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Thread: Advaita Siddhi

  1. #11
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    Re: Advaita Siddhi

    This prompts an objection: If the negation of the world is vyAvahArika, then this negation should itself be sublated. Upon sublation of the negation of the world, the world's reality, not unreality, would be affirmed. That means the advaitin is proving something other than what he intended, a defect called arthAntara.

    To this objection, MadhusUdana replies that it is not the case that world's reality would be affirmed upon sublation of the negation of the world. In the example of a dream, an object in the dream may be negated later in the same dream. And the negation itself is negated upon waking up. This does not result in the dream-object becoming real in the waking state!
    So what implies the reality of a thing is NOT the mere fact that its negation is sublatable, but the fact that such negation is of a lesser order of reality than that of the thing itself.

    For example, if we see a rope in semi-darkness and imagine it to be a snake,we may say "There is no rope." Here we are negating the rope. But this negation is illusory (prAtibhAsika). Upon removal of the illusion, we realize that the thing seen before is indeed a rope. So the rope, which was negated before, is being affirmed (as vyAvahArika). What has happened here is that the reality order of the negation is prAtibhAsika which is less than the reality order of the rope, vyAvahArika.

    It is only in such cases that the reality of the thing negated may be affirmed, not otherwise. In the case under discussion, the negation of the world being described and the world are of the same order of reality. So the mere sublatability of the negation cannot make the world real.

    BRIEF RECAP: MadhusUdana started by accepting the definition of unreality (of the world) as "pratipanna-upAdhau traikAlikanishhedha-pratiyogitvam.h" (please see advaita-siddhi 10).Unreality is that which is subject to absolute negation (negation for all times) in the substratum where it is cognized. So the opponent asks: Now, how do you classify this absolute negation that you speak of? Is this absolute negation pAramArthika, vyAvahArika or prAtibhAsika?

    We have seen how MadhusUdana has answered this question by pointing out that the absolute negation can be treated as pAramArthika, identical with Brahman. In doing so, there is no harm done to the non-duality principle. Also, the opponent cannot insist on the rule that a negation and its counter-positive (pratiyogin) have to have the same order of reality (sama-sattAka), because an exception that breaks the rule is readily found in the case of an illusion such as the silver-in-nacre illusion. The illusory silver is prAtibhAsika but its negation is pAramArthika if the substratum of illusion is treated as Brahman Itself or at least vyAvahArika, if the substratum is taken to be nacre.
    That which is without letters (parts) is the Fourth, beyond apprehension through ordinary means, the cessation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious and the non-dual. Thus Om is certainly the Self. He who knows thus enters the Self by the Self.

  2. #12
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    Re: Advaita Siddhi

    BRIEF RECAP: MadhusUdana started by accepting the definition of unreality (of the world) as "pratipanna-upAdhau traikAlikanishhedha- pratiyogitvam.h".

    Unreality is that which is subject to absolute negation (negation for all times) in the substratum where it is cognized.

    Objection: The world is not a chimera

    Now the opponent tries to show that the unreality of the world defined by the advaitin actually amounts to admitting that the world is a chimera (a vastu-shUnya) or a purely fictitious thing that is only imagined, but without a real basis. Is the world according to advaita a vastu-shUnya, a mere nothing or is it something with a real basis? Let us find out.

    advaita-siddhi text:
    nanu evamatyanta-asattvApAtaH pratipannopAdhau traikAlikanishhedha- pratiyogitvaM hyanyatra-asattvena saMpratipannasya ghaTAdeH sarvatra traikAlikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM paryavasitam.h ; anyathA teshhAM anyatra sattvApAtAt.h, nahi teshhAmanyatra sattA saMbhavatIti tvadukteshcha ; tathAcha kathamasadvailaxaNyam.h, nahi shashashR^iNgAderito .anyad- asattvam.h|

    Translation: (Objection): Being the counter-positive (pratiyogin) of the absolute negation (for all three periods of time) in the very substratum where it (the thing that is unreal, mithyA) is cognized has thus been defined as being unreal (mithyA) (by you) and it is absolutely unreal (completely nonexistent). From this, it follows that things of the world, such as a pot, which are not existent in substrata other than where they are cognized, are eternally negated in all substrata! Otherwise, they would have to be existent in substrata other than where they are cognized. (But) you have said that they do not exist in other substrata. Accordingly, how is it that they (things of the world) are different from nonexistence (asat)? This (the world) is certainly not different from purely nonexistent things such as a hare's horn, (according to your view).

