a person with the outward aggregate of matter
    that bears the external characteristics of humanity. To be a 'knower'
    means to be the agent in the action of knowing; and this is something
    essentially changeful and non-intelligent (jada), having its abode in
    the ahamkâra, which is itself a thing subject to change. How, on the
    other hand, could such agency possibly belong to the changeless
    'witness' (of all change, i.e. consciousness) whose nature is pure Being?
    That agency cannot be an attribute of the Self follows therefrom also
    that, like colour and other qualities, agency depends, for its own proof,
    on seeing, i.e. consciousness.

    That the Self does not fall within the sphere (is not an object of), the
    idea of 'I' is proved thereby also that in deep sleep, swoon, and
    similar states, the idea of the 'I' is absent, while the consciousness
    of the Self persists. Moreover, if the Self were admitted to be an agent
    and an object of the idea of 'I,' it would be difficult to avoid the
    conclusion that like the body it is non-intelligent, something merely
    outward ('being for others only, not for itself') and destitute of
    Selfhood. That from the body, which is the object of the idea of 'I,'
    and known to be an agent, there is different that Self which enjoys the
    results of the body's actions, viz. the heavenly word, and so on, is
    acknowledged by all who admit the validity of the instruments of
    knowledge; analogously, therefore, we must admit that different from the
    knower whom we understand by the term 'I,' is the 'witnessing' inward
    Self. The non-intelligent ahamkâra thus merely serves to manifest the
    nature of non-changing consciousness, and it effects this by being its
    abode; for it is the proper quality of manifesting agents to manifest
    the objects manifested, in so far as the latter abide in them. A mirror,
    e.g., or a sheet of water, or a certain mass of matter, manifests a face
    or the disc of the moon (reflected in the mirror or water) or the
    generic character of a cow (impressed on the mass of matter) in so far
    as all those things abide in them.--In this way, then, there arises the
    erroneous view that finds expression in the judgment 'I know.'--Nor must
    you, in the way of objection, raise the question how self-luminous
    consciousness is to be manifested by the non-intelligent ahamkâra, which
    rather is itself manifested by consciousness; for we observe that the
    surface of the hand, which itself is manifested by the rays of sunlight
    falling on it, at the same time manifests those rays. This is clearly
    seen in the case of rays passing through the interstices of network; the
    light of those rays is intensified by the hand on which they fall, and
    which at the same time is itself manifested by the rays.

    It thus appears that the 'knowing agent,' who is denoted by the 'I,' in
    the judgment 'I know,' constitutes no real attribute of the Self, the
    nature of which is pure intelligence. This is also the reason why the
    consciousness of Egoity does not persist in the states of deep sleep and
    final release: in those states this special form of consciousness passes
    away, and the Self appears in its true nature, i.e. as pure
    consciousness. Hence a person who has risen from deep, dreamless sleep
    reflects, 'Just now I was unconscious of myself.'

    Summing up of the pûrvapaksha view.

    As the outcome of all this, we sum up our view as follows.--Eternal,
    absolutely non-changing consciousness, whose nature is pure
    non-differenced intelligence, free from all distinction whatever, owing
    to error illusorily manifests itself (vivarttate) as broken up into
    manifold distinctions--knowing subjects, objects of knowledge, acts of
    knowledge. And the purpose for which we enter on the consideration of
    the Vedânta-texts is utterly to destroy what is the root of that error,
    i.e. Nescience, and thus to obtain a firm knowledge of the oneness of
    Brahman, whose nature is mere intelligence--free, pure, eternal.

    [FOOTNOTE 22:1. In agreement with the use made of this passage by the
    Pûrvapakshin, vijñâna must here be understood in the sense of avidyâ.
    Vijñânasabdena vividham jñâyate-neneti karanavyutpattyâ-vidyâ-bhidhiyate.
    Sru. Pra.]

    [FOOTNOTE 25:1. The distinction is illustrated by the different views
    Perception and Inference cause us to take of the nature of the flame of
    the lamp. To Perception the flame, as long as it burns, seems one and
    the same: but on the ground of the observation that the different
    particles of the wick and the oil are consumed in succession, we infer
    that there are many distinct flames succeeding one another. And we
    accept the Inference as valid, and as sublating or refuting the
    immediate perception, because the perceived oneness of the flame admits
    of being accounted for 'otherwise,' viz. on the ground of the many
    distinct flames originating in such rapid succession that the eye
    mistakes them for one. The inference on the other hand does not admit of
    being explained in another way.]

    [FOOTNOTE 26:1. The reference is to the point discussed Pû. Mî. Sû. VI,
    5, 54 (Jaim. Nyâ. Mâlâ Vistara, p. 285).]

    [FOOTNOTE 27:1. The texts which deny all qualities of Brahman are later
    in order than the texts which refer to Brahman as qualified, because
    denial presupposes that which is to be denied.]

    [FOOTNOTE 27:2. The unity of purport of the sentence is inferred from
    its constituent words having the same case-ending.]

    [FOOTNOTE 30:1. The theory here referred to is held by some of the
    Mîmâmsakas. The imperative forms of the verb have their primary meaning,
    i.e. the power of originating action, only in Vedic sentences which
    enjoin the performance of certain actions for the bringing about of
    certain ends: no other means of knowledge but the Veda informing us that
    such ends can be accomplished by such actions. Nobody, e.g. would offer
    a soma sacrifice in order to obtain the heavenly world, were he not told
    by the Veda to do so. In ordinary life, on the other hand, no imperative
    possesses this entirely unique originative force, since any action which
    may be performed in consequence of a command may be prompted by other
    motives as well: it is, in technical Indian language, established
    already, apart from the command, by other means of knowledge. The man
    who, e.g. is told to milk a cow might have proceeded to do so, apart
    from the command, for reasons of his own. Imperatives in ordinary speech
    are therefore held not to have their primary meaning, and this
    conclusion is extended, somewhat unwarrantably one should say, to all
    the words entering into an imperative clause.]

    [FOOTNOTE 34:1. Being not permanent but occasional, it is an effect only,
    and as such must have a cause.]

  4. #4

    Re: Vedanta Sutra - read this translation

    THE GREAT SIDDHÂNTA.

    This entire theory rests on a fictitious foundation of altogether hollow
    and vicious arguments, incapable of being stated in definite logical
    alternatives, and devised by men who are destitute of those particular
    qualities which cause individuals to be chosen by the Supreme Person
    revealed in the Upanishads; whose intellects are darkened by the
    impression of beginningless evil; and who thus have no insight into the
    nature of words and sentences, into the real purport conveyed by them,
    and into the procedure of sound argumentation, with all its methods
    depending on perception and the other instruments of right knowledge.
    The theory therefore must needs be rejected by all those who, through
    texts, perception and the other means of knowledge--assisted by sound
    reasoning--have an insight into the true nature of things.




    There is no proof of non-differenced substance.

    To enter into details.--Those who maintain the doctrine of a substance
    devoid of all difference have no right to assert that this or that is a
    proof of such a substance; for all means of right knowledge have for
    their object things affected with difference.--Should any one taking his
    stand on the received views of his sect, assert that the theory of a
    substance free from all difference (does not require any further means
    of proof but) is immediately established by one's own consciousness; we
    reply that he also is refuted by the fact, warranted by the witness of
    the Self, that all consciousness implies difference: all states of
    consciousness have for their object something that is marked by some
    difference, as appears in the case of judgments like 'I saw this.' And
    should a state of consciousness--although directly apprehended as
    implying difference--be determined by some fallacious reasoning to be
    devoid of difference, this determination could be effected only by means
    of some special attributes additional to the quality of mere Being; and
    owing to these special qualities on which the determination depends,
    that state of consciousness would clearly again be characterised by
    difference. The meaning of the mentioned determination could thus only
    be that of a thing affected with certain differences some other
    differences are denied; but manifestly this would not prove the
    existence of a thing free from all difference. To thought there at any
    rate belongs the quality of being thought and self-illuminatedness, for
    the knowing principle is observed to have for its essential nature the
    illumining (making to shine forth) of objects. And that also in the
    states of deep sleep, swoon, &c., consciousness is affected with
    difference we shall prove, in its proper place, in greater detail.
    Moreover you yourself admit that to consciousness there actually belong
    different attributes such as permanency (oneness, self-luminousness, &c.
    ), and of these it cannot be shown that they are only Being in general.
    And even if the latter point were admitted, we observe that there takes
    place a discussion of different views, and you yourself attempt to prove
    your theory by means of the differences between those views and your own.
    It therefore must be admitted that reality is affected with difference
    well established by valid means of proof.




    Sabda proves difference.

    As to sound (speech; sabda) it is specially apparent that it possesses
    the power of denoting only such things as are affected with difference.
    Speech operates with words and sentences. Now a word (pada) originates
    from the combination of a radical element and a suffix, and as these two
    elements have different meanings it necessarily follows that the word
    itself can convey only a sense affected with difference. And further,
    the plurality of words is based on plurality of meanings; the sentence
    therefore which is an aggregate of words expresses some special
    combination of things (meanings of words), and hence has no power to
    denote a thing devoid of all difference.--The conclusion is that sound
    cannot be a means of knowledge for a thing devoid of all difference.




    Pratyaksha--even of the nirvikalpaka kind--proves difference.

    Perception in the next place--with its two subdivisions of
    non-determinate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka)
    perception--also cannot be a means of knowledge for things devoid of
    difference. Determinate perception clearly has for its object things
    affected with difference; for it relates to that which is distinguished
    by generic difference and so on. But also non-determinate perception has
    for its object only what is marked with difference; for it is on the
    basis of non-determinate perception that the object distinguished by
    generic character and so on is recognised in the act of determinate
    perception. Non-determinate perception is the apprehension of the object
    in so far as destitute of some differences but not of all difference.
    Apprehension of the latter kind is in the first place not observed ever
    to take place, and is in the second place impossible: for all
    apprehension by consciousness takes place by means of some distinction
    'This is such and such.' Nothing can be apprehended apart from some
    special feature of make or structure, as e.g. the triangularly shaped
    dewlap in the case of cows. The true distinction between non-determinate
    and determinate perception is that the former is the apprehension of the
    first individual among a number of things belonging to the same class,
    while the latter is the apprehension of the second, third, and so on,
    individuals. On the apprehension of the first individual cow the
    perceiving person is not conscious of the fact that the special shape
    which constitutes the generic character of the class 'cows' extends to
    the present individual also; while this special consciousness arises in
    the case of the perception of the second and third cow. The perception
    of the second individual thus is 'determinate' in so far as it is
    determined by a special attribute, viz. the extension, to the
    perception, of the generic character of a class--manifested in a certain
    outward shape--which connects this act of perception with the earlier
    perception (of the first individual); such determination being
    ascertained only on the apprehension of the second individual. Such
    extension or continuance of a certain generic character is, on the other
    hand, not apprehended on the apprehension of the first individual, and
    perception of the latter kind thence is 'non-determinate.' That it is
    such is not due to non-apprehension of structure, colour, generic
    character and so on, for all these attributes are equally objects of
    sensuous perception (and hence perceived as belonging to the first
    individual also). Moreover that which possesses structure cannot be
    perceived apart from the structure, and hence in the case of the
    apprehension of the first individual there is already perception of
    structure, giving rise to the judgment 'The thing is such and such.' In
    the case of the second, third, &c., individuals, on the other hand, we
    apprehend, in addition to the thing possessing structure and to the
    structure itself, the special attribute of the persistence of the
    generic character, and hence the perception is 'determinate.' From all
    this it follows that perception never has for its object that which is
    devoid of all difference.




    The bhedâbheda view is untenable.

    The same arguments tend to refute the view that there is difference and
    absence of difference at the same time (the so-called bhedâbheda view).
    Take the judgment 'This is such and such'; how can we realise here the
    non-difference of 'being this' and 'being such and such'? The 'such and
    such' denotes a peculiar make characterised, e.g. by a dewlap, the
    'this' denotes the thing distinguished by that peculiar make; the
    non-difference of these two is thus contradicted by immediate
    consciousness. At the outset the thing perceived is perceived as
    separate from all other things, and this separation is founded on the
    fact that the thing is distinguished by a special constitution, let us
    say the generic characteristics of a cow, expressed by the term 'such
    and such.' In general, wherever we cognise the relation of
    distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished thereby, the two
    clearly present themselves to our mind as absolutely different.
    Somethings--e.g. staffs and bracelets--appear sometimes as having a
    separate, independent existence of their own; at other times they
    present themselves as distinguishing attributes of other things or
    beings (i.e. of the persons carrying staffs or wearing bracelets). Other
    entities--e.g. the generic character of cows--have a being only in so
    far as they constitute the form of substances, and thus always present
    themselves as distinguishing attributes of those substances. In both
    cases there is the same relation of distinguishing attribute and thing
    distinguished thereby, and these two are apprehended as absolutely
    different. The difference between the two classes of entities is only
    that staffs, bracelets, and similar things are capable of being
    apprehended in separation from other things, while the generic
    characteristics of a species are absolutely incapable thereof. The
    assertion, therefore, that the difference of things is refuted by
    immediate consciousness, is based on the plain denial of a certain form
    of consciousness, the one namely--admitted by every one--which is
    expressed in the judgment 'This thing is such and such.'--This same
    point is clearly expounded by the Sûtrakâra in II, 2, 33.




    Inference also teaches difference.

    Perception thus having for its object only what is marked by difference,
    inference also is in the same case; for its object is only what is
    distinguished by connexion with things known through perception and
    other means of knowledge. And thus, even in the case of disagreement as
    to the number of the different instruments of knowledge, a thing devoid
    of difference could not be established by any of them since the
    instruments of knowledge acknowledged by all have only one and the same
    object, viz. what is marked by difference. And a person who maintains
    the existence of a thing devoid of difference on the ground of
    differences affecting that very thing simply contradicts himself without
    knowing what he does; he is in fact no better than a man who asserts
    that his own mother never had any children.




    Perception does not reveal mere being.

    In reply to the assertion that perception causes the apprehension of
    pure Being only, and therefore cannot have difference for its object;
    and that 'difference' cannot be defined because it does not admit of
    being set forth in definite alternatives; we point out that these
    charges are completely refuted by the fact that the only objects of
    perception are things distinguished by generic character and so on, and
    that generic character and so on--as being relative things--give at once
    rise to the judgment as to the distinction between themselves and the
    things in which they inhere. You yourself admit that in the case of
    knowledge and in that of colour and other qualities this relation holds
    good, viz. that something which gives rise to a judgment about another
    thing at the same time gives rise to a judgment about itself; the same
    may therefore be admitted with regard to difference [FOOTNOTE 44:1].

    For this reason the charge of a regressus in infinitum and a logical
    seesaw (see above, p. 32) cannot be upheld. For even if perceptive
    cognition takes place within one moment, we apprehend within that moment
    the generic character which constitutes on the one hand the difference
    of the thing from others, and on the other hand the peculiar character
    of the thing itself; and thus there remains nothing to be apprehended in
    a second moment.