    The gist of the argument here is that if the unreality of a thing consists in its being negated absolutely (for all periods of time) in the very substratum where it was cognized, then it must be admitted that such a thing is negated absolutely everywhere. Otherwise, it would mean the thing appears somewhere other than the substratum where it was cognized. But this is denied by the advaitin. Therefore, the unreal thing stands negated everywhere and for all times. So it is no different than a chimera which is also absolutely absent everywhere.

    advaita-siddhi text:
    nacha nirupAkhyatvameva tadasattvam.h; nirupAkhyatvapadenaiva khyAyamAnatvAt.h |
    nApyapratIyamAnatvamasattvam.h; asato .apratI- tau asadvailaxaNyaGYAnasya-asatpratItinirAsasya-asatpadaprayogasya chAyogAt.h |
    nacha-aparoxatayA apratIyamAnatvaM tat.h; nitya- atIndriyeshhvativyApteH

    Translation: (Objection continued: Nonexistence (asat) cannot be undefinable (nirupAkhya). Because, (the moment you say it is nirupAkhya), it becomes defined by the (very) word nirupAkhya! Nor can you say asat is what cannot be cognized. If asat were not cognized then there would be no cognition of anything that is different from asat. And there would be no sublation of cognition of a non-existent thing. And it would not be possible to use the word "asat". Further, you cannot define asat as that which is not cognized as being directly perceived because this would make the definition too wide (having the defect of ativyApti) due to the inclusion of eternal but supra-sensuous things.

    Madhusudana says:

    iti chenmaivam.h |

    If this is what you say, we say no (ie. your objection is not justified).
    Last edited by atanu; 03 April 2010 at 12:06 PM.
    That which is without letters (parts) is the Fourth, beyond apprehension through ordinary means, the cessation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious and the non-dual. Thus Om is certainly the Self. He who knows thus enters the Self by the Self.

  3. #13
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    Re: Advaita Siddhi

    advaita is not shUnyavAda

    advaita-siddhi text: (MadhusUdana)
    sarvatra traikAlikanishhedhapratiyogitvaM yadyapi tuchchha- anirvAchyayoH sAdhAraNam.h tathApi kvachidapyupAdhau sattvena pratItyanarhatvaM atyantAsattvam.h tachcha shuktirUpye prapaJNche cha bAdhAtpUrvaM nAstyeveti na tuchchhatvApattiH |
    na cha bAdhAt.h pUrvaM shuktirUpyaM prapaJNcho vA sattvena na pratIyate |

    etadeva sadarthakenopAdhipadena sUchitam.h |
    shUnyavAdibhiH sadadhiShThAnabhrama-anaN^gIkAreNa kvachidapy- upAdhau sattvena pratItyanarhatvarUpa-asadvailaxaNyasya shuktirUpye prapaJNche cha-anaN^gIkArAt.h |


    Translation: Although being the counter-positive of absolute negation (negation for all times) is common between the absolutely nonexistent and the undefinable (anirvachanIya), still, what is absolute nonexistence is **incapability**of**being**cognized**as** existing**in**any**substratum. And that (incapability) is NOT either in the silver-in-nacre (the illusory silver) or in the world **before**sublation. Thus, they (the illusory silver or the world) cannot be absolutely nonexistent (as, for example, a hare's horn). For, it is not the case that the silver-in-nacre or the world is not cognized as existing (as identified with Existence).
    This is precisely what is indicated by the word "upAdhi" that has Reality (sat) for its denotation (meaning).