    Moreover, if perception made us apprehend only pure Being judgments
    clearly referring to different objects--such as 'Here is a jar,' 'There
    is a piece of cloth'--would be devoid of all meaning. And if through
    perception we did not apprehend difference--as marked by generic
    character, &c., constituting the structure or make of a thing, why
    should a man searching for a horse not be satisfied with finding a
    buffalo? And if mere Being only were the object of all our cognitions,
    why should we not remember, in the case of each particular cognition,
    all the words which are connected with all our cognitions? And further,
    if the cognition of a horse and that of an elephant had one object only,
    the later cognition would cause us to apprehend only what was
    apprehended before, and there being thus no difference (of object of
    cognition) there would be nothing to distinguish the later state of
    cognition from remembrance. If on the other hand a difference is
    admitted for each state of consciousness, we admit thereby that
    perception has for its objects things affected with difference.

    If all acts of cognition had one and the same object only, everything
    would be apprehended by one act of cognition; and from this it would
    follow that there are no persons either deaf or blind!

    Nor does, as a matter of fact, the eye apprehend mere Being only; for
    what it does apprehend is colour and the coloured thing, and those other
    qualities (viz. extension, &c.), which inhere in the thing together with
    colour. Nor does feeling do so; for it has for its objects things
    palpable. Nor have the ear and the other senses mere Being for their
    object; but they relate to what is distinguished by a special sound or
    taste or smell. Hence there is not any source of knowledge causing us to
    apprehend mere Being. If moreover the senses had for their object mere
    Being free from all difference, it would follow that Scripture which has
    the same object would (not be originative of knowledge but) perform the
    function of a mere anuvâda, i.e. it would merely make statements about
    something, the knowledge of which is already established by some other
    means. And further, according to your own doctrine, mere Being, i.e.
    Brahman, would hold the position of an object with regard to the
    instruments of knowledge; and thus there would cling to it all the
    imperfections indicated by yourself--non-intelligent nature,
    perishableness and so on.--From all this we conclude that perception has
    for its object only what is distinguished by difference manifesting
    itself in generic character and so on, which constitute the make or
    structure of a thing. (That the generic character of a thing is nothing
    else but its particular structure follows) from the fact that we do not
    perceive anything, different from structure, which could be claimed as
    constituting the object of the cognition that several individuals
    possess one and the same general form. And as our theory sufficiently
    accounts for the ordinary notions as to generic character, and as
    moreover even those who hold generic character to be something different
    from structure admit that there is such a thing as (common) structure,
    we adhere to the conclusion that generic character is nothing but
    structure. By 'structure' we understand special or distinctive form; and
    we acknowledge different forms of that kind according to the different
    classes of things. And as the current judgments as to things being
    different from one another can be explained on the basis of the
    apprehension of generic character, and as no additional entity is
    observed to exist, and as even those who maintain the existence of such
    an additional thing admit the existence of generic character, we further
    conclude that difference (bheda) is nothing but generic character (jâti).--
    But if this were so, the judgment as to difference would immediately
    follow from the judgment as to generic character, as soon as the latter
    is apprehended! Quite true, we reply. As a matter of fact the judgment
    of difference is immediately formulated on the basis of the judgment as
    to generic character. For 'the generic character' of a cow, e.g., means
    just the exclusion of everything else: as soon as that character is
    apprehended all thought and speech referring to other creatures
    belonging to the same wider genus (which includes buffaloes and so on
    also) come to an end. It is through the apprehension of difference only
    that the idea of non-difference comes to an end.

    [FOOTNOTE 44:1. Colour reveals itself as well as the thing that has
    colour; knowledge reveals itself as well as the object known; so
    difference manifests itself as well as the things that differ.]




    Plurality is not unreal.

    Next as to the assertion that all difference presented in our
    cognition--as of jars, pieces of cloth and the like--is unreal because
    such difference does not persist. This view, we maintain, is altogether
    erroneous, springs in fact from the neglect of distinguishing between
    persistence and non-persistence on the one hand, and the relation
    between what sublates and what is sublated on the other hand. Where two
    cognitions are mutually contradictory, there the latter relation holds
    good, and there is non-persistence of what is sublated. But jars, pieces
    of cloth and the like, do not contradict one another, since they are
    separate in place and time. If on the other hand the non-existence of a
    thing is cognised at the same time and the same place where and when its
    existence is cognised, we have a mutual contradiction of two cognitions,
    and then the stronger one sublates the other cognition which thus comes
    to an end. But when of a thing that is perceived in connexion with some
    place and time, the non-existence is perceived in connexion with some
    other place and time, there arises no contradiction; how then should the
    one cognition sublate the other? or how can it be said that of a thing
    absent at one time and place there is absence at other times and places
    also? In the case of the snake-rope, there arises a cognition of
    non-existence in connexion with the given place and time; hence there is
    contradiction, one judgment sublates the other and the sublated
    cognition comes to an end. But the circumstance of something which is
    seen at one time and in one place not persisting at another time and in
    another place is not observed to be invariably accompanied by falsehood,
    and hence mere non-persistence of this kind does not constitute a reason
    for unreality. To say, on the other hand, that what is is real because
    it persists, is to prove what is proved already, and requires no further
    proof.




    Being and consciousness are not one.

    Hence mere Being does not alone constitute reality. And as the
    distinction between consciousness and its objects--which rests just on
    this relation of object and that for which the object is--is proved by
    perception, the assertion that only consciousness has real existence is
    also disposed of.




    The true meaning of Svayamprakâsatva.

    We next take up the point as to the self-luminousness of consciousness
    (above, p. 33). The contention that consciousness is not an object holds
    good for the knowing Self at the time when it illumines (i.e.
    constitutes as its objects) other things; but there is no absolute rule
    as to all consciousness never being anything but self-luminous. For
    common observation shows that the consciousness of one person may become
    the object of the cognition of another, viz. of an inference founded on
    the person's friendly or unfriendly appearance and the like, and again
    that a person's own past states of consciousness become the object of
    his own cognition--as appears from judgments such as 'At one time I knew.'
    It cannot therefore be said 'If it is consciousness it is self-proved'
    (above p. 33), nor that consciousness if becoming an object of
    consciousness would no longer be consciousness; for from this it would
    follow that one's own past states, and the conscious states of others--
    because being objects of consciousness--are not themselves consciousness.
    Moreover, unless it were admitted that there is inferential knowledge of
    the thoughts of others, there would be no apprehension of the connexion
    of words and meaning, and this would imply the absolute termination of
    all human intercourse depending on speech. Nor also would it be possible
    for pupils to attach themselves to a teacher of sacred lore, for the
    reason that they had become aware of his wisdom and learning. The
    general proposition that consciousness does not admit of being an object
    is in fact quite untenable. The essential 'nature of consciousness or
    knowledge--consists therein that it shines forth, or manifests itself,
    through its own being to its own substrate at the present moment; or (to
    give another definition) that it is instrumental in proving its own
    object by its own being [FOOTNOTE 48:1].

    Now these two characteristics are established by a person's own state of
    consciousness and do not vanish when that consciousness becomes the
    object of another state of consciousness; consciousness remains also in
    the latter case what it is. Jars and similar things, on the other hand,
    do not possess consciousness, not because they are objects of
    consciousness but because they lack the two characteristics stated
    above. If we made the presence of consciousness dependent on the absence
    of its being an object of consciousness, we should arrive at the
    conclusion that consciousness is not consciousness; for there are
    things--e.g. sky-flowers--which are not objects of consciousness and at
    the same time are not consciousness. You will perhaps reply to this that
    a sky-flower's not being consciousness is due not to its not being an
    object of consciousness, but to its non-existence!--Well then, we
    rejoin, let us say analogously that the reason of jars and the like not
    being contradictory to Nescience (i.e. of their being jada), is their
    not being of the nature of consciousness, and let us not have recourse
    to their being objects of consciousness!--But if consciousness is an
    object of consciousness, we conclude that it also is non-contradictory
    of Nescience, like a jar!--At this conclusion, we rejoin, you may arrive
    even on the opposite assumption, reasoning as follows: 'Consciousness is
    non-contradictory of Nescience, because it is not an object of
    consciousness, like a sky-flower! All which shows that to maintain as a
    general principle that something which is an object of consciousness
    cannot itself be consciousness is simply ridiculous.'

    [FOOTNOTE 48:1. The comment of the Sru. Pra. on the above definitions
    runs, with a few additional explanations, as follows: The term
    'anubhûti' here denotes knowledge in general, not only such knowledge as
    is not remembrance (which limited meaning the term has sometimes). With
    reference to the 'shining forth' it might be said that in this way jars
    also and similar things know or are conscious because they also shine
    forth' (viz. in so far as they are known); to exclude jars and the like
    the text therefore adds 'to its own substrate' (the jar 'shines forth,'
    not to itself, but to the knowing person). There are other attributes
    of the Self, such as atomic extension, eternity, and so on, which are
    revealed (not through themselves) but through an act of knowledge
    different from them; to exclude those the text adds 'through its own
    being.' In order to exclude past states of consciousness or acts of
    knowledge, the text adds 'at the present moment.' A past state of
    consciousness is indeed not revealed without another act of knowledge
    (representing it), and would thus by itself be excluded; but the text
    adds this specification (viz. 'at the present moment') on purpose, in
    order to intimate that a past state of consciousness can be represented
    by another state--a point denied by the opponent. 'At the present
    moment' means 'the connexion with the object of knowledge belonging to
    the present time.' Without the addition of 'to its own substrate' the
    definition might imply that a state of consciousness is manifest to
    another person also; to exclude this the clause is added. This first
    definition might be objected to as acceptable only to those who maintain
    the svayamprakâsatva-theory (which need not be discussed here); hence a
    second definition is given. The two clauses 'to its own substrate' and
    'at the present moment' have to be supplied in this second definition
    also. 'Instrumental in bringing about' would apply to staffs, wheels,
    and such like implements also; hence the text adds 'its own object.'
    (Staffs, wheels, &c. have no 'objects.') Knowledge depending on sight
    does not bring about an object depending on hearing; to exclude this
    notion of universal instrumentality the text specifies the object by the
    words 'its own.' The clause 'through its own being' excludes the sense
    organs, which reveal objects not by their own being, but in so far as
    they give rise to knowledge. The two clauses 'at the present moment' and
    'to its own substrate' have the same office in the second definition as
    in the first.]




    Consciousness is not eternal.

    It was further maintained by the pûrvapakshin that as consciousness is
    self-established it has no antecedent non-existence and so on, and that
    this disproves its having an origin. But this is an attempt to prove
    something not proved by something else that is equally unproved;
    comparable to a man blind from birth undertaking to guide another blind
    man! You have no right to maintain the non-existence of the antecedent
    non-existence of consciousness on the ground that there is nothing to
    make us apprehend that non-existence; for there is something to make us
    apprehend it, viz. consciousness itself!--But how can consciousness at
    the time when it is, make us apprehend its own previous non-existence
    which is contradictorily opposed to it?--Consciousness, we rejoin, does
    not necessarily constitute as its objects only what occupies the same
    time with itself; were it so it would follow that neither the past nor
    the future can be the object of consciousness. Or do you mean that there
    is an absolute rule that the Antecedent non-existence of consciousness,
    if proved, must be contemporaneous with consciousness? Have you then, we
    ask, ever observed this so as to be able to assert an absolute rule? And
    if it were observed, that would prove the existence of previous
    non-existence, not its negation!--The fact, however, is that no person
    in his senses will maintain the contemporaneous existence of
    consciousness and its own antecedent non-existence. In the case of
    perceptive knowledge originating from sensation, there is indeed this
    limitation, that it causes the apprehension of such things only as are
    actually present at the same time. But this limitation does not extend
    to cognitions of all kinds, nor to all instruments of knowledge; for we
    observe that remembrance, inference, and the magical perception of Yogis
    apprehend such things also as are not present at the time of
    apprehension. On this very point there rests the relation connecting the
    means of knowledge with their objects, viz. that the former are not
    without the latter. This does not mean that the instrument of knowledge
    is connected with its object in that way that it is not without
    something that is present at the time of cognition; but rather that the
    instrument of knowledge is opposed to the falsehood of that special form
    in which the object presents itself as connected with some place and
    time.--This disposes also of the contention that remembrance has no
    external object; for it is observed that remembrance is related to such
    things also as have perished.--Possibly you will now argue as follows.
    The antecedent non-existence of consciousness cannot be ascertained by
    perception, for it is not something present at the time of perception.
    It further cannot be ascertained by the other means of knowledge, since
    there is no characteristic mark (linga) on which an inference could be
    based: for we do not observe any characteristic mark invariably
    accompanied by the antecedent non-existence of consciousness. Nor do we
    meet with any scriptural text referring to this antecedent
    non-existence. Hence, in the absence of any valid instrument of
    knowledge, the antecedent non-existence of consciousness cannot be
    established at all.--If, we reply, you thus, altogether setting aside
    the force of self-provedness (on which you had relied hitherto), take
    your stand on the absence of valid means of knowledge, we again must
    request you to give in; for there is a valid means of knowledge whereby
    to prove the antecedent non-existence of consciousness, viz. valid
    non-perception (anupalabdhi).

    Moreover, we observe that perceptional knowledge proves its object, be
    it a jar or something else, to exist only as long as it exists itself,
    not at all times; we do not, through it, apprehend the antecedent or
    subsequent existence of the jar. Now this absence of apprehension is due
    to the fact that consciousness itself is limited in time. If that
    consciousness which has a jar for its object were itself apprehended as
    non-limited in time, the object also--the jar--would be apprehended
    under the same form, i.e. it would be eternal. And if self-established
    consciousness were eternal, it would be immediately cognised as eternal;
    but this is not the case. Analogously, if inferential consciousness and
    other forms of consciousness were apprehended as non-limited in time,
    they would all of them reveal their objects also as non-limited, and
    these objects would thus be eternal; for the objects are conform in
    nature to their respective forms of consciousness.




    There is no consciousness without object.

    Nor is there any consciousness devoid of objects; for nothing of this
    kind is ever known. Moreover, the self-luminousness of consciousness has,
    by our opponent himself, been proved on the ground that its essential
    nature consists in illumining (revealing) objects; the self-luminousness
    of consciousness not admitting of proof apart from its essential nature
    which consists in the lighting up of objects. And as moreover, according
    to our opponent, consciousness cannot be the object of another
    consciousness, it would follow that (having neither an object nor itself
    being an object) it is something altogether unreal, imaginary.

    Nor are you justified in maintaining that in deep sleep, swoon,
    senselessness and similar states, pure consciousness, devoid of any
    object, manifests itself. This view is negatived by 'valid
    non-perception' (see above, p. 52). If consciousness were present in
    those states also, there would be remembrance of it at the time of
    waking from sleep or recovery from swoon; but as a matter of fact there
    is no such remembrance.--But it is not an absolute rule that something
    of which we were conscious must be remembered; how then can the absence
    of remembrance prove the absence of previous consciousness?--Unless, we
    reply, there be some cause of overpowering strength which quite
    obliterates all impressions--as e.g. the dissolution of the body--the
    absence of remembrance does necessarily prove the absence of previous
    consciousness. And, moreover, in the present case the absence of
    consciousness does not only follow from absence of remembrance; it is
    also proved by the thought presenting itself to the person risen from
    sleep, 'For so long a time I was not conscious of anything.'--Nor may it
    be said that even if there was consciousness, absence of remembrance
    would necessarily follow from the absence (during deep sleep) of the
    distinction of objects, and from the extinction of the consciousness of
    the 'I'; for the non-consciousness of some one thing, and the absence of
    some one thing cannot be the cause of the non-remembrance of some other
    thing, of which there had been consciousness. And that in the states in
    question the consciousness of the 'I' does persist, will moreover be
    shown further on.

    But, our opponent urges, have you not said yourself that even in deep
    sleep and similar states there is consciousness marked by difference?--
    True, we have said so. But that consciousness is consciousness of the
    Self, and that this is affected by difference will be proved further on.
    At present we are only interested in denying the existence of your pure
    consciousness, devoid of all objects and without a substrate. Nor can we
    admit that your pure consciousness could constitute what we call the
    consciousness of the Self; for we shall prove that the latter has a
    substrate.

    It thus cannot be maintained that the antecedent non-existence of
    consciousness does not admit of being proved, because consciousness
    itself does not prove it. And as we have shown that consciousness itself
    may be an object of consciousness, we have thereby disproved the alleged
    impossibility of antecedent non-existence being proved by other means.
    Herewith falls the assertion that the non-origination of consciousness
    can be proved.




    Consciousness is capable of change.

    Against the assertion that the alleged non-origination of consciousness
    at the same time proves that consciousness is not capable of any other
    changes (p. 36), we remark that the general proposition on which this
    conclusion rests is too wide: it would extend to antecedent
    non-existence itself, of which it is evident that it comes to an end,
    although it does not originate. In qualifying the changes as changes of
    'Being,' you manifest great logical acumen indeed! For according to your
    own view Nescience also (which is not 'Being') does not originate, is
    the substrate of manifold changes, and comes to an end through the rise
    of knowledge! Perhaps you will say that the changes of Nescience are all
    unreal. But, do you then, we ask in reply, admit that any change is
    real? You do not; and yet it is only this admission which would give a
    sense to the distinction expressed by the word 'Being' [FOOTNOTE 54:1].

    Nor is it true that consciousness does not admit of any division within
    itself, because it has no beginning (p. 36). For the non-originated Self
    is divided from the body, the senses, &c., and Nescience also, which is
    avowedly without a beginning, must needs be admitted to be divided from
    the Self. And if you say that the latter division is unreal, we ask
    whether you have ever observed a real division invariably connected with
    origination! Moreover, if the distinction of Nescience from the Self is
    not real, it follows that Nescience and the Self are essentially one.
    You further have yourself proved the difference of views by means of the
    difference of the objects of knowledge as established by non-refuted
    knowledge; an analogous case being furnished by the difference of acts
    of cleaving, which results from the difference of objects to be cleft.
    And if you assert that of this knowing--which is essentially knowing
    only--nothing that is an object of knowledge can be an attribute, and
    that these objects--just because they are objects of knowledge--cannot
    be attributes of knowing; we point out that both these remarks would
    apply also to eternity, self-luminousness, and the other attributes of
    'knowing', which are acknowledged by yourself, and established by valid
    means of proof. Nor may you urge against this that all these alleged
    attributes are in reality mere 'consciousness' or 'knowing'; for they
    are essentially distinct. By 'being conscious' or 'knowing', we
    understand the illumining or manifesting of some object to its own
    substrate (i.e. the substrate of knowledge), by its own existence (i.e.
    the existence of knowledge) merely; by self-luminousness (or
    'self-illuminatedness') we understand the shining forth or being
    manifest by its own existence merely to its own substrate; the terms
    'shining forth', 'illumining', 'being manifest' in both these
    definitions meaning the capability of becoming an object of thought and
    speech which is common to all things, whether intelligent or
    non-intelligent. Eternity again means 'being present in all time';
    oneness means 'being defined by the number one'. Even if you say that
    these attributes are only negative ones, i.e. equal to the absence of
    non-intelligence and so on, you still cannot avoid the admission that
    they are attributes of consciousness. If, on the other hand, being of a
    nature opposite to non-intelligence and so on, be not admitted as
    attributes of consciousness--whether of a positive or a negative
    kind--in addition to its essential nature; it is an altogether unmeaning
    proceeding to deny to it such qualities, as non-intelligence and the
    like.

    We moreover must admit the following alternative: consciousness is
    either proved (established) or not. If it is proved it follows that it
    possesses attributes; if it is not, it is something absolutely nugatory,
    like a sky-flower, and similar purely imaginary things.

    [FOOTNOTE 54:1. The Sânkara is not entitled to refer to a distinction of
    real and unreal division, because according to his theory all
    distinction is unreal.]

  5. #5

    Re: Vedanta Sutra - read this translation

    Consciousness is the attribute of a permanent Conscious self.

    Let it then be said that consciousness is proof (siddhih) itself. Proof
    of what, we ask in reply, and to whom? If no definite answer can be
    given to these two questions, consciousness cannot be defined as
    'proof'; for 'proof' is a relative notion, like 'son.' You will perhaps
    reply 'Proof to the Self'; and if we go on asking 'But what is that
    Self'? you will say, 'Just consciousness as already said by us before.'
    True, we reply, you said so; but it certainly was not well said. For if
    it is the nature of consciousness to be 'proof' ('light,'
    'enlightenment') on the part of a person with regard to something, how
    can this consciousness which is thus connected with the person and the
    thing be itself conscious of itself? To explain: the essential character
    of consciousness or knowledge is that by its very existence it renders
    things capable of becoming objects, to its own substrate, of thought and
    speech. This consciousness (anubhûti), which is also termed jñâna,
    avagati, samvid, is a particular attribute belonging to a conscious Self
    and related to an object: as such it is known to every one on the
    testimony of his own Self--as appears from ordinary judgments such as 'I
    know the jar,' 'I understand this matter,' 'I am conscious of (the
    presence of) this piece of cloth.' That such is the essential nature of
    consciousness you yourself admit; for you have proved thereby its
    self-luminousness. Of this consciousness which thus clearly presents
    itself as the attribute of an agent and as related to an object, it
    would be difficult indeed to prove that at the same time it is itself
    the agent; as difficult as it would be to prove that the object of
    action is the agent.

    For we clearly see that this agent (the subject of consciousness) is
    permanent (constant), while its attribute, i. e. consciousness, not
    differing herein from joy, grief, and the like, rises, persists for some
    time, and then comes to an end. The permanency of the conscious subject
    is proved by the fact of recognition, 'This very same thing was formerly
    apprehended by me.' The non-permanency of consciousness, on the other
    hand, is proved by thought expressing itself in the following forms, 'I
    know at present,' 'I knew at a time,' 'I, the knowing subject, no longer
    have knowledge of this thing.' How then should consciousness and (the
    conscious subject) be one? If consciousness which changes every moment
    were admitted to constitute the conscious subject, it would be
    impossible for us to recognise the thing seen to-day as the one we saw
    yesterday; for what has been perceived by one cannot be recognised by
    another. And even if consciousness were identified with the conscious
    subject and acknowledged as permanent, this would no better account for
    the fact of recognition. For recognition implies a conscious subject
    persisting from the earlier to the later moment, and not merely
    consciousness. Its expression is 'I myself perceived this thing on a
    former occasion.' According to your view the quality of being a
    conscious agent cannot at all belong to consciousness; for consciousness,
    you say, is just consciousness and nothing more. And that there exists a
    pure consciousness devoid of substrate and objects alike, we have
    already refuted on the ground that of a thing of this kind we have
    absolutely no knowledge. And that the consciousness admitted by both of
    us should be the Self is refuted by immediate consciousness itself. And
    we have also refuted the fallacious arguments brought forward to prove
    that mere consciousness is the only reality.--But, another objection is
    raised, should the relation of the Self and the 'I' not rather be
    conceived as follows:--In self-consciousness which expresses itself in
    the judgment 'I know,' that intelligent something which constitutes the
    absolutely non-objective element, and is pure homogeneous light, is the
    Self; the objective element (yushmad-artha) on the other hand, which is
    established through its being illumined (revealed) by the Self is the
    _I_--in 'I know'--and this is something different from pure
    intelligence, something objective or external?

    By no means, we reply; for this view contradicts the relation of
    attribute and substrate of attribute of which we are directly conscious,
    as implied in the thought 'I know.'

    Consider also what follows.--'If the _I_ were not the Self, the
    inwardness of the Self would not exist; for it is just the consciousness
    of the _I_ which separates the inward from the outward.

    '"May I, freeing myself from all pain, enter on free possession of
    endless delight?" This is the thought which prompts the man desirous of
    release to apply himself to the study of the sacred texts. Were it a
    settled matter that release consists in the annihilation of the I, the
    same man would move away as soon as release were only hinted at. "When I
    myself have perished, there still persists some consciousness different
    from me;" to bring this about nobody truly will exert himself.

    'Moreover the very existence of consciousness, its being a consciousness
    at all, and its being self-luminous, depend on its connexion with a Self;
    when that connexion is dissolved, consciousness itself cannot be
    established, not any more than the act of cutting can take place when
    there is no person to cut and nothing to be cut. Hence it is certain
    that the I, i.e. the knowing subject, is the inward Self.'

    This scripture confirms when saying 'By what should he know the knower?'
    (Bri. Up. II, 4, 15); and Smriti also, 'Him who knows this they call the
    knower of the body' (Bha. Gî. XIII, 1). And the Sûtrakâra also, in the
    section beginning with 'Not the Self on account of scriptural statement'
    (II, 3, 17), will say 'For this very reason (it is) a knower' (II, 3,
    18); and from this it follows that the Self is not mere consciousness.

    What is established by consciousness of the 'I' is the I itself, while
    the not-I is given in the consciousness of the not-I; hence to say that
    the knowing subject, which is established by the state of consciousness,
    'I know,' is the not-I, is no better than to maintain that one's own
    mother is a barren woman. Nor can it be said that this 'I,' the knowing
    subject, is dependent on its light for something else. It rather is
    self-luminous; for to be self-luminous means to have consciousness for
    one's essential nature. And that which has light for its essential
    nature does not depend for its light on something else. The case is
    analogous to that of the flame of a lamp or candle. From the
    circumstance that the lamp illumines with its light other things, it
    does not follow either that it is not luminous, or that its luminousness
    depends on something else; the fact rather is that the lamp being of
    luminous nature shines itself and illumines with its light other things
    also. To explain.--The one substance tejas, i.e. fire or heat, subsists
    in a double form, viz. as light (prabh&#226, and as luminous matter.
    Although light is a quality of luminous substantial things, it is in
    itself nothing but the substance tejas, not a mere quality like e.g.
    whiteness; for it exists also apart from its substrates, and possesses
    colour (which is a quality). Having thus attributes different from those
    of qualities such as whiteness and so on, and possessing illumining
    power, it is the substance tejas, not anything else (e.g. a quality).
    Illumining power belongs to it, because it lights up itself and other
    things. At the same time it is practically treated as a quality because
    it always has the substance tejas for its substrate, and depends on it.
    This must not be objected to on the ground that what is called light is
    really nothing but dissolving particles of matter which proceed from the
    substance tejas; for if this were so, shining gems and the sun would in
    the end consume themselves completely. Moreover, if the flame of a lamp
    consisted of dissolving particles of matter, it would never be
    apprehended as a whole; for no reason can be stated why those particles
    should regularly rise in an agglomerated form to the height of four
    fingers breadth, and after that simultaneously disperse themselves
    uniformly in all directions--upwards, sideways, and downwards. The fact
    is that the flame of the lamp together with its light is produced anew
    every moment and again vanishes every moment; as we may infer from the
    successive combination of sufficient causes (viz. particles of oil and
    wick) and from its coming to an end when those causes are completely
    consumed.

    Analogously to the lamp, the Self is essentially intelligent (kid-rûpa),
    and has intelligence (kaitanya) for its quality. And to be essentially
    intelligent means to be self-luminous. There are many scriptural texts
    declaring this, compare e.g. 'As a mass of salt has neither inside nor
    outside but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed that Self has
    neither inside nor outside but is altogether a mass of knowledge' (Bri.
    Up. IV, 5, 13); 'There that person becomes self-luminous, there is no
    destruction of the knowing of the knower' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 14; 30); 'He
    who knows, let me smell this, he is the Self (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 4); 'Who
    is that Self? That one who is made of knowledge, among the prânas,
    within the heart, the light, the person' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7); 'For it is
    he who sees, hears, smells, tastes, thinks, considers, acts, the person
    whose Self is knowledge' (Pr. Up. IV, 9); 'Whereby should one know the
    knower' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15). 'This person knows,' 'The seer does not
    see death nor illness nor pain' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2); 'That highest
    person not remembering this body into which he was born' (Ch. Up. VIII,
    12, 3); 'Thus these sixteen parts of the spectator that go towards the
    person; when they have readied the person, sink into him' (Pr. Up. VI,
    5); 'From this consisting of mind, there is different an interior Self
    consisting of knowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 4). And the Sûtrakâra also will
    refer to the Self as a 'knower' in II, 3, 18. All which shows that the
    self-luminous Self is a knower, i.e. a knowing subject, and not pure
    light (non-personal intelligence). In general we may say that where
    there is light it must belong to something, as shown by the light of a
    lamp. The Self thus cannot be mere consciousness. The grammarians
    moreover tell us that words such as 'consciousness,' 'knowledge,' &c.,
    are relative; neither ordinary nor Vedic language uses expressions such
    as 'he knows' without reference to an object known and an agent who
    knows.

    With reference to the assertion that consciousness constitutes the Self,
    because it (consciousness) is not non-intelligent (jada), we ask what
    you understand by this absence of non-intelligence.' If you reply
    'luminousness due to the being of the thing itself (i.e. of the thing
    which is ajada)'; we point out that this definition would wrongly
    include lamps also, and similar things; and it would moreover give rise
    to a contradiction, since you do not admit light as an attribute,
    different from consciousness itself. Nor can we allow you to define
    ajadatva as 'being of that nature that light is always present, without
    any exception,' for this definition would extend also to pleasure, pain,
    and similar states. Should you maintain that pleasure and so on,
    although being throughout of the nature of light, are non-intelligent
    for the reason that, like jars, &c., they shine forth (appear) to
    something else and hence belong to the sphere of the not-Self; we ask in
    reply: Do you mean then to say that knowledge appears to itself?
    Knowledge no less than pleasure appears to some one else, viz. the 'I':
    there is, in that respect, no difference between the judgment 'I know,'
    and the judgment 'I am pleased.' Non-intelligence in the sense of
    appearingness-to-itself is thus not proved for consciousness; and hence
    it follows that what constitutes the Self is the non-jada 'I' which is
    proved to itself by its very Being. That knowledge is of the nature of
    light depends altogether on its connection with the knowing 'I': it is
    due to the latter, that knowledge, like pleasure, manifests itself to
    that conscious person who is its substrate, and not to anybody else. The
    Self is thus not mere knowledge, but is the knowing 'I.'




    The view that the conscious subject is something unreal, due to the
    ahamkâra, cannot be maintained.