    The shUnyavAdins (Buddhists) do not agree that the basis of (any) illusion is the Reality (sat). So they do not agree that the silver-in-nacre and the world are capable of being cognized as existing in some substratum, which is what makes them (illusory entities such as the silver-in-nacre and the world) different from the absolutely non-existent.
    Last edited by atanu; 03 April 2010 at 12:06 PM.
    That which is without letters (parts) is the Fourth, beyond apprehension through ordinary means, the cessation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious and the non-dual. Thus Om is certainly the Self. He who knows thus enters the Self by the Self.

  4. #14
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    Re: Advaita Siddhi

    The Third Definition of Unreality
    The third definition
    Having seen the first two definitions of mithyAtva (unreality), we will now study the third definition of mithyAtva that MadhusUdana deals with in the advaita-siddhi.

    Recall that the first definition of mithyAtva said that what is mithyA is characterized by "sadasadanadhikaraNatva", not being the substratum of either sat (Existence) or asat (nonexistence).

    And the second definition of mithyAtva said that what is mithyA (unreal) is characterized as being the counterpositive (pratiyogin) of an absolute negation in the very substratum where it (the thing that is mithyA) is cognized.

    The third definition that is now taken up in the advaita-siddhi simply says:

    GYAnanivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam.h |
    Alternatively, unreality is the property of being sublated by knowledge or cognition.

    This is an extremely pithy definition which must only be understood by careful analysis, not just brushed off as something obvious and trivial. The definition comes from the VivaraNAchArya, PrakAshAtman.

    First of all, let us do a simple analysis. We know that GYAna and aGYAna are like light and darkness. aGYAna, ignorance is sublated, negated by GYAna. Further, what is aGYAna, ignorance, is also unreal. If I am ignorant of something, I have erroneous information about that thing. This erroneous information does not represent any true state of affairs. So it is false. When do I eliminate the erroneous information? Only when I have the correct information, GYAna of the thing in question.

    Next, let us try to analyse the definition in a deeper and technical manner using nyAya. In any philosophical debate, any definitions that you make must be unambiguous and must withstand close scrutiny by the opponent. This is especially true in the advaita-siddhi context because the opponents here happen to be led by the mAdhva exponent VyAsa-tIrtha, who in the words of contemporary mAdhva scholar BNK Sharma (if my memory serves me right), subjects all theories to "microscopic scrutiny." We'd better make sure the definition is "air-tight" with no holes whatsoever.

    A significant difficulty with the definition, when we take a closer look, is this. The definition should apply to ordinary cases of illusion such as the silver-in-nacre and snake-on-rope as well as the quite extra-ordinary and fantastic illusion of the world on Brahman. The cognition of the rope as rope (or nacre as nacre) ends the ordinary illusion. Now what ends the illusion of the world? Surely, Brahman cannot be cognized in the same objective way that a piece of rope or nacre is cognized. The cognition of an object, such as a rope, of the form of "this is a rope" is fundamentally different from the GYAna of Brahman or BrahmasAxAtkAra, the direct realization of Brahman.

    What is it that is so fundamentally different between the two types of GYAna? Let us investigate further with the help of nyAya, more specifially the tarka-saMgraha of aNNaMbhaTTa.

    tatra niShprakArakaM GYAnaM nirvikalpakam.h|
    saprakArakaM GYAna savikalpakam.h |

    An indeterminate cognition (nirvikalpaka-GYAna) is one with no attribute (prakAra). A determinate cognition (savikalpaka-GYAna) is one with an attribute (prakAra).

    Any savikalpaka-GYAna can be broken down into three components, as per nyAya. Or more precisely, any savikalpaka-GYAna has an objective content (viShaya) consisting of 1) a visheShya or qualificand, 2) a visheShaNa (also prakAra), ie. a qualifier, and 3) a saMsarga or relation between the qualificand and qualifier. This also corresponds roughly to the subject-predicate form of a sentence in natural language. Consider the Sanskrit sentence "nIlo ghaTaH" (the pot is blue.) Here the visheShya is "pot", the visheShaNa is "nIla" and the relation between them is that of inherence of blue color in the pot. Such a relation is called "samavAya" in nyAya.

    In the language of navya-nyAya, the cognition corresponding to the sentence (nIlo ghaTaH) is analysed as follows:

    nIlatva-avachchhinnaprakAratAnirUpita-ghaTatva-avachchhinna- visheShyatAnirUpita-samavAyatva-avachchhinna-saMsargatA- nirUpita-viShayitAshAli-GYAnam.h |

    An awkward English translation is: It is a cognition whose subjectness is described by the qualific and ness delimited by potness, described by the qualifierness delimited by blue-ness, and described by the relation-ness delimited by inherence-ness. The naiyAyikas say that in a nirvikalpaka cognition, it is not possible to identify the visheShya, the visheShaNa, and the saMsarga, even though they may be present.

    This is where the advaitins part company with the naiyAyikas. The advaitins hold that in a nirvikalpaka-GYAna, only Existence (Brahman) is presented. There is no visheShya, no visheShaNa, no saMsarga.

    Finally now, we can be satisified that the definition of mithyAtva as "GYAnanivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam.h" applies to ordinary illusions as well as the world-on-Brahman illusion. When an ordinary illusion such as a snake-on-rope is negated in an ordinary fashion, the cognition which negates the illusion is the savikalpaka type, "this is a rope." When the world-illusion is negated by Brahma-GYAna, this GYAna is of the nirvikalpaka type. In the next part, we will see how the opponent launches a new line of attack on the definition.
    Last edited by atanu; 03 April 2010 at 12:17 PM.
    That which is without letters (parts) is the Fourth, beyond apprehension through ordinary means, the cessation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious and the non-dual. Thus Om is certainly the Self. He who knows thus enters the Self by the Self.

  5. #15
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    Re: Advaita Siddhi

    Objections to the Third Definition

    In this part, we will study the objections raised by the opponent against the definition of mithyAtva as being sublated by GYAna.

    advaita-siddhi text
    GYAnanivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam.h |
    nanu - uttaraGYAnanivartye pUrvaGYAne ativyAptiH, mudgarapAtAdinivartye cha ghaTAdAv-avyAptiH, GYAnatvena GYAnanivartyatva-vivaxAyAmapyayaM doShaH, adhiShThAna- sAXAtkAratvena nivartye shuktirajatAdau cha GYAnatvena GYAnanivartyatva-abhAvAt.h sAdhyavikalatA, GYAnatvavyApya- dharmeNa GYAnanivartyatva-vivaxAyAM GYAnatvavyApyena smR^iti- tvena GYAnanivartye saMskAre ativyAptiH –

    Translation ----------- Definition: Alternatively, unreality is the property of being sublated by knowledge or cognition.

    Objection by oppponent: This definition of mithyAtva, ie. GYAnanivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam, is too wide (ativyApti) in the case of a cognition's being sublated by a subsequent cognition.
    And in the case of a pot's being destroyed by stroke of a hammer, the definition would be too narrow (avyApti).

    If the intention is that unreality consists in being sublated by cognition as cognition, (GYAnatvena GYAnanivartyatva) even then there is the same defect, ie. of being too narrow.

    Further, in the case of the illusion of silver in nacre, the sublation of the illusory silver is due to the direct realization of the substratum, ie. the nacre, (adhiShThAna-sAxAtkAra), and there is no sublation due to cognition as cognition, which leads to the defect of sAdhyavikalatA, ie. the definition is defective.

    If the definition means that unreality is what is sublated by a property concomitant with the property of being a cognition (GYAnatva-vyApya-dharma), in the case of a memory (smR^iti) that sublates a mental impression (saMskAra), the definition is too wide.
    As BrahmAnanda's GauDabrahmAnandI clarifies, this third definition is based on the shruti itself.