    We turn to a further point. You maintain that consciousness which is in
    reality devoid alike of objects and substrate presents itself, owing to
    error, in the form of a knowing subject, just as mother o' pearl appears
    as silver; (consciousness itself being viewed as a real substrate of an
    erroneous imputation), because an erroneous imputation cannot take place
    apart from a substrate. But this theory is indefensible. If things were
    as you describe them, the conscious 'I' would be cognised as co-ordinate
    with the state of consciousness 'I am consciousness,' just as the
    shining thing presenting itself to our eyes is judged to be silver. But
    the fact is that the state of consciousness presents itself as something
    apart, constituting a distinguishing attribute of the I, just as the
    stick is an attribute of Devadatta who carries it. The judgment 'I am
    conscious' reveals an 'I' distinguished by consciousness; and to declare
    that it refers only to a state of consciousness--which is a mere
    attribute--is no better than to say that the judgment 'Devadatta carries
    a stick' is about the stick only. Nor are you right in saying that the
    idea of the Self being a knowing agent, presents itself to the mind of
    him only who erroneously identifies the Self and the body, an error
    expressing itself in judgments such as 'I am stout,' and is on that
    account false; for from this it would follow that the consciousness
    which is erroneously imagined as a Self is also false; for it presents
    itself to the mind of the same person. You will perhaps rejoin that
    consciousness is not false because it (alone) is not sublatcd by that
    cognition which sublates everything else. Well, we reply, then the
    knowership of the Self also is not false; for that also is not sublatcd.
    You further maintain that the character of being a knower, i.e. the
    agent in the action of knowing, does not become the non-changing Self;
    that being a knower is something implying change, of a non-intelligent
    kind (jada), and residing in the ahamkâra which is the abode of change
    and a mere effect of the Unevolved (the Prakriti); that being an agent
    and so on is like colour and other qualities, an attribute of what is
    objective; and that if we admit the Self to be an agent and the object
    of the notion of the 'I,' it also follows that the Self is, like the
    body, not a real Self but something external and non-intelligent. But
    all this is unfounded, since the internal organ is, like the body,
    non-intelligent, an effect of Prakriti, an object of knowledge,
    something outward and for the sake of others merely; while being a
    knowing subject constitutes the special essential nature of intelligent
    beings. To explain. Just as the body, through its objectiveness,
    outwardness, and similar causes, is distinguished from what possesses
    the opposite attributes of subjectiveness, inwardness, and so on; for
    the same reason the ahamkâra also--which is of the same substantial
    nature as the body--is similarly distinguished. Hence the ahamkâra is
    no more a knower than it is something subjective; otherwise there would
    be an evident contradiction. As knowing cannot be attributed to the
    ahamkâra, which is an object of knowledge, so knowership also cannot be
    ascribed to it; for of that also it is the object. Nor can it be
    maintained that to be a knower is something essentially changing. For to
    be a knower is to be the substrate of the quality of knowledge, and as
    the knowing Self is eternal, knowledge which is an essential quality of
    the Self is also eternal. That the Self is eternal will be declared in
    the Sûtra, II, 3, 17; and in II, 3, 18 the term 'jña' (knower) will show
    that it is an essential quality of the Self to be the abode of
    knowledge. That a Self whose essential nature is knowledge should be the
    substrate of the (quality of) knowledge--just as gems and the like are
    the substrate of light--gives rise to no contradiction whatever.

    Knowledge (the quality) which is in itself unlimited, is capable of
    contraction and expansion, as we shall show later on. In the so-called
    kshetrajña--condition of the Self, knowledge is, owing to the influence
    of work (karman), of a contracted nature, as it more or less adapts
    itself to work of different kinds, and is variously determined by the
    different senses. With reference to this various flow of knowledge as
    due to the senses, it is spoken of as rising and setting, and the Self
    possesses the quality of an agent. As this quality is not, however,
    essential, but originated by action, the Self is essentially unchanging.
    This changeful quality of being a knower can belong only to the Self
    whose essential nature is knowledge; not possibly to the non-intelligent
    ahamkâra. But, you will perhaps say, the ahamkâra, although of non-
    intelligent nature, may become a knower in so far as by approximation to
    intelligence it becomes a reflection of the latter. How, we ask in
    return, is this becoming a reflection of intelligence imagined to take
    place? Does consciousness become a reflection of the ahamkâra, or does
    the ahamkâra become a reflection of consciousness? The former
    alternative is inadmissible, since you will not allow to consciousness
    the quality of being a knower; and so is the latter since, as explained
    above, the non-intelligent ahamkâra can never become a knower. Moreover,
    neither consciousness nor the ahamkâra are objects of visual perception.
    Only things seen by the eye have reflections.--Let it then be said that
    as an iron ball is heated by contact with fire, so the consciousness of
    being a knower is imparted to the ahamkâra through its contact with
    Intelligence.--This view too is inadmissible; for as you do not allow
    real knowership to Intelligence, knowership or the consciousness of
    knowership cannot be imparted to the ahamkâra by contact with
    Intelligence; and much less even can knowership or the consciousness of
    it be imparted to Intelligence by contact with the essentially non-
    intelligent ahamkâra. Nor can we accept what you say about
    'manifestation.' Neither the ahamkâra, you say, nor Intelligence is
    really a knowing subject, but the ahamkâra manifests consciousness
    abiding within itself (within the ahamkâra), as the mirror manifests the
    image abiding within it. But the essentially non-intelligent ahamkâra
    evidently cannot 'manifest' the self-luminous Self. As has been said
    'That the non-intelligent ahamkâra should manifest the self-luminous
    Self, has no more sense than to say that a spent coal manifests the Sun.'
    The truth is that all things depend for their proof on self-luminous
    consciousness; and now you maintain that one of these things, viz. the
    non-intelligent ahamkâra--which itself depends for its light on
    consciousness--manifests consciousness, whose essential light never
    rises or sets, and which is the cause that proves everything! Whoever
    knows the nature of the Self will justly deride such a view! The
    relation of 'manifestation' cannot hold good between consciousness and
    the ahamkâra for the further reason also that there is a contradiction
    in nature between the two, and because it would imply consciousness not
    to be consciousness. As has been said, 'One cannot manifest the other,
    owing to contradictoriness; and if the Self were something to be
    manifested, that would imply its being non-intelligent like a jar.' Nor
    is the matter improved by your introducing the hand and the sunbeams
    (above, p. 38), and to say that as the sunbeams while manifesting the
    hand, are at the same time manifested by the hand, so consciousness,
    while manifesting the ahamkâra, is at the same time itself manifested by
    the latter. The sunbeams are in reality not manifested by the hand at
    all. What takes place is that the motion of the sunbeams is reversed
    (reflected) by the opposed hand; they thus become more numerous, and
    hence are perceived more clearly; but this is due altogether to the
    multitude of beams, not to any manifesting power on the part of the hand.

    What could, moreover, be the nature of that 'manifestation' of the Self
    consisting of Intelligence, which would be effected through the ahamkâra?
    It cannot be origination; for you acknowledge that what is self-
    established cannot be originated by anything else. Nor can it be
    'illumination' (making to shine forth), since consciousness cannot--
    according to you--be the object of another consciousness. For the same
    reason it cannot be any action assisting the means of being conscious of
    consciousness. For such helpful action could be of two kinds only. It
    would either be such as to cause the connexion of the object to be known
    with the sense-organs; as e.g. any action which, in the case of the
    apprehension of a species or of one's own face, causes connexion between
    the organ of sight and an individual of the species, or a looking-glass.
    Or it would be such as to remove some obstructive impurity in the mind
    of the knowing person; of this kind is the action of calmness and self-
    restraint with reference to scripture which is the means of apprehending
    the highest reality. Moreover, even if it were admitted that
    consciousness may be an object of consciousness, it could not be
    maintained that the 'I' assists the means whereby that consciousness is
    effected. For if it did so, it could only be in the way of removing any
    obstacles impeding the origination of such consciousness; analogous to
    the way in which a lamp assists the eye by dispelling the darkness which
    impedes the origination of the apprehension of colour. But in the case
    under discussion we are unable to imagine such obstacles. There is
    nothing pertaining to consciousness which obstructs the origination of
    the knowledge of consciousness and which could be removed by the
    ahamkâra.--There is something, you will perhaps reply, viz. Nescience!
    Not so, we reply. That Nescience is removed by the ahamkâra cannot be
    admitted; knowledge alone can put an end to Nescience. Nor can
    consciousness be the abode of Nescience, because in that case Nescience
    would have the same abode and the same object as knowledge.

    In pure knowledge where there is no knowing subject and no object of
    knowledge--the so-called 'witnessing' principle (sâkshin)--Nescience
    cannot exist. Jars and similar things cannot be the abode of Nescience
    because there is no possibility of their being the abode of knowledge,
    and for the same reason pure knowledge also cannot be the abode of
    Nescience. And even if consciousness were admitted to be the abode of
    Nescience, it could not be the object of knowledge; for consciousness
    being viewed as the Self cannot be the object of knowledge, and hence
    knowledge cannot terminate the Nescience abiding within consciousness.
    For knowledge puts an end to Nescience only with regard to its own
    objects, as in the case of the snake-rope. And the consequence of this
    would be that the Nescience attached to consciousness could never be
    destroyed by any one.--If Nescience, we further remark, is viewed as
    that which can be defined neither as Being nor non-Being, we shall show
    later on that such Nescience is something quite incomprehensible.--On
    the other hand, Nescience, if understood to be the antecedent non-
    existence of knowledge, is not opposed in nature to the origination of
    knowledge, and hence the dispelling of Nescience cannot be viewed as
    promoting the means of the knowledge of the Self.--From all this it
    follows that the ahamkâra cannot effect in any way 'manifestation of
    consciousness.'

    Nor (to finish up this point) can it be said that it is the essential
    nature of manifesting agents to manifest things in so far as the latter
    have their abode in the former; for such a relation is not observed in
    the case of lamps and the like (which manifest what lies outside them).
    The essential nature of manifesting agents rather lies therein that they
    promote the knowledge of things as they really are, and this is also the
    nature of whatever promotes knowledge and the means thereof. Nor is it
    even true that the mirror manifests the face. The mirror is only the
    cause of a certain irregularity, viz. the reversion of the ocular rays
    of light, and to this irregularity there is due the appearance of the
    face within the mirror; but the manifesting agent is the light only. And
    it is evident that the ahamkâra is not capable of producing an
    irregularity (analogous to that produced by the mirror) in consciousness
    which is self-luminous.--And--with regard to the second analogous
    instance alleged by you--the fact is that the species is known through
    the individual because the latter is its substrate (as expressed in the
    general principle, 'the species is the form of the individual'), but not
    because the individual 'manifests' the species. Thus there is no reason,
    either real or springing from some imperfection, why the consciousness
    of consciousness should be brought about by its abiding in the ahamkâra,
    and the attribute of being the knowing agent or the consciousness of
    that cannot therefore belong to the ahamkâra. Hence, what constitutes
    the inward Self is not pure consciousness but the 'I' which proves
    itself as the knowing subject. In the absence of egoity, 'inwardness'
    could not be established for consciousness.

  6. #6

    Re: Vedanta Sutra - read this translation

    The conscious subject persists in deep sleep.

    We now come to the question as to the nature of deep sleep. In deep
    sleep the quality of darkness prevails in the mind and there is no
    consciousness of outward things, and thus there is no distinct and clear
    presentation of the 'I'; but all the same the Self somehow presents
    itself up to the time of waking in the one form of the 'I,' and the
    latter cannot therefore be said to be absent. Pure consciousness assumed
    by you (to manifest itself in deep sleep) is really in no better case;
    for a person risen from deep sleep never represents to himself his
    state of consciousness during sleep in the form, 'I was pure
    consciousness free from all egoity and opposed in nature to everything
    else, witnessing Nescience'; what he thinks is only 'I slept well.' From
    this form of reflection it appears that even during sleep the Self. i.e.
    the 'I,' was a knowing subject and perceptive of pleasure. Nor must you
    urge against this that the reflection has the following form: 'As now I
    feel pleasure, so I slept then also'; for the reflection is distinctly
    _not_ of that kind. [FOOTNOTE 68:1] Nor must you say that owing to the
    non-permanency of the 'I' its perception of pleasure during sleep
    cannot connect itself with the waking state. For (the 'I' is permanent
    as appears from the fact that) the person who has risen from sleep
    recalls things of which he was conscious before his sleep, 'I did such
    and such a thing,' 'I observed this or that,' 'I said so or so.'--But,
    you will perhaps say, he also reflects, 'For such and such a time I was
    conscious of nothing!'--'And what does this imply?' we ask.--'It implies
    a negation of everything!'--By no means, we rejoin. The words 'I was
    conscious' show that the knowing 'I' persisted, and that hence what is
    negated is only the objects of knowledge. If the negation implied in 'of
    nothing' included everything, it would also negative the pure
    consciousness which you hold to persist in deep sleep. In the judgment
    'I was conscious of nothing,' the word 'I' clearly refers to the 'I,' i.
    e. the knowing Self which persists even during deep sleep, while the
    words 'was conscious of nothing' negative all knowledge on the part of
    t`at 'I'; if, now%2K in the face of this, you undertake to prove by means
    of this very judgment that knowledge--which is expressly denied--existed
    at the time, and that the persisting knowing Self did not exist, you may
    address your proof to the patient gods who give no reply!--But--our
    opponent goes on to urge--I form the following judgment also: 'I then
    was not conscious of myself,' and from this I understand that the 'I'
    did not persist during deep sleep!--You do not know, we rejoin, that
    this denial of the persistence of the 'I' flatly contradicts the state
    of consciousness expressed in the judgment 'I was not conscious of
    myself' and the verbal form of the judgment itself!--But what then is
    denied by the words 'of myself?--This, we admit, is a reasonable
    question. Let us consider the point. What is negatived in that judgment
    is not the knowing 'I' itself, but merely the distinctions of caste,
    condition of life, &c. which belong to the 'I' at the time of waking. We
    must distinguish the objects of the several parts of the judgment under
    discussion. The object of the '(me) myself' is the 'I' distinguished by
    class characteristics as it presents itself in the waking state; the
    object of the word 'I' (in the judgment) is that 'I' which consists of a
    uniform flow of self-consciousness which persists in sleep also, but is
    then not quite distinct. The judgment 'I did not know myself' therefore
    means that the sleeper was not conscious of the place where he slept, of
    his special characteristics, and so on.--It is, moreover, your own view
    that in deep sleep the Self occupies the position of a witnessing
    principle with regard to Nescience. But by a witness (sâkshin) we
    understand some one who knows about something by personal observation
    (sâkshât); a person who does not know cannot be a witness. Accordingly,
    in scripture as well as in ordinary language a knowing subject only, not
    mere knowledge, is spoken of as a witness; and with this the Reverend
    Pânini also agrees when teaching that the word 'sâkshin' means one who
    knows in person (Pâ. Sû. V, 2, 91). Now this witness is nothing else but
    the 'I' which is apprehended in the judgment 'I know'; and how then
    should this 'I' not be apprehended in the state of sleep? That which
    itself appears to the Self appears as the 'I,' and it thus follows that
    also in deep sleep and similar states the Self which then shines forth
    appears as the 'I.'

    [FOOTNOTE 68:1. I. e. the reflection as to the perception of pleasure
    refers to the past state of sleep only, not to the present moment of
    reflection.]




    The conscious subject persists in the state of release.

    To maintain that the consciousness of the 'I' does not persist in the
    state of final release is again altogether inappropriate. It in fact
    amounts to the doctrine--only expressed in somewhat different words--
    that final release is the annihilation of the Self. The 'I' is not a
    mere attribute of the Self so that even after its destruction the
    essential nature of the Self might persist--as it persists on the
    cessation of ignorance; but it constitutes the very nature of the Self.
    Such judgments as 'I know', 'Knowledge has arisen in me', show, on the
    other hand, that we are conscious of knowledge as a mere attribute of
    the Self.--Moreover, a man who suffering pain, mental or of other kind--
    whether such pain be real or due to error only--puts himself in relation
    to pain--'I am suffering pain'--naturally begins to reflect how he may
    once for all free himself from all these manifold afflictions and enjoy
    a state of untroubled ease; the desire of final release thus having
    arisen in him he at once sets to work to accomplish it. If, on the other
    hand, he were to realise that the effect of such activity would be the
    loss of personal existence, he surely would turn away as soon as
    somebody began to tell him about 'release'. And the result of this would
    be that, in the absence of willing and qualified pupils, the whole
    scriptural teaching as to final release would lose its authoritative
    character.--Nor must you maintain against this that even in the state of
    release there persists pure consciousness; for this by no means improves
    your case. No sensible person exerts himself under the influence of the
    idea that after he himself has perished there will remain some entity
    termed 'pure light!'--What constitutes the 'inward' Self thus is the 'I',
    the knowing subject.