    'vidvAnnAmarUpAdvimukta' ityAdishrutyarthe vivadamAnaM prati sAdhyAntaramAha - GYAnanivartyatvaM veti |

    A different sAdhya (thing to be proved, ie definition) is (now) stated, as per the interpretation of the shruti "The knower of Brahman is free from names and forms."

    Let us now examine the objection of the opponent point bypoint.

    1) Definition is too wide
    First of all, he says that the definition has the defect of being too wide (ativyApti). How? In the case of a cognition being replaced by a subsequent cognition, the first cognition though "out of focus" right now is certainly not false. Suppose, I see the sun rising in the East and next I see a cow. At that moment when I am cognizing the cow, the cognition of the sun is in the background or out of focus, so to speak, being displaced by the cognition of the cow. Does it mean my cognition of the sun is false. No. The definition is too wide because it seems to apply to this case where a cognition is displaced or sublated in some sense by a subsequent cognition.

    2) Definition is too narrow
    Next, the opponent says that in the case of a pot being destroyed by stroke of a hammer, thereby driving the pot into nonexistence, the definition is too narrow. The advaitin claims that things such as a pot are sublated by GYAna alone. Clearly, the opponent says, the pot is not existent any more after being destroyed. So it should be sublated. But what destroys or sublates the pot is not GYAna, but something as simple as the stroke of a hammer!

    3) What if GYAnanivartyatva means GYAnatvena GYananivartyatva
    The opponent now seems to anticipate a move by the advaitin to silence the charge of ativyApti. Suppose the advaitin says "By GYAnanivartyatva, we really mean that the cognition (GYAna) that sublates what is mithyA has to be considered as a cognition acting as a cognition, not anything else.

    4) The charge of avyApti still holds
    The opponent now says that although the advaitin has freed his definition from this defect of being too wide, the other defect of being too narrow still applies.
    The GYAnatvena GYAnanivartya- tva clarification still does nothing to remove the defect in the case of the stroke of the hammer which destroys the pot.

    5) The definition is flawed
    Further, there is another problem with the "GYAnatvena GYAnanivartyatva" definition. In the case of the illusion of silver in nacre (shukti-rajata), the cause of the destruction of the illusion is not just any cognition of nacre, rather it is the cognition of that nacre which is the substratum of the illusory silver. While a person mistakes a rope for a snake in the dark, it is not sufficient to end his illusion by holding some other rope in front of him! What does end the illusion is his perceiving the rope which he mistook for a snake. In such cases of illusion, the destruction of the illusion is not by a cognition acting in its capacity as a cognition. However, the illusory thing is admitted to be mithyA. So even though mithyAtva is present, GYAnanivartyatva is absent in the illusory thing. This gives rise to the defect of sAdhya-vikalatA, ie. the definition is defective because we see that mithyAtva is really not defined as GYAnanivartyatva but as "adhiShThAna-sAxAtkAratva", which makes the advaitin's attempt to prove the GYAnanivartyatva version futile!

    6) What if a sub-class of GYAna is intended
    The opponent now anticipates another move by the advaitin. What if GYAnanivartyatva is taken to mean "GYAnatvavyApya- dharmeNa GYAnanivartyatva", ie. what is illusory is sublated by a sub-class of GYAna, not just GYAna in general.

    7) Still the definition is too wide
    There is still a problem with the definition, says the opponent. Consider smR^iti or memory which is a sub-class of GYAna, ie. a specific kind of GYAna. The tarkasaMgraha of annaMbhaTTa defines smR^iti as "saMskAramAtrajanyaM GYAnaM smR^itiH", memory or recollection is cognition caused by reminiscent impression alone. So it is clear that recollections are a sub-class or a specific kind of cognition. The opponent, however, contends that whenever a recollection occurs, the corresponding reminiscent impression (saMskAra) that caused it gets destroyed. In this case, the saMskAra, though destroyed by the smR^iti is not considered false. So, once again, we have a case where the definition of mithyAtva is too wide.

    This last objection by the opponent is quite shaky at the outset. First of all, even the naiyAyikas are divided regarding whether the saMskAra gets destroyed by the smR^iti that it gives rise to. The older nyAya-vaisheShika school holds that the saMskAra gets destroyed by the smR^iti but logicians of the newer navya-nyAya school tend to side with the advaitins in rejecting this theory. The VedAnta-paribhAShA says: na hi smR^iteH saMskAranAshakatva niyamaH, smR^itidhArA-darshanAt.h - there is no rule that recollection destroys saMskAra because a flow of recollection is observed. Therefore, the very premise of the objection is questionable. But still, the opponent might persist in challenging the advaita position that smR^iti does not destroy saMskAra. As we shall see, MadhusUdana's reply makes the last objection irrelevant even if this advaita position regarding smR^iti is notadmitted.

    MadhusUdana begins his reply thus (as usual): iti chenna | If this is what you contend, we say no (your objections are not justified).
    Last edited by atanu; 03 April 2010 at 12:17 PM.
    That which is without letters (parts) is the Fourth, beyond apprehension through ordinary means, the cessation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious and the non-dual. Thus Om is certainly the Self. He who knows thus enters the Self by the Self.

  6. #16
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    Re: Advaita Siddhi

    MadhusUdana's reply to the Objections to the Third Definition of Unreality

    || shrI gaNeshAya namaH ||

    Invocation (First verse of the laghuchandrikA - GauDabrahmAnandI)

    namo navaghanashyAmakAmakAmitadehine |
    kamalAkAmasaudAmakaNakAmukagehine ||

    Obeisance to the householder (Krishna) whose appearance
    resembles a fresh dark cloud, whose (beautiful) form
    is desired even by kAmadeva (manmatha even though he is
    extremely handsome himself), who desires the particles of flattened
    rice brought by sudAmA the brAhmaNa, despite the fact that
    He is the desirer(Lord) of the Goddess of Wealth, kamalA (lakShmI).

    nyAyAmR^ita:
    shuktiGYAnena rUpyaM naShTamiti kadApyananubhavena tatrApyavyApteshcha |
    etAvantaM kAlaM shuktyaGYAnamAsId-bhrama AsIdityanubhavena shuktivatsatye
    aGYAnabhramAdau shuktiGYAnena tadaGYAnaM naShTamityanubhavena GYAnatvena
    GYAnanivartyatvasya sattvenAtivyApteshcha |


    VyAsa tIrtha says that there is never an experience of the destruction of the silver due to the knowledge of nacre. No person ever feels, "The silver (of the illusion) was destroyed by the knowledge of the nacre" but only feels "all this while, there was an ignorance of nacre and there was an illusion." Therefore the definition is too narrow (avyApti) and does not cover the case of the silver-on-nacre erroneous cognition (bhrama). In other words, the knowledge of nacre does not remove the false silver.

    However, there is the experience that the bhrama and ignorance (ajnAna) get destroyed by the knowledge of the nacre (shuktijnAna). But the ajnAna that has the a real substratum (nacre) is itself real. And this real ajnAna is removed by jnAna. This makes the definition suffer from the defect of being too wide (ativyApti), because a real thing (the ignorance, aGYAna) is removed by knowledge (in its capacity as knowledge) and not an unreal thing.

    Summarizing his arguments, VyAsa tIrtha says:

    vijnAnanAshyatA mithyArUpyAdau nAnubhUyate |
    kiMtvadhiShThAnavat-satye tadajnAne .nubhUyate ||


    The destruction of an unreal thing due to knowledge, such as the silver (in nacre), is not experienced. But, (the destruction) of the real ignorance of the substratum (the nacre) is experienced.

    What VyAsatIrtha means here is that there are two defects in the definition of mithyAtva –

    jnananivartyatvaM vA mithyAtvam.h.