    This 'inward' Self shines forth in the state of final release also as an
    'I'; for it appears to itself. The general principle is that whatever
    being appears to itself appears as an 'I'; both parties in the present
    dispute establish the existence of the transmigrating Self on such
    appearance. On the contrary, whatever does not appear as an 'I', does
    not appear to itself; as jars and the like. Now the emancipated Self
    does thus appear to itself, and therefore it appears as an 'I'. Nor does
    this appearance as an 'I' imply in any way that the released Self is
    subject to Nescience and implicated in the Samsâra; for this would
    contradict the nature of final release, and moreover the consciousness
    of the 'I' cannot be the cause of Nescience and so on. Nescience
    (ignorance) is either ignorance as to essential nature, or the cognition
    of something under an aspect different from the real one (as when a
    person suffering from jaundice sees all things yellow); or cognition of
    what is altogether opposite in nature (as when mother o' pearl is
    mistaken for silver). Now the 'I' constitutes the essential nature of
    the Self; how then can the consciousness of the 'I,' i.e. the
    consciousness of its own true nature, implicate the released Self in
    Nescience, or, in the Samsâra? The fact rather is that such
    consciousness destroys Nescience, and so on, because it is essentially
    opposed to them. In agreement with this we observe that persons like the
    rishi Vâmadeva, in whom the intuition of their identity with Brahman had
    totally destroyed all Nescience, enjoyed the consciousness of the
    personal 'I'; for scripture says, 'Seeing this the rishi Vâmadeva
    understood,_I_ was Manu and the Sun' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10). And the
    highest Brahman also, which is opposed to all other forms of Nescience
    and denoted and conceived as pure Being, is spoken of in an analogous
    way; cp. 'Let me make each of these three deities,' &c. (Ch. Up. VI, 3,
    3); 'May I be many, may I grow forth' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); 'He thought,
    shall I send forth worlds?' (Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 1); and again, 'Since I
    transcend the Destructible, and am higher also than the Indestructible,
    therefore I am proclaimed in the world and in the Veda as the highest
    Person' (Bha. Gî. XV, 18); 'I am the Self, O Gûdâkesa.' (Bha. Gî. X, 20);
    'Never was I not' (Bha. Gî. II, 12); 'I am the source and the
    destruction of the whole world' (Bha. Gî. VII, 6); 'I am the source of
    all; from me proceeds everything' (Bha. Gî. X, 8); 'I am he who raises
    them from the ocean of the world of death' (Bha. Gî. XII, 7); 'I am the
    giver of seed, the father' (Bha. Gî. XIV, 4); 'I know the things past'
    (Bha. Gî. VII, 26).--But if the 'I' (aham) constitutes the essential
    nature of the Self, how is it that the Holy One teaches the principle of
    egoity (ahamkâra) to belong to the sphere of objects, 'The great
    elements, the ahamkâra, the understanding (buddhi), and the Unevolved'
    (Bha. Gî. XIII, 5)?--As in all passages, we reply, which give
    information about the true nature of the Self it is spoken of as the 'I',
    we conclude that the 'I' constitutes the essential nature of the inward
    Self. Where, on the other hand, the Holy One declares the ahamkâra--a
    special effect of the Unevolved--to be comprised within the sphere of
    the Objective, he means that principle which is called ahamkâra, because
    it causes the assumption of Egoity on the part of the body which belongs
    to the Not-self. Such egoity constitutes the ahamkâra also designated as
    pride or arrogance, which causes men to slight persons superior to
    themselves, and is referred to by scripture in many places as something
    evil. Such consciousness of the 'I' therefore as is not sublated by
    anything else has the Self for its object; while, on the other hand,
    such consciousness of the 'I' as has the body for its object is mere
    Nescience. In agreement with this the Reverend Parâsara has said, 'Hear
    from me the essential nature of Nescience; it is the attribution of
    Selfhood to what is not the Self.' If the Self were pure consciousness
    then pure consciousness only, and not the quality of being a knowing
    subject, would present itself in the body also, which is a Not-self
    wrongly imagined to be a Self. The conclusion therefore remains that the
    Self is nothing but the knowing 'I'. Thus it has been said, 'As is
    proved by perception, and as also results from reasoning and tradition,
    and from its connexion with ignorance, the Self presents itself as a
    knowing 'I'. And again,'That which is different from body, senses, mind,
    and vital airs; which does not depend on other means; which is permanent,
    pervading, divided according to bodies-that is the Self blessed in
    itself.' Here 'not dependent on other means' means 'self-luminous'; and
    'pervading' means 'being of such a nature as to enter, owing to
    excessive minuteness, into all non-sentient things.'




    In cases of Scripture conflicting with Perception, Scripture is not
    stronger. The True cannot be known through the Untrue.

    With reference to the assertion (p. 24 ff.) that Perception, which
    depends on the view of plurality, is based on some defect and hence
    admits of being otherwise accounted for--whence it follows that it is
    sublated by Scripture; we ask you to point out what defect it is on
    which Perception is based and may hence be accounted for otherwise.--'
    The beginningless imagination of difference' we expect you to reply.--
    But, we ask in return, have you then come to know by some other means
    that this beginningless imagination of difference, acting in a manner
    analogous to that of certain defects of vision, is really the cause of
    an altogether perverse view of things?--If you reply that this is known
    just from the fact that Perception is in conflict with Scripture, we
    point out that you are reasoning in a circle: you prove the
    defectiveness of the imagination of plurality through the fact that
    Scripture tells us about a substance devoid of all difference; and at
    the same time you prove the latter point through the former. Moreover,
    if Perception gives rise to perverse cognition because it is based on
    the imagination of plurality, Scripture also is in no better case--for
    it is based on the very same view.--If against this you urge that
    Scripture, although based on a defect, yet sublates Perception in so far
    as it is the cause of a cognition which dispels all plurality
    apprehended through Perception, and thus is later in order than
    Perception; we rejoin that the defectiveness of the foundation of
    Scripture having once been recognised, the circumstance of its being
    later is of no avail. For if a man is afraid of a rope which he mistakes
    for a snake his fear does not come to an end because another man, whom
    he considers to be in error himself, tells him 'This is no snake, do not
    be afraid.' And that Scripture _is_ founded on something defective is
    known at the very time of hearing Scripture, for the reflection (which
    follows on hearing) consists in repeated attempts to cognise the oneness
    of Brahman--a cognition which is destructive of all the plurality
    apprehended through the first hearing of the Veda.--We further ask, 'By
    what means do you arrive at the conclusion that Scripture cannot
    possibly be assumed to be defective in any way, while defects may be
    ascribed to Perception'? It is certainly not Consciousness--self-proved
    and absolutely devoid of all difference--which enlightens you on this
    point; for such Consciousness is unrelated to any objects whatever, and
    incapable of partiality to Scripture. Nor can sense-perception be the
    source of your conviction; for as it is founded on what is defective it
    gives perverse information. Nor again the other sources of knowledge;
    for they are all based on sense-perception. As thus there are no
    acknowledged means of knowledge to prove your view, you must give it up.
    But, you will perhaps say, we proceed by means of the ordinary empirical
    means and objects of knowledge!--What, we ask in reply, do you
    understand by 'empirical'?--What rests on immediate unreflective
    knowledge, but is found not to hold good when tested by logical
    reasoning!--But what is the use, we ask, of knowledge of this kind? If
    logical reasoning refutes something known through some means of
    knowledge, that means of knowledge is no longer authoritative!--Now you
    will possibly argue as follows: 'Scripture as well as Perception is
    founded on Nescience; but all the same Perception is sublated by
    Scripture. For as the object of Scripture, i.e. Brahman, which is one
    and without a second, is not seen to be sublated by any ulterior
    cognition, Brahman, i.e. pure non-differenced Consciousness, remains as
    the sole Reality.'--But here too you are wrong, since we must decide
    that something which rests on a defect is unreal, although it may remain
    unrefuted. We will illustrate this point by an analogous instance. Let
    us imagine a race of men afflicted with a certain special defect of
    vision, without being aware of this their defect, dwelling in some
    remote mountain caves inaccessible to all other men provided with sound
    eyes. As we assume all of these cave dwellers to be afflicted with the
    same defect of vision, they, all of them, will equally see and judge
    bright things, e.g. the moon, to be double. Now in the case of these
    people there never arises a subsequent cognition sublating their
    primitive cognition; but the latter is false all the same, and its
    object, viz., the doubleness of the moon, is false likewise; the defect
    of vision being the cause of a cognition not corresponding to reality.--
    And so it is with the cognition of Brahman also. This cognition is based
    on Nescience, and therefore is false, together with its object, viz.
    Brahman, although no sublating cognition presents itself.--This
    conclusion admits of various expressions in logical form. 'The Brahman
    under dispute is false because it is the object of knowledge which has
    sprung from what is affected with Nescience; as the phenomenal world is.'
    'Brahman is false because it is the object of knowledge; as the world
    is.' 'Brahman is false because it is the object of knowledge, the rise
    of which has the Untrue for its cause; as the world is.'

    You will now perhaps set forth the following analogy. States of dreaming
    consciousness--such as the perception of elephants and the like in one's
    dreams--are unreal, and yet they are the cause of the knowledge of real
    things, viz. good or ill fortune (portended by those dreams). Hence
    there is no reason why Scripture--although unreal in so far as based on
    Nescience--should not likewise be the cause of the cognition of what is
    real, viz. Brahman.--The two cases are not parallel, we reply. The
    conscious states experienced in dreams are not unreal; it is only their
    objects that are false; these objects only, not the conscious states,
    are sublated by the waking consciousness. Nobody thinks 'the cognitions
    of which I was conscious in my dream are unreal'; what men actually
    think is 'the cognitions are real, but the things are not real.' In the
    same way the illusive state of consciousness which the magician produces
    in the minds of other men by means of mantras, drugs, &c., is true, and
    hence the cause of love and fear; for such states of consciousness also
    are not sublated. The cognition which, owing to some defect in the
    object, the sense organ, &c., apprehends a rope as a snake is real, and
    hence the cause of fear and other emotions. True also is the imagination
    which, owing to the nearness of a snake, arises in the mind of a man
    though not actually bitten, viz. that he has been bitten; true also is
    the representation of the imagined poison, for it may be the cause of
    actual death. In the same way the reflection of the face in the water is
    real, and hence enables us to ascertain details belonging to the real
    face. All these states of consciousness are real, as we conclude from
    their having a beginning and actual effects.--Nor would it avail you to
    object that in the absence of real elephants, and so on, the ideas of
    them cannot be real. For ideas require only _some_ substrate in general;
    the mere appearance of a thing is a sufficient substrate, and such an
    appearance is present in the case in question, owing to a certain defect.
    The thing we determine to be unreal because it is sublated; the idea is
    non-sublated, and therefore real.

    Nor can you quote in favour of your view--of the real being known
    through the unreal--the instance of the stroke and the letter. The
    letter being apprehended through the stroke (i.e. the written character)
    does not furnish a case of the real being apprehended through the unreal;
    for the stroke itself is real.--But the stroke causes the idea of the
    letter only in so far as it is apprehended as being a letter, and this
    'being a letter' is untrue!--Not so, we rejoin. If this 'being a letter'
    were unreal it could not be a means of the apprehension of the letter;
    for we neither observe nor can prove that what is non-existent and
    indefinable constitutes a means.--Let then the idea of the letter
    constitute the means!--In that case, we rejoin, the apprehension of the
    real does not spring from the unreal; and besides, it would follow
    therefrom that the means and what is to be effected thereby would be one,
    i.e. both would be, without any distinction, the idea of the letter only.
    Moreover, if the means were constituted by the stroke in so far as it is
    _not_ the letter, the apprehension of all letters would result from the
    sight of one stroke; for one stroke may easily be conceived as _not_
    being _any_ letter.--But, in the same way as the word 'Devadatta'
    conventionally denotes some particular man, so some particular stroke
    apprehended by the eye may conventionally symbolise some particular
    letter to be apprehended by the ear, and thus a particular stroke may be
    the cause of the idea of a particular letter!--Quite so, we reply, but
    on this explanation the real is known through the real; for both stroke
    and conventional power of symbolisation are real. The case is analogous
    to that of the idea of a buffalo being caused by the picture of a
    buffalo; that idea rests on the similarity of picture and thing
    depicted, and that similarity is something real. Nor can it be said
    (with a view to proving the pûrvapaksha by another analogous instance)
    that we meet with a cognition of the real by means of the unreal in the
    case of sound (sabda) which is essentially uniform, but causes the
    apprehension of different things by means of difference of tone (nâda).
    For sound is the cause of the apprehension of different things in so far
    only as we apprehend the connexion of sound manifesting itself in
    various tones, with the different things indicated by those various
    tones [FOOTNOTE 77:1]. And, moreover, it is not correct to argue on the
    ground of the uniformity of sound; for only particular significant
    sounds such as 'ga,' which can be apprehended by the ear, are really
    'sound.'--All this proves that it is difficult indeed to show that the
    knowledge of a true thing, viz. Brahman, can be derived from Scripture,
    if Scripture--as based on Nescience--is itself untrue.

    Our opponent may finally argue as follows:--Scripture is not unreal in
    the same sense as a sky-flower is unreal; for antecedently to the
    cognition of universal non-duality Scripture is viewed as something that
    _is_, and only on the rise of that knowledge it is seen to be unreal. At
    this latter time Scripture no longer is a means of cognising Brahman,
    devoid of all difference, consisting of pure Intelligence; as long on
    the other hand as it is such a means, Scripture _is_; for then we judge
    'Scripture is.'--But to this we reply that if Scripture is not (true),
    the judgment 'Scripture is' is false, and hence the knowledge resting on
    false Scripture being false likewise, the object of that knowledge, i.e.
    Brahman itself, is false. If the cognition of fire which rests on mist
    being mistaken for smoke is false, it follows that the object of that
    cognition, viz. fire itself, is likewise unreal. Nor can it be shown
    that (in the case of Brahman) there is no possibility of ulterior
    sublative cognition; for there may be such sublative cognition, viz. the
    one expressed in the judgment 'the Reality is a Void.' And if you say
    that this latter judgment rests on error, we point out that according to
    yourself the knowledge of Brahman is also based on error. And of our
    judgment (viz. 'the Reality is a Void') it may truly be said that all
    further negation is impossible.--But there is no need to continue this
    demolition of an altogether baseless theory.

    [FOOTNOTE 77:1. And those manifestations of sound by means of various
    tones are themselves something real.]

  7. #7

    Re: Vedanta Sutra - read this translation

    No scriptural texts teach a Brahman devoid of all difference.