    1)Although the silver that is perceived in error instead of the nacre, is mithyA (false), nobody experiences the destruction (sublation) of this silver as being due to knowledge. Therefore the definition is too narrow, since it does not apply to a thing that is mithyA.
    2) The ignorance of the nacre which is the substratum (of the false silver) is real. However, it is this ignorance that gets destroyed by the knowledge of the substratum, nacre. Therefore the definition is too wide, because it applies to a thing, the ignorance, that is not mithyA.

    It is necessary to understand the mAdhva explanation of error or ayathArthajnAna. This is stated in the prAmANapaddhati of JayatIrtha:
    asadeva rajataM pratyabhAdityuttarakAlInAnubhavAchchhuktireva-
    atyanta-asadrajatAtmanA pratibhAtItyAchAryAH |

    (With respect to the error of silver in nacre), the experience "The false silver appeared (before me)" occurs after (the bhrama is over). It follows that the nacre itself appears as the absolutely false silver. This is what the AchArya (madhvAchArya) says.

    This is based on Madhva's theory of error that is put forth, for example in the ViShNu-tattva-vinirNaya:

    na cha shukteH rajatatvaM sadasadvilakShaNam.h |
    asadeva rajataM pratyabhAdityanubhavAt.h ||


    The (erroneous) silverness of the nacre is not different from reality and unreality (as claimed by advaitins) because of the experience "the false silver appeared" (after the illusion has ended).

    Janardana's TippaNi on the pramANa-paddhati makes it clear that the mAdhva position is different from the naiyAyika position.

    nanu evaM naiyAyikamatAnna visheSha AchAryamatasya | tairapi
    shuktAvavidyamAna-deshAntarIya-rajatAtmatayA shukterbhAnAN^gI-
    kArAdityata Aha "atyanteti" | kutrApi kadA .pyavidyamAnetyarthaH |

    To meet the objection: "This position of MadhvAchArya does not differ from the naiyAyika position. Even they (naiyAyikas) accept that the silver that does not occur in the nacre occurs elsewhere and it appears (erroneously) in the nacre.",(the AchArya) uses the term "atyanta". (This means) that which does not occur anywhere, at any time. The mAdhvas, however, ignore what happens *during* the illusion phase, since their emphasis is on the reflection *after* the illusion is over (bhramottarakAle shuktiviShyakaparAmarshAt.h).

    For example, there is no explanation of how or why there is an activity (pravR^itti) based on the illusory object, silver. A person may, upon mistaking the nacre to be silver, proceed to pick it up. mAnameyodaya, a treatise on the pUrva mImAMsA, remarks, in different context, how this pravR^itti is to be considered.

    "tattat.h GYAnasya svaviShaya eva pravR^ittikaratvaniyamAdrajataGYAnasyApi
    idaMviShayatvAbhAve tatra pravR^ittirna sidhyet.h"

    Any cognition can only lead to activity based on its own object or content (of the cognition). Therefore, if the object (content) of the cognition of silver is not the "this" (the object lying before the person under illusion), then there would be no activity in this case.

    The mAdhva theory of error, referred to as abhinava-anyathAkhyAti by ShrI rAghavendrasvAmI in his TippaNi on the pramANa-paddhati, differs from those of other realist systems such as nyAya and vishiShTa-advaita.

    nyAya puts forth what is termed anyathAkhyAti. What is seen is silver that is present elsewhere but is (erroneously) presented here in place of the nacre. "sarvathA .asatve pratItyanupapattestatraiva sattve vA bAdhAnupapattiriti" - If the silver were completely false, it would not have appeared (before the observer). If it were present right in the place where it was perceived, there would be no sublation (of such a perception).