    We now turn to the assertion that certain scriptural texts, as e.g.
    'Being only was this in the beginning,' are meant to teach that there
    truly exists only one homogeneous substance, viz. Intelligence free from
    all difference.--This we cannot allow. For the section in which the
    quoted text occurs, in order to make good the initial declaration that
    by the knowledge of one thing all things are known, shows that the
    highest Brahman which is denoted by the term 'Being' is the substantial
    and also the operative cause of the world; that it is all-knowing,
    endowed with all powers; that its purposes come true; that it is the
    inward principle, the support and the ruler of everything; and that
    distinguished by these and other good qualities it constitutes the Self
    of the entire world; and then finally proceeds to instruct Svetaketu
    that this Brahman constitutes his Self also ('Thou art that'). We have
    fully set forth this point in the Vedârtha-samgraha and shall establish
    it in greater detail in the present work also, in the so-called
    ârambhana-adhikarana.--In the same way the passage 'the higher knowledge
    is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended, &c.' (Mu. Up. I, 1,
    5) first denies of Brahman all the evil qualities connected with Prakriti,
    and then teaches that to it there belong eternity, all-pervadingness,
    subtilty, omnipresence, omniscience, imperishableness, creativeness with
    regard to all beings, and other auspicious qualities. Now we maintain
    that also the text 'True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman', does not
    prove a substance devoid of all difference, for the reason that the
    co-ordination of the terms of which it consists explains itself in so
    far only as denoting one thing distinguished by several attributes. For
    'co-ordination' (sâmânâdhikaranya, lit.'the abiding of several things in
    a common substrate') means the reference (of several terms) to one
    thing, there being a difference of reason for the application (of
    several terms to one thing). Now whether we take the several terms,'
    True','Knowledge','Infinite', in their primary sense, i. e. as denoting
    qualities, or as denoting modes of being opposed to whatever is contrary
    to those qualities; in either case we must needs admit a plurality of
    causes for the application of those several terms to one thing. There is
    however that difference between the two alternatives that in the former
    case the terms preserve their primary meaning, while in the latter case
    their denotative power depends on so-called 'implication' (lakshan&#226.
    Nor can it be said that the opposition in nature to non-knowledge,
    &c.(which is the purport of the terms on the hypothesis of lakshan&#226,
    constitutes nothing more than the essential nature (of one
    non-differenced substance; the three terms thus having one purport
    only); for as such essential nature would be sufficiently apprehended
    through one term, the employment of further terms would be purposeless.
    This view would moreover be in conflict with co-ordination, as it would
    not allow of difference of motive for several terms applied to one
    thing. On the other hand it cannot be urged against the former
    alternative that the distinction of several attributes predicated of one
    thing implies a distinction in the thing to which the attributes belong,
    and that from this it follows that the several terms denote several
    things--a result which also could not be reconciled with
    'co-ordination'; for what 'co-ordination' aims at is just to convey the
    idea of one thing being qualified by several attributes. For the
    grammarians define 'coordination' as the application, to one thing, of
    several words, for the application of each of which there is a different
    motive.

    You have further maintained the following view:--In the text 'one only
    without a second', the phrase 'without a second' negatives all duality
    on Brahman's part even in so far as qualities are concerned. We must
    therefore, according to the principle that all Sâkhâs convey the same
    doctrine, assume that all texts which speak of Brahman as cause, aim at
    setting forth an absolutely non-dual substance. Of Brahman thus
    indirectly defined as a cause, the text 'The True, knowledge, infinite
    is Brahman,' contains a direct definition; the Brahman here meant to be
    defined must thus be devoid of all qualities. Otherwise, moreover, the
    text would be in conflict with those other texts which declare Brahman
    to be without qualities and blemish.--But this also cannot be admitted.
    What the phrase 'without a second' really aims at intimating is that
    Brahman possesses manifold powers, and this it does by denying the
    existence of another ruling principle different from Brahman. That
    Brahman actually possesses manifold powers the text shows further on,
    'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' and 'it sent forth fire,'
    and so on.--But how are we to know that the mere phrase 'without a
    second' is meant to negative the existence of all other causes in
    general?--As follows, we reply. The clause 'Being only this was in the
    beginning, one only,' teaches that Brahman when about to create
    constitutes the substantial cause of the world. Here the idea of some
    further operative cause capable of giving rise to the effect naturally
    presents itself to the mind, and hence we understand that the added
    clause 'without a second' is meant to negative such an additional cause.
    If it were meant absolutely to deny all duality, it would deny also the
    eternity and other attributes of Brahman which you yourself assume. You
    in this case make just the wrong use of the principle of all the--Sâkhâs
    containing the same doctrine; what this principle demands is that the
    qualities attributed in all--Sâkhâs to Brahman as cause should be taken
    over into the passage under discussion also. The same consideration
    teaches us that also the text 'True, knowledge', &c., teaches Brahman to
    possess attributes; for this passage has to be interpreted in agreement
    with the texts referring to Brahman as a cause. Nor does this imply a
    conflict with the texts which declare Brahman to be without qualities;
    for those texts are meant to negative the evil qualities depending on
    Prakriti.--Those texts again which refer to mere knowledge declare
    indeed that knowledge is the essential nature of Brahman, but this does
    not mean that mere knowledge constitutes the fundamental reality. For
    knowledge constitutes the essential nature of a knowing subject only
    which is the substrate of knowledge, in the same way as the sun, lamps,
    and gems are the substrate of Light. That Brahman is a knowing subject
    all scriptural texts declare; cp. 'He who is all knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1,
    9); 'It thought' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); 'This divine being thought' (Ch. Up.
    VI, 3, 2); 'He thought, let me send forth the worlds' (Ait. Âr. II,4, 1,
    2); 'He who arranges the wishes--as eternal of those who are not eternal,
    as thinker of (other) thinkers, as one of many' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13);
    'There are two unborn ones--one who knows, one who does not know--one
    strong, the other weak' (Svet. Up. I, 9); 'Let us know Him, the highest
    of Lords, the great Lord, the highest deity of deities, the master of
    masters, the highest above the god, the lord of the world, the adorable
    one' (Svet. Up. VI, 7); 'Of him there is known no effect (body) or
    instrument; no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power is
    revealed as manifold, forming his essential nature, as knowledge,
    strength, and action' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'That is the Self, free from
    sin, ageless, deathless, griefless, free from hunger and thirst, whose
    wishes are true, whose purposes are true' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5). These
    and other texts declare that to Brahman, whose essential nature is
    knowledge, there belong many excellent qualities--among which that of
    being a knowing subject stands first, and that Brahman is free from all
    evil qualities. That the texts referring to Brahman as free from
    qualities, and those which speak of it as possessing qualities, have
    really one and the same object may be inferred from the last of the
    passages quoted above; the earlier part of which--'free from sin,' up to
    'free from thirst'--denies of Brahman all evil qualities, while its
    latter part--'whose wishes are true,' and so on--asserts of its certain
    excellent qualities. As thus there is no contradiction between the two
    classes of texts, there is no reason whatever to assume that either of
    them has for its object something that is false.--With regard to the
    concluding passage of the Taittiriya-text, 'from whence all speech,
    together with the mind, turns away, unable to reach it [FOOTNOTE 82:1],'
    we point out that with the passage 'From terror of it the wind blows,'
    there begins a declaration of the qualities of Brahman, and that the
    next section 'one hundred times that human bliss,' &c., makes statements
    as to the relative bliss enjoyed by the different classes of embodied
    souls; the concluding passage 'He who knows the bliss of that Brahman
    from whence all speech, together with the mind, turns away unable to
    reach it,' hence must be taken as proclaiming with emphasis the infinite
    nature of Brahman's auspicious qualities. Moreover, a clause in the
    chapter under discussion--viz. 'he obtains all desires, together with
    Brahman the all-wise' (II, 1)--which gives information as to the fruit
    of the knowledge of Brahman clearly declares the infinite nature of the
    qualities of the highest all-wise Brahman. The desires are the
    auspicious qualities of Brahman which are the objects of desire; the man
    who knows Brahman obtains, together with Brahman, all qualities of it.
    The expression 'together with' is meant to bring out the primary
    importance of the qualities; as also described in the so-called dahara-
    vidyâ (Ch. Up. VIII, 1). And that fruit and meditation are of the same
    character (i.e. that in meditations on Brahman its qualities are the
    chief matter of meditation, just as these qualities are the principal
    point in Brahman reached by the Devotee) is proved by the text
    'According to what a man's thought is in this world, so will he be after
    he has departed this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 1). If it be said that the
    passage 'By whom it is not thought by him it is thought', 'not
    understood by those who understand' (Ke. Up. II, 3), declares Brahman
    not to be an object of knowledge; we deny this, because were it so,
    certain other texts would not teach that final Release results from
    knowledge; cp. 'He who knows Brahman obtains the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II,
    1, 1); 'He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman.' And, moreover, the text
    'He who knows Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing; he
    who knows Brahman as existing, him we know himself as existing' (Taitt
    Up. II, 6, 1), makes the existence and non-existence of the Self
    dependent on the existence and non-existence of knowledge which has
    Brahman for its object. We thus conclude that all scriptural texts
    enjoin just the knowledge of Brahman for the sake of final Release. This
    knowledge is, as we already know, of the nature of meditation, and what
    is to be meditated on is Brahman as possessing qualities. (The text from
    the Ke. Up. then explains itself as follows:--) We are informed by the
    passage 'from whence speech together with mind turns away, being unable
    to reach it', that the infinite Brahman with its unlimited excellences
    cannot be defined either by mind or speech as being so or so much, and
    from this we conclude the Kena text to mean that Brahman is not thought
    and not understood by those who understand it to be of a definitely
    limited nature; Brahman in truth being unlimited. If the text did not
    mean this, it would be self-contradictory, parts of it saying that
    Brahman is _not_ thought and _not_ understood, and other parts, that it
    _is_ thought and _is_ understood.

    Now as regards the assertion that the text 'Thou mayest not see the seer
    of seeing; thou mayest not think the thinker of thinking' (Bri. Up. III,
    5, 2), denies the existence of a seeing and thinking subject different
    from mere seeing and thinking--This view is refuted by the following
    interpretation. The text addresses itself to a person who has formed the
    erroneous opinion that the quality of consciousness or knowledge does
    not constitute the essential nature of the knower, but belongs to it
    only as an adventitious attribute, and tells him 'Do not view or think
    the Self to be such, but consider the seeing and thinking Self to have
    seeing and thinking for its essential nature.'--Or else this text may
    mean that the embodied Self which is the seer of seeing and the thinker
    of thinking should be set aside, and that only the highest Self--the
    inner Self of all beings--should be meditated upon.--Otherwise a
    conflict would arise with texts declaring the knowership of the Self,
    such as 'whereby should he know the knower?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15).

    Your assertion that the text 'Bliss is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6, 1)
    proves pure Bliss to constitute the essential nature of Brahman is
    already disposed of by the refutation of the view that knowledge
    (consciousness) constitutes the essential nature of Brahman; Brahman
    being in reality the substrate only of knowledge. For by bliss we
    understand a pleasing state of consciousness. Such passages as
    'consciousness, bliss is Brahman,' therefore mean 'consciousness--the
    essential character of which is bliss--is Brahman.' On this identity of
    the two things there rests that homogeneous character of Brahman, so
    much insisted upon by yourself. And in the same way as numerous passages
    teach that Brahman, while having knowledge for its essential nature, is
    at the same time a knowing subject; so other passages, speaking of
    Brahman as something separate from mere bliss, show it to be not mere
    bliss but a subject enjoying bliss; cp. 'That is one bliss of Brahman'
    (Taitt. Up. II, 8, 4); 'he knowing the bliss of Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II,
    9, 1). To be a subject enjoying bliss is in fact the same as to be a
    conscious subject.

    We now turn to the numerous texts which, according to the view of our
    opponent, negative the existence of plurality.--'Where there is duality
    as it were' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'There is not any plurality here; from
    death to death goes he who sees here any plurality' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19);
    'But when for him the Self alone has become all, by what means, and whom,
    should he see?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15) &c.--But what all these texts deny
    is only plurality in so far as contradicting that unity of the world
    which depends on its being in its entirety an effect of Brahman, and
    having Brahman for its inward ruling principle and its true Self. They
    do not, on the other hand, deny that plurality on Brahman's part which
    depends on its intention to become manifold--a plurality proved by the
    text 'May I be many, may I grow forth' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3). Nor can our
    opponent urge against this that, owing to the denial of plurality
    contained in other passages this last text refers to something not real;
    for it is an altogether laughable assertion that Scripture should at
    first teach the doctrine, difficult to comprehend, that plurality as
    suggested by Perception and the other means of Knowledge belongs to
    Brahman also, and should afterwards negative this very doctrine!

    Nor is it true that the text 'If he makes but the smallest "antaram" (i.
    e. difference, interval, break) in it there is fear for him' (Taitt. Up.
    II, 7) implies that he who sees plurality within Brahman encounters fear.
    For the other text 'All this is Brahman; let a man meditate with calm
    mind on all this as beginning, ending and breathing in it, i.e. Brahman'
    (Ch. Up. III, 14, 1) teaches directly that reflection on the plurality
    of Brahman is the cause of peace of mind. For this passage declares that
    peace of mind is produced by a reflection on the entire world as
    springing from, abiding within, and being absorbed into Brahman, and
    thus having Brahman for its Self; and as thus the view of Brahman
    constituting the Self of the world with all its manifold distinctions of
    gods, men, animals, inanimate matter and so on, is said to be the cause
    of peace of mind, and, consequently, of absence of fear, that same view
    surely cannot be a _cause_ of fear!--But how then is it that the Taitt.
    text declares that 'there is fear for him'?--That text, we reply,
    declares in its earlier part that rest in Brahman is the cause of
    fearlessness ('when he finds freedom from fear, rest, in that which is
    invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported; then he has obtained
    fearlessness'); its latter part therefore means that fear takes place
    when there is an interval, a break, in this resting in Brahman. As the
    great Rishi says 'When Vâsudeva is not meditated on for an hour or even
    a moment only; that is loss, that is great calamity, that is error, that
    is change.'

    The Sûtra III, 2, ii does not, as our opponent alleges, refer to a
    Brahman free from all difference, but to Brahman as possessing
    attributes--as we shall show in its place. And the Sûtra IV, 2, 3
    declares that the things seen in dreams are mere 'Mâyâ' because they
    differ in character from the things perceived in the waking state; from
    which it follows that the latter things are real.

    [FOOTNOTE 82:1. Which passage appears to refer to a nirguna brahman,
    whence it might be inferred that the connected initial passage--'Satyam
    jñanam,' &c.--has a similar purport.]

  8. #8

    Re: Vedanta Sutra - read this translation

    Nor do Smriti and Purâna teach such a doctrine.

    Nor is it true that also according to Smriti and Purânas only non-
    differenced consciousness is real and everything else unreal.--'He who
    knows me as unborn and without a beginning, the supreme Lord of the
    worlds' (Bha. Gî. X, 3); 'All beings abide in me, I abide not in them.
    Nay, the beings abide not in me--behold my lordly power. My Self
    bringing forth the beings supports them but does not abide in them' (Bha.
    Gî. IX, 4, 5); 'I am the origin and the dissolution of the entire world;
    higher than I there is nothing else: on me all this is strung as pearls
    on a thread' (Bha. Gî. VII, 6, 7); 'Pervading this entire Universe by a
    portion (of mine) I abide' (Bha. Gî. X, 42); 'But another, the highest
    Person, is called the highest Self who, pervading the three worlds
    supports them, the eternal Lord. Because I transcend the Perishable and
    am higher than the Imperishable even, I am among the people and in the
    Veda celebrated as the supreme Person' (Bha. Gî. XV, 17, 18).

    'He transcends the fundamental matter of all beings, its modifications,
    properties and imperfections; he transcends all investing (obscuring)
    influences, he who is the Self of all. Whatever (room) there is in the
    interstices of the world is filled by him; all auspicious qualities
    constitute his nature. The whole creation of beings is taken out of a
    small part of his power. Assuming at will whatever form he desires he
    bestows benefits on the whole world effected by him. Glory, strength,
    dominion, wisdom, energy, power and other attributes are collected in
    him, Supreme of the supreme in whom no troubles abide, ruler over high
    and low, lord in collective and distributive form, non-manifest and
    manifest, universal lord, all-seeing, all-knowing, all-powerful, highest
    Lord. The knowledge by which that perfect, pure, highest, stainless
    homogeneous (Brahman) is known or perceived or comprehended--that is
    knowledge: all else is ignorance' (Vishnu Purâna VI, 5, 82-87).--'To
    that pure one of mighty power, the highest Brahman to which no term is
    applicable, the cause of all causes, the name "Bhagavat" is suitable.
    The letter bha implies both the cherisher and supporter; the letter ga
    the leader, mover and creator. The two syllables bhaga indicate the six
    attributes--dominion, strength, glory, splendour, wisdom, dispassion.
    That in him--the universal Self, the Self of the beings--all beings
    dwell and that he dwells in all, this is the meaning of the letter va.
    Wisdom, might, strength, dominion, glory, without any evil qualities,
    are all denoted by the word bhagavat. This great word bhagavat is the
    name of Vâsudeva who is the highest Brahman--and of no one else. This
    word which denotes persons worthy of reverence in general is used in its
    primary sense with reference to Vâsudeva only; in a derived sense with
    regard to other persons' (Vi. Pu. VI, 5, 72 ff.); 'Where all these
    powers abide, that is the form of him who is the universal form: that is
    the great form of Hari. That form produces in its sport forms endowed
    with all powers, whether of gods or men or animals. For the purpose of
    benefiting the worlds, not springing from work (karman) is this action
    of the unfathomable one; all-pervading, irresistible' (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 69-
    71); 'Him who is of this kind, stainless, eternal, all-pervading,
    imperishable, free from all evil, named Vishnu, the highest abode' (Vi.
    Pu. I, 22,53); 'He who is the highest of the high, the Person, the
    highest Self, founded on himself; who is devoid of all the
    distinguishing characteristics of colour, caste and the like; who is
    exempt from birth, change, increase, decay and death; of whom it can
    only be said that he ever is. He is everywhere and in him everything
    abides; hence he is called Vâsudeva by those who know. He is Brahman,
    eternal, supreme, imperishable, undecaying; of one essential nature and
    ever pure, as free from all defects. This whole world is Brahman,
    comprising within its nature the Evolved and the Unevolved; and also
    existing in the form of the Person and in that of time' (Vi. Pu. I, 2,
    10-14); 'The Prakriti about which I told and which is Evolved as well as
    Unevolved, and the Person--both these are merged in the highest Self.
    The highest Self is the support of all, the highest Lord; as Vishnu he
    is praised in the Vedas and the Vedânta-texts' (Vi. Pu. VI, 4, 38, 39).
    'Two forms are there of that Brahman, one material, the other immaterial.
    These two forms, perishable and imperishable, are within all things: the
    imperishable one is the highest Brahman, the perishable one this whole
    world. As the light of a fire burning in one place spreads all around,
    so the energy of the highest Brahman constitutes this entire world' (Vi.
    Pu. I, 23,53-55). 'The energy of Vishnu is the highest, that which is
    called the embodied soul is inferior; and there is another third energy
    called karman or Nescience, actuated by which the omnipresent energy of
    the embodied soul perpetually undergoes the afflictions of worldly
    existence. Obscured by Nescience the energy of the embodied soul is
    characterised in the different beings by different degrees of
    perfection' (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 61-63).

    These and other texts teach that the highest Brahman is essentially free
    from all imperfection whatsoever, comprises within itself all auspicious
    qualities, and finds its pastime in originating, preserving, reabsorbing,
    pervading, and ruling the universe; that the entire complex of
    intelligent and non-intelligent beings (souls and matter) in all their
    different estates is real, and constitutes the form, i.e. the body of
    the highest Brahman, as appears from those passages which co-ordinate it
    with Brahman by means of terms such as sarîra (body), rûpa (form), tanu
    (body), amsa (part), sakti (power), vibhûti (manifestation of power),
    and so on;--that the souls which are a manifestation of Brahman's power
    exist in their own essential nature, and also, through their connexion
    with matter, in the form of embodied souls (kshetrajña);--and that the
    embodied souls, being engrossed by Nescience in the form of good and
    evil works, do not recognise their essential nature, which is knowledge,
    but view themselves as having the character of material things.--The
    outcome of all this is that we have to cognise Brahman as carrying
    plurality within itself, and the world, which is the manifestation of
    his power, as something real.

    When now the text, in the sloka 'where all difference has vanished' (Vi.
    Pu. VI, 7, 53), declares that the Self, although connected with the
    different effects of Prakriti, such as divine, human bodies, and so on,
    yet is essentially free from all such distinctions, and therefore not
    the object of the words denoting those different classes of beings, but
    to be defined as mere knowledge and Being; to be known by the Self and
    not to be reached by the mind of the practitioner of Yoga (yogayuj);
    this must in no way be understood as denying the reality of the world.--
    But how is this known?--As follows, we reply. The chapter of the Purâna
    in which that sloka occurs at first declares concentration (Yoga) to be
    the remedy of all the afflictions of the Samsâra; thereupon explains the
    different stages of Yoga up to the so-called pratyâhâra (complete
    restraining of the senses from receiving external impressions); then, in
    order to teach the attainment of the 'perfect object' (subhâsraya)
    required for dhâranâ, declares that the highest Brahman, i. e. Vishnu,
    possesses two forms, called powers (sakti), viz. a denned one (mûrta)
    and an undefined one (amûrta); and then teaches that a portion of the
    'defined' form, viz. the embodied soul (kshetrajña), which is
    distinguished by its connexion with matter and involved in Nescience--
    that is termed 'action,' and constitutes a third power--is not perfect.
    The chapter further teaches that a portion of the undefined form which
    is free from Nescience called action, separated from all matter, and
    possessing the character of pure knowledge, is also not the 'perfect
    object,' since it is destitute of essential purity; and, finally,
    declares that the 'perfect object' is to be found in that defined form
    which is special to Bhagavat, and which is the abode of the three powers,
    viz. that non-defined form which is the highest power, that non-defined
    form which is termed embodied soul, and constitutes the secondary
    (apara) power, and Nescience in the form of work--which is called the
    third power, and is the cause of the Self, which is of the essence of
    the highest power, passing into the state of embodied soul. This defined
    form (which is the 'perfect object') is proved by certain Vedânta-texts,
    such as 'that great person of sun-like lustre' (Svet. Up. III, 8). We
    hence must take the sloka, 'in which all differences vanish,' &c., to
    mean that the pure Self (the Self in so far as knowledge only) is not
    capable of constituting the 'perfect object.' Analogously two other
    passages declare 'Because this cannot be reflected upon by the beginner
    in Yoga, the second (form) of Vishnu is to be meditated upon by Yogins-
    the highest abode.' 'That in which all these powers have their abode,
    that is the other great form of Hari, different from the (material)
    Visva form.'

    In an analogous manner, Parâsara declares that Brahmâ, Katurmukha,
    Sanaka, and similar mighty beings which dwell within this world, cannot
    constitute the 'perfect object' because they are involved in Nescience;
    after that goes on to say that the beings found in the Samsâra are in
    the same condition--for they are essentially devoid of purity since they
    reach their true nature, only later on, when through Yoga knowledge has
    arisen in them--; and finally teaches that the essential individual
    nature of the highest Brahman, i.e. Vishnu, constitutes the 'perfect
    object.' 'From Brahmâ down to a blade of grass, all living beings that
    dwell within this world are in the power of the Samsâra due to works,
    and hence no profit can be derived by the devout from making them
    objects of their meditation. They are all implicated in Nescience, and
    stand within the sphere of the Samsâra; knowledge arises in them only
    later on, and they are thus of no use in meditation. Their knowledge
    does not belong to them by essential nature, for it comes to them
    through something else. Therefore the stainless Brahman which possesses
    essential knowledge,' &c. &c.--All this proves that the passage 'in
    which all difference vanishes' does not mean to deny the reality of the
    world.

  9. #9

    Re: Vedanta Sutra - read this translation

    Nor, again, does the passage 'that which has knowledge for its essential
    nature' (Vi. Pu. 1,2,6) imply that the whole complex of things different
    from knowledge is false; for it declares only that the appearance of the
    Self--the essential nature of which is knowledge--as gods, men, and so
    on, is erroneous. A declaration that the appearance of mother o' pearl
    as silver is founded on error surely does not imply that all the silver
    in the world is unreal!--But if, on the ground of an insight into the
    oneness of Brahman and the world--as expressed in texts where the two
    appear in co-ordination--a text declares that it is an error to view
    Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, under the form of material
    things, this after all implies that the whole aggregate of things is
    false!--By no means, we rejoin. As our sástra distinctly teaches that
    the highest Brahman, i. e. Vishnu, is free from all imperfections
    whatsoever, comprises within himself all auspicious qualities, and
    reveals his power in mighty manifestations, the view of the world's
    reality cannot possibly be erroneous. That information as to the oneness
    of two things by means of co-ordination does not allow of sublation (of
    either of the two), and is non-contradictory, we shall prove further on.
    Hence also the sloka last referred to does not sublate the reality of
    the world.

    'That from whence these beings are born, by which, when born, they live,
    into which they enter when they die, endeavour to know that; that is
    Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 1). From this scriptural text we ascertain
    that Brahman is the cause of the origination, and so on, of the world.
    After this we learn from a Purâna text ('He should make the Veda grow by
    means of Itihâsa and Purâna; the Veda fears that a man of little reading
    may do it harm') that the Veda should be made to grow by Itihâsa and
    Purâna. By this 'making to grow' we have to understand the elucidation
    of the sense of the Vedic texts studied by means of other texts,
    promulgated by men who had mastered the entire Veda and its contents,
    and by the strength of their devotion had gained full intuition of Vedic
    truth. Such 'making to grow' must needs be undertaken, since the purport
    of the entire Veda with all its Sâkhâs cannot be fathomed by one who has
    studied a small part only, and since without knowing that purport we
    cannot arrive at any certitude.

    The Vishnu Purâna relates how Maitreya, wishing to have his knowledge of
    Vedic matters strengthened by the holy Parâsara, who through the favour
    of Pulastya and Vasishtha had obtained an insight into the true nature
    of the highest divinity, began to question Parâsara, 'I am desirous to
    hear from thee how this world originated, and how it will again
    originate in future, and of what it consists, and whence proceed animate
    and inanimate things; how and into what it has been resolved, and into
    what it will in future be resolved?' &c. (Vi. Pu. I, 1). The questions
    asked refer to the essential nature of Brahman, the different modes of
    the manifestation of its power, and the different results of
    propitiating it. Among the questions belonging to the first category,
    the question 'whence proceed animate and inanimate things?' relates to
    the efficient and the material cause of the world, and hence the clause
    'of what the world consists' is to be taken as implying a question as to
    what constitutes the Self of this world, which is the object of creation,
    sustentation, and dissolution. The reply to this question is given in
    the words 'and the world is He.' Now the identity expressed by this
    clause is founded thereon that he (i.e. Brahman or Vishnu) pervades the
    world as its Self in the character of its inward Ruler; and is not
    founded on unity of substance of the pervading principle and the world
    pervaded. The phrase 'consists of' (-maya) does not refer to an effect
    (so that the question asked would be as to the causal substance of which
    this world is an effect), for a separate question on this point would be
    needless. Nor does the--maya express, as it sometimes does-e.g. in the
    case of prana-maya [FOOTNOTE 92:1], the own sense of the word to which it
    is attached; for in that case the form of the reply 'and the world is
    He' (which implies a distinction between the world and Vishnu) would be
    inappropriate; the reply would in that case rather be 'Vishnu only.'
    What 'maya' actually denotes here is abundance, prevailingness, in
    agreement with Pânini, V, 4, 21, and the meaning is that Brahman
    prevails in the world in so far as the entire world constitutes its body.
    The co-ordination of the two words 'the world' and 'He' thus rests on
    that relation between the two, owing to which the world is the body of
    Brahman, and Brahman the Self of the world. If, on the other hand, we
    maintained that the sâstra aims only at inculcating the doctrine of one
    substance free from all difference, there would be no sense in all those
    questions and answers, and no sense in an entire nastra devoted to the
    explanation of that one thing. In that case there would be room for one
    question only, viz. 'what is the substrate of the erroneous imagination
    of a world?' and for one answer to this question, viz. 'pure
    consciousness devoid of all distinction!'--And if the co-ordination
    expressed in the clause 'and the world is he' was meant to set forth the
    absolute oneness of the world and Brahman, then it could not be held
    that Brahman possesses all kinds of auspicious qualities, and is opposed
    to all evil; Brahman would rather become the abode of all that is impure.
    All this confirms the conclusion that the co-ordination expressed in
    that clause is to be understood as directly teaching the relation
    between a Self and its body.--The sloka, 'From Vishnu the world has
    sprung: in him he exists: he is the cause of the subsistence and
    dissolution of this world: and the world is he' (Vi. Pu. I, 1, 35),
    states succinctly what a subsequent passage--beginning with 'the highest
    of the high' (Vi. Pu. I, 2, 10)--sets forth in detail. Now there the
    sloka,'to the unchangeable one' (I, 2, 1), renders homage to the holy
    Vishnu, who is the highest Brahman in so far as abiding within his own
    nature, and then the text proceeds to glorify him in his threefold form
    as Hiranyagarbha, Hari, and Sankara, as Pradhâna, Time, and as the
    totality of embodied souls in their combined and distributed form. Here
    the sloka, 'Him whose essential nature is knowledge' (I, 2, 6),
    describes the aspect of the highest Self in so far as abiding in the
    state of discrete embodied souls; the passage cannot therefore be
    understood as referring to a substance free from all difference. If the
    sâstra aimed at teaching that the erroneous conception of a manifold
    world has for its substrate a Brahman consisting of non-differenced
    intelligence, there would be room neither for the objection raised in I,
    3, I ('How can we attribute agency creative and otherwise to Brahman
    which is without qualities, unlimited, pure, stainless?') nor for the
    refutation of that objection, 'Because the powers of all things are the
    objects of (true) knowledge excluding all (bad) reasoning, therefore
    there belong to Brahman also such essential powers as the power of
    creating, preserving, and so on, the world; just as heat essentially
    belongs to fire [FOOTNOTE 94:1].' In that case the objection would rather
    be made in the following form: 'How can Brahman, which is without
    qualities, be the agent in the creation, preservation, and so on, of the
    world?' and the answer would be, 'Creation by Brahman is not something
    real, but something erroneously imagined.'--The purport of the objection
    as it stands in the text is as follows: 'We observe that action creative
    and otherwise belongs to beings endowed with qualities such as goodness,
    and so on, not perfect, and subject to the influence of karman; how then
    can agency creative, and so on, be attributed to Brahman which is devoid
    of qualities, perfect, not under the influence of karman, and incapable
    of any connexion with action?' And the reply is, 'There is nothing
    unreasonable in holding that Brahman as being of the nature described
    above, and different in kind from all things perceived, should possess
    manifold powers; just as fire, which is different in kind from water and
    all other material substances, possesses the quality of heat and other
    qualities.' The slokas also, which begin with the words 'Thou alone art
    real' (Vi. Pu. I, 4, 38 ff.), do not assert that the whole world is
    unreal, but only that, as Brahman is the Self of the world, the latter
    viewed apart from Brahman is not real. This the text proceeds to confirm,
    'thy greatness it is by which all movable and immovable things are
    pervaded.' This means--because all things movable and immovable are
    pervaded by thee, therefore all this world has thee for its Self, and
    hence 'there is none other than thee' and thus thou being the Self of
    all art alone real. Such being the doctrine intended to be set forth,
    the text rightly says, 'this all-pervasiveness of thine is thy
    greatness'; otherwise it would have to say, 'it is thy error.' Were this
    latter view intended, words such as 'Lord of the world,' 'thou,' &c.,
    could not, moreover, be taken in their direct sense, and there would
    arise a contradiction with the subject-matter of the entire chapter, viz.
    the praise of the Holy one who in the form of a mighty boar had uplifted
    in play the entire earth.--Because this entire world is thy form in so
    far as it is pervaded as its Self by thee whose true nature is knowledge;
    therefore those who do not possess that devotion which enables men to
    view thee as the Self of all, erroneously view this world as consisting
    only of gods, men, and other beings; this is the purport of the next
    sloka, 'this which is seen.'--And it is an error not only to view the
    world which has its real Self in thee as consisting of gods, men, and so
    on, but also to consider the Selfs whose true nature is knowledge as
    being of the nature of material beings such as gods, men, and the like;
    this is the meaning of the next sloka, 'this world whose true nature is
    knowledge.'--Those wise men, on the other hand, who have an insight into
    the essentially intelligent Self, and whose minds are cleared by
    devotion--the means of apprehending the Holy one as the universal Self--,
    they view this entire world with all its manifold bodies--the effects of
    primeval matter--as thy body--a body the Self of which is constituted by
    knowledge abiding apart from its world-body; this is the meaning of the
    following sloka: 'But those who possess knowledge,' &c.--If the
    different slokas were not interpreted in this way, they would be mere
    unmeaning reiterations; their constitutive words could not be taken in
    their primary sense; and we should come into conflict with the sense of
    the passages, the subject-matter of the chapter, and the purport of the
    entire sâstra. The passage, further, 'Of that Self although it exists in
    one's own and in other bodies, the knowledge is of one kind' (Vi. Pu. II,
    14, 31 ff.), refers to that view of duality according to which the
    different Selfs--although equal in so far as they are all of the essence
    of knowledge--are constituted into separate beings, gods, men, &c., by
    their connexion with different portions of matter all of which are
    modifications of primary matter, and declares that view to be false. But
    this does not imply a denial of the duality which holds good between
    matter on the one hand and Self on the other: what the passage means is
    that the Self which dwells in the different material bodies of gods, men,
    and so on, is of one and the same kind. So the Holy one himself has said,
    'In the dog and the low man eating dog's flesh the wise see the same';
    'Brahman, without any imperfection, is the same' (Bha. Gî. V, 18, 19).
    And, moreover, the clause 'Of the Self although existing in one's own
    and in other bodies' directly declares that a thing different from the
    body is distributed among one's own and other bodies.