    The maNikaNa, a summary of the tattvachintAmaNi of Gangesha, says - "rajatatvena purovartinaM jAnAmi ityanuvyavasAyAd-eva anyathAkhyAtisiddhiH" - by the realization "I cognize what is before me as silver", the cognition of one thing as another (anyathAkhyAti) is established.

    advaita-siddhi text:
    GYAna-prayukta-avasthitisAmAnya-viraha-pratiyogitvaM hi GYAnanivartyatvam.h |
    avasthitishcha dvedhA; svarUpeNa kAraNAtmanA cha ; satkAryavAdAbhyapugamAt.h |
    tathAcha mudgarapAtena ghaTasya svarUpeNa-avasthitivirahe .api kAraNAtmanA avasthitivirahAbhAvAt.h brahmaGYAnaprayukta eva sa iti nAtItaghaTAdAv-avyAptiH|

    Translation
    GYAnanivartyatva or the property of being sublated by GYAna is exactly the property of being the counterpositive of a negation of existence in general (all forms) such that the GYAna of the substratum is concomitant with the negation. And existence of a thing can be of two kinds - 1) in its own form and 2) in the form of the cause, since this follows from the theory of satkAryavAda that holds that the effect exists in the cause (in a causal form). Accordingly, even though there is a negation of the existence of a pot in its form due to stroke of a hammer, there is no negation of existence of the pot in its causal form (after being destroyed by a hammer, because the pot still exists in its causal form as clay from which it was originally produced). The (negation of existence in its causal form) is only by the knowledge of Brahman. Thus, the definition of mithyAtva is not too narrow (as you contend), in the case of things of the past such as a pot (after being struck by a hammer).

    It is important to understand the term "GYAnaprayukta" as used by MadhusUdana here. BrahmAnanda defines it in his GauDabrahmAnandI as "adhiShThAnatatvaGYAnavyApaka", ie. such that the cognition of the substratum is concomitant with it (ie. the negation of existence in all forms). This is equivalent to saying: Wherever there is the cognition of the substratum there is the negation of the thing that is mithyA (superimposed on the substratum) in all its forms.

    avasthitisAmAnyaviraha - BrahmAnanda defines it as "svasvIyasaMskAra-anyatarasya-abhAva, the negation of (a thing) as itself and its saMskAra, reminiscent impression. In the case of aGYAna, ignorance, MadhusUdana's expression "svarUpeNa kAraNAtmanA cha" means "aGYAna-tatprayuktasvarUpeNa sthUla-avasthAkAraNIbhUta-saMskArarupeNa cha", aGYAna and the reminiscent impression that is the cause of its gross form and that the aGYAna is concomitant with.

    MadhusUdana continues:

    ataevottaraGYAnanivartye pUrvaGYAne na siddhasAdhanam.h; navA
    viyadAdau brahmaGYAnanAshyatve .api tadvadeva mithyAtva-asiddhyA-
    arthAntaram.h; uttaraGYAnena lInasya pUrvaGYAnasya svakAraNAtmanA-
    avasthAnAdavasthitisAmAnyaviraha-anupapatteH |

    Translation:
    For this reason, there can be no charge of a redundant proof in the case of the sublation of a previous cognition by a subsequent cognition.Nor can there be a charge of proving something other than what was intended to be proved in the case of space, etc., that are destroyed by knowledge of Brahman, on the grounds that their unreality is not established in the same way (that the unreality of a previous cognition is not established).

    This follows from the fact that the previous cognition exists in its causal form and thus the negation of its existence in general cannot be established.In the case of a cognition being sublated by a subsequent cognition, the first cognition continues to exist in its causal state (as saMskAra or reminiscent impression in the mind). In the case of a things such as AkAsha,or anything in the world of duality, being destroyed by Brahman knowledge, there is total destruction of these things in their causal and own forms as well. It cannot be claimed that the unreality of these things is not established and that there is an error of proving something other than what was intended to be proved.


    Om Namah Shivaya
    Last edited by atanu; 03 April 2010 at 11:17 PM.
    That which is without letters (parts) is the Fourth, beyond apprehension through ordinary means, the cessation of the phenomenal world, the auspicious and the non-dual. Thus Om is certainly the Self. He who knows thus enters the Self by the Self.

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