    Nor does the passage 'If there is some other (para) different (anya)
    from me,' &c. (Vi. Pu. II, 13, 86) intimate the oneness of the Self; for
    in that case the two words 'para' and 'anya' would express one meaning
    only (viz. 'other' in the sense of 'distinct from'). The word 'para'
    there denotes a Self distinct from that of one's own Self, and the word
    'anya' is introduced to negative a character different from that of pure
    intelligence: the sense of the passage thus is 'If there is some Self
    distinct from mine, and of a character different from mine which is pure
    knowledge, then it can be said that I am of such a character and he of a
    different character'; but this is not the case, because all Selfs are
    equal in as far as their nature consists of pure knowledge.--Also the
    sloka beginning 'Owing to the difference of the holes of the flute' (Vi.
    Pu. II, 14, 32) only declares that the inequality of the different Selfs
    is owing not to their essential nature, but to their dwelling in
    different material bodies; and does not teach the oneness of all Selfs.
    The different portions of air, again, passing through the different
    holes of the flute--to which the many Selfs are compared--are not said
    to be one but only to be equal in character; they are one in character
    in so far as all of them are of the nature of air, while the different
    names of the successive notes of the musical scale are applied to them
    because they pass out by the different holes of the instrument. For an
    analogous reason the several Selfs are denominated by different names,
    viz. gods and so on. Those material things also which are parts of the
    substance fire, or water, or earth, are one in so far only as they
    consist of one kind of substance; but are not absolutely one; those
    different portions of air, therefore, which constitute the notes of the
    scale are likewise not absolutely one. Where the Purâna further says 'He
    (or "that") I am and thou art He (or "that"); all this universe that has
    Self for its true nature is He (or "that"); abandon the error of
    distinction' (Vi. Pu. II, 16, 23); the word 'that' refers to the
    intelligent character mentioned previously which is common to all Selfs,
    and the co-ordination stated in the two clauses therefore intimates that
    intelligence is the character of the beings denoted 'I' and 'Thou';
    'abandon therefore,' the text goes on to say, 'the illusion that the
    difference of outward form, divine and so on, causes a corresponding
    difference in the Selfs.' If this explanation were not accepted (but
    absolute non-difference insisted upon) there would be no room for the
    references to difference which the passages quoted manifestly contain.

    Accordingly the text goes on to say that the king acted on the
    instruction he had received, 'he abandoned the view of difference,
    having recognised the Real.'--But on what ground do we arrive at this
    decision (viz. that the passage under discussion is not meant to teach
    absolute non-duality)?--On the ground, we reply, that the proper topic
    of the whole section is to teach the distinction of the Self and the
    body--for this is evident from what is said in an early part of the
    section, 'as the body of man, characterised by hands, feet, and the like,'
    &c. (Vi. Pu. II, 13, 85).--For analogous reasons the sloka 'When that
    knowledge which gives rise to distinction' &c. (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 94)
    teaches neither the essential unity of all Selfs nor the oneness of the
    individual Self and the highest Self. And that the embodied soul and the
    highest Self should be essentially one, is no more possible than that
    the body and the Self should be one. In agreement herewith Scripture
    says, 'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of
    them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Mu. Up.
    III, 1, 1). 'There are two drinking their reward in the world of their
    own works, entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those
    who know Brahman call them shade and light,' &c. (Ka. Up. I, 3, 1). And
    in this sâstra also (i.e. the Vishnu Purâna) there are passages of
    analogous import; cp. the stanzas quoted above, 'He transcends the
    causal matter, all effects, all imperfections such as the gunas' &c.

    The Sûtras also maintain the same doctrine, cp. I, 1, 17; I, 2, 21; II,
    1, 22; and others. They therein follow Scripture, which in several
    places refers to the highest and the individual soul as standing over
    against each other, cp. e.g. 'He who dwells in the Self and within the
    Self, whom the Self does not know, whose body the Self is, who rules the
    Self from within' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Embraced by the intelligent
    Self (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 21); 'Mounted by the intelligent Self (IV, 3, 35).
    Nor can the individual Self become one with the highest Self by freeing
    itself from Nescience, with the help of the means of final Release; for
    that which admits of being the abode of Nescience can never become quite
    incapable of it. So the Purâna says, 'It is false to maintain that the
    individual Self and the highest Self enter into real union; for one
    substance cannot pass over into the nature of another substance.'
    Accordingly the Bhagavad Gîtâ declares that the released soul attains
    only the same attributes as the highest Self. 'Abiding by this knowledge,
    they, attaining to an equality of attributes with me, do neither come
    forth at the time of creation, nor are troubled at the time of general
    destruction' (XIV, 2). Similarly our Purâna says, 'That Brahman leads
    him who meditates on it, and who is capable of change, towards its own
    being (âtmabhâva), in the same way as the magnet attracts the iron' (Vi.
    Pu. VI, 7, 30). Here the phrase 'leads him towards his own being' means
    'imparts to him a nature like his own' (not 'completely identifies him
    with itself'); for the attracted body does not become essentially one
    with the body attracting.

    The same view will be set forth by the Sûtrakâra in IV, 4, 17; 21, and I,
    3, 2. The Vritti also says (with reference to Sû. IV, 4, 17) 'with the
    exception of the business of the world (the individual soul in the state
    of release) is equal (to the highest Self) through light'; and the
    author of the Dramidabhâshya says, 'Owing to its equality (sâyujya) with
    the divinity the disembodied soul effects all things, like the divinity.'
    The following scriptural texts establish the same view, 'Those who
    depart from hence, after having known the Self and those true desires,
    for them there is freedom in all the worlds' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 6); 'He
    who knows Brahman reaches the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'He obtains
    all desires together with the intelligent Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1);
    'Having reached the Self which consists of bliss, he wanders about in
    these worlds having as much food and assuming as many forms as he likes'
    (Taitt. Up. III, 10, 5); 'There he moves about' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3);
    'For he is flavour; for only after having perceived a flavour can any
    one perceive pleasure' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); 'As the flowing rivers go to
    their setting in the sea, losing name and form; thus he who knows, freed
    from name and form, goes to the divine Person who is higher than the
    high' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8); 'He who knows, shaking off good and evil,
    reaches the highest oneness, free from stain' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3).

    The objects of meditation in all the vidyâs which refer to the highest
    Brahman, are Brahman viewed as having qualities, and the fruit of all
    those meditations. For this reason the author of the Sûtras declares
    that there is option among the different vidyâs--cp. Ve. Sû. III, 3, II;
    III., 3, 59. In the same way the Vâkyakâra teaches that the qualified
    Brahman only is the object of meditation, and that there is option of
    vidyâs; where he says '(Brahman) connected (with qualities), since the
    meditation refers to its qualities.' The same view is expressed by the
    Bhâshyakâra in the passage beginning 'Although he who bases himself on
    the knowledge of Being.'--Texts such as 'He knows Brahman, he becomes
    Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9) have the same purport, for they must be
    taken in connexion with the other texts (referring to the fate of him
    who knows) such as 'Freed from name and form he goes to the divine
    Person who is higher than the high'; 'Free from stain he reaches the
    highest oneness' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8; III, 1,3); 'Having approached the
    highest light he manifests himself in his own shape' (Kh. Up. VIII, 3,
    4). Of him who has freed himself from his ordinary name and form, and
    all the distinctions founded thereon, and has assumed the uniform
    character of intelligence, it may be said that he is of the character of
    Brahman.--Our Purâna also propounds the same view. The sloka (VI, 7, 91),
    'Knowledge is the means to obtain what is to be obtained, viz. the
    highest Brahman: the Self is to be obtained, freed from all kinds of
    imagination,' states that that Self which through meditation on Brahman,
    is freed from all imagination so as to be like Brahman, is the object to
    be attained. (The three forms of imagination to be got rid of are so-
    called karma-bhâvanâ, brahma-bhâvanâ and a combination of the two. See
    Vi. Pu. VI, 7.) The text then goes on, 'The embodied Self is the user of
    the instrument, knowledge is its instrument; having accomplished Release--
    whereby his object is attained--he may leave off.' This means that the
    Devotee is to practise meditation on the highest Brahman until it has
    accomplished its end, viz. the attainment of the Self free from all
    imagination.--The text continues, 'Having attained the being of its
    being, then he is non-different from the highest Self; his difference is
    founded on Nescience only.' This sloka describes the state of the
    released soul. 'Its being' is the being, viz. the character or nature,
    of Brahman; but this does not mean absolute oneness of nature; because
    in this latter case the second 'being' would be out of place and the
    sloka would contradict what had been said before. The meaning is: when
    the soul has attained the nature of Brahman, i.e. when it has freed
    itself from all false imagination, then it is non-different from the
    highest Self. This non-difference is due to the soul, as well as the
    highest Self, having the essential nature of uniform intelligence. The
    difference of the soul--presenting itself as the soul of a god, a man,
    &c.--from the highest Self is not due to its essential nature, but rests
    on the basis of Nescience in the form of work: when through meditation
    on Brahman this basis is destroyed, the difference due to it comes to an
    end, and the soul no longer differs from the highest Self. So another
    text says, 'The difference of things of one nature is due to the
    investing agency of outward works; when the difference of gods, men,
    &c., is destroyed, it has no longer any investing power' (Vi. Pu. II,
    14, 33).--The text then adds a further explanation, 'when the knowledge
    which gives rise to manifold difference is completely destroyed, who
    then will produce difference that has no real existence?' The manifold
    difference is the distinction of gods, men, animals, and inanimate
    things: compare the saying of Saunaka:'this fourfold distinction is
    founded on false knowledge.' The Self has knowledge for its essential
    nature; when Nescience called work--which is the cause of the manifold
    distinctions of gods, men, &c.--has been completely destroyed through
    meditation on the highest Brahman, who then will bring about the
    distinction of gods, & c., from the highest Self--a distinction which in
    the absence of a cause cannot truly exist.--That Nescience is called
    karman (work) is stated in the same chapter of the Purâna (st.
    61--avidyâ karmasamjña).

  10. #10

    Re: Vedanta Sutra - read this translation

    The passage in the Bhagavad Gîtâ, 'Know me to be the kshetrajña' (XIII,
    2), teaches the oneness of all in so far as the highest Self is the
    inward ruler of all; taken in any other sense it would be in conflict
    with other texts, such as 'All creatures are the Perishable, the
    unchanging soul is the Imperishable; but another is the highest Person'
    (Bha. Gî. XV, 16). In other places the Divine one declares that as
    inward Ruler he is the Self of all: 'The Lord dwells in the heart of all
    creatures' (XVIII, 61), and 'I dwell within the heart of all' (XV, 15).
    and 'I am the Self which has its abode within all creatures' (X, 20).
    The term 'creature' in these passages denotes the entire aggregate of
    body, &c., up to the Self.--Because he is the Self of all, the text
    expressly denies that among all the things constituting his body there
    is any one separate from him,'There is not anything which is without me'
    (X, 39). The place where this text occurs is the winding up of a
    glorification of the Divine one, and the text has to be understood
    accordingly. The passage immediately following is 'Whatever being there
    is, powerful, beautiful, or glorious, even that know thou to have sprung
    from a portion of my glory; pervading this entire Universe by a portion
    of mine I do abide' (X, 41; 42).

    All this clearly proves that the authoritative books do _not_ teach the
    doctrine of one non-differenced substance; that they do _not_ teach that
    the universe of things is false; and that they do _not_ deny the
    essential distinction of intelligent beings, non-intelligent things, and
    the Lord.

    [FOOTNOTE 92:1. 'Prânamaya' is explained as meaning 'prana' only.]

    [FOOTNOTE 94:1. The sense in which this sloka has to be taken is 'As in
    ordinary life we ascribe to certain things (e.g. gems, mantras) certain
    special powers because otherwise the effects they produce could not be
    accounted for; so to Brahman also,' &c.]

